Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 228 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1967). · Go Syfert
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Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 228 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1967). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2013–2018 · …a warrant of attorney is a contractual agreement between the parties and the parties are free to determine the manner in which the warrant may be exercised. ⚠ not in text Topic ↗
108 citation events (37 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dominic's Inc. v. Tony's Famous Tomato Pie Bar (pasuperct, 2019-07-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1969 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1969 1997 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dominic's Inc. v. Tony's Famous Tomato Pie Bar
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290, 291 , 228 A.2d 887, 888 (1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) K & S Joint Ventures v. OPC Mining Co.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
A party who enters into an agreement containing a warrant of attorney has granted the other contracting party the authority, upon the occurrence of a specified event, "to enter that which results ordinarily only after a trial of the issue between the parties, i.e., a judgment." Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290, 293 , 228 A.2d 887, 888 (1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ferrick v. Bianchini
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2013 · confidence medium
Relying upon Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290 , 228 A.2d 887, 889 (1967), Tenant alleges that, “once a judgment has been entered under a warrant of attorney, the authority to use the warrant vanishes and the warrant cannot again be exercised.” Landlord counters that subsequent cases have interpreted Scott Factors as prohibiting the use of a warrant of attorney to collect the same debt or portion of a debt that has already been confessed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TCPF LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. Skatell
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2009 · confidence medium
We note that the entry of a valid judgment by confession "carries with it the same legal consequences as any judgment of a court." Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290, 293 , 228 A.2d 887, 888 (1967). 4 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Deglau
3rd Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Bank v. Talacki, 657 A.2d 1285, 1291-92 (Pa. 1995); entry of judgment by means not in accord with provisions of a warrant of attorney, see, e.g., Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 228 A.2d 887, 888-89 (Pa. 1967); and warrants that are not in writing, or not signed directly by the person to be bound by them, see, e.g., Shidemantle v. Dyer, 218 A.2d 810, 811 (Pa. 1966). 28 The district court here articulated the proper standard for deciding a motion to strike, and stated baldly that "the Deglaus have not identified any `fatal defects or irregularities' on the face of the record." R.503a (Mem. at 9…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal Deposit Insurance v. Deglau
3rd Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Bank v. Talacki, 441 Pa.Super. 513 , 657 A.2d 1285, 1291-92 (1995); entry of judgment by means not in accord with provisions of a warrant of attorney, see, e.g., Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290 , 228 A.2d 887, 888-89 (1967); and warrants that are not in writing, or not signed directly by the person to be bound by them, see, e.g., Shidemantle v. Dyer, 421 Pa. 56 , 218 A.2d 810, 811 (1966).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) B. Lipsitz Co. v. Walker
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1987 · confidence medium
In the case at bar, upon the entry of the first judgment, even though such entry was not in accord with the provisions of the warrant of attorney, the warrant of attorney ceased to have vitality upon which to enter the second judgment and the court below should have stricken off the judgment. 425 Pa. at 292-94 , 228 A.2d at 888-89 (Citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Langman v. Metropolitan Acceptance Corp.
Pa. · 1983 · confidence medium
Kline v. Marianne Germantown Corp., 438 Pa. 41, 45 , 263 A.2d 362, 364 (1970); Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290, 292-293 , 228 A.2d 887, 888 (1967); Walter E.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Continental Bank v. Tuteur
Pa. · 1982 · confidence medium
In the case at bar, upon the entry of the first judgment, even though such entry was not in accord with the provisions of the warrant of attorney, the warrant of attorney ceased to have vitality upon which to enter the second judgment and the court below should have stricken off the judgment. 425 Pa. at 292-94 , 228 A.2d at 888-89 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Industrial Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Glossbrenner
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1982 · confidence medium
Unfortunately, it did not. *337 In view of the foregoing discussion, and mindful of the rule that “any doubt as to the validity of [confessed judgments] must be resolved against the party entering the judgments,” Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290, 293 , 228 A.2d 887, 888 (1967), we must conclude that the lower court erred in refusing to strike the judgment confessed against appellants. 4 Order reversed and judgment directed to be stricken from the record. 1 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Centennial Bank v. Germantown-Stevens Academy
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1980 · confidence medium
Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290, 293 , 228 A.2d 887, 888 (1967); Florida Crab House, Inc. v. Hake, 259 Pa.Super. 230, 232 , 393 A.2d 801, 803 (1978); Solebury National Bank of New Hope v. Cairns, supra, 252 Pa.Super. at 48 , 380 A.2d at 1275 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida Crab House, Inc. v. Hake
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1978 · confidence medium
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290, 292-293 , 228 A.2d 887, 888 (1967), stated: In Pennsylvania, we have long recognized and permitted the entry of a judgment by confession upon the authority of a warrant of attorney contained in an agreement between the parties.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter of Martin M. Decker and Kathleen H. Decker, Individually and Jointly, Debtors. Appeal of Leumi Financial Corporation
3rd Cir. · 1972 · confidence medium
Under Pennsylvania law “[s]ucli judgment when entered carries with it the same legal consequences as any judgment of a court.” Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290, 293 , 228 A.2d 887, 888 (1967). 3 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Citizens National Bank v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass'n
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1971 · confidence medium
While our courts will allow amendment of strictly formal defects, West Penn Sand & Gravel Co. v. Shippingsport Sand Co., 367 Pa. 218 , 80 A. 2d 84 (1951), “[t]he entry of a valid judgment can only be accomplished if such entry is accomplished in rigid adherence to the provisions of the warrant of attorney.” Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290, 293 , 228 A. 2d 887, 888 (1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lancaster Housing Authority v. Gardner
Pa. · 1969 · confidence medium
Judgment by confession is an extraordinary remedy, and the potential for abuse has made the courts strict in requiring all procedural rules to be followed without deviation. 3 Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartely, 425 Pa. 290, 292-93 , 228 A. 2d 887, 888 (1967).
discussed Cited "see" Lyndora Hotel v. Koch, H.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 228 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1967). “[A] warrant of attorney is a contractual agreement between the parties and the parties are free to determine the manner in which the warrant may be exercised.” Atlantic Nat.
discussed Cited "see" Neducsin, D. v. Caplan, S. (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290 , 228 A.2d 887 (1967). “[A] warrant of attorney is a contractual agreement between the parties and the parties are free to determine the manner in which the warrant may be exercised.” Atlantic Nat.
cited Cited "see" Ridesafely.com, Inc. v. Thiam, A.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
discussed Cited "see" Midwest Financial Acceptance Corp. v. Lopez (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290 , 228 A.2d 887 (1967). “[A] warrant of attorney is a contractual agreement between the parties and the parties are free to determine the manner in which the warrant may be exercised.” Atlantic Nat.
examined Cited "see" Atlantic National Trust, LLC v. Stivala Investments, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scott Factors, 228 A.2d at 888 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ridesafely.com, Inc. v. Thiam, A.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
Consequently, “the law jealously insists on proof that this helplessness and impoverishment was voluntarily accepted and consciously assumed." Id.; see also Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 228 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1967).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Germantown Manufacturing Co. v. Rawlinson (2×)
Pa. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290 , 228 A.2d 887 (1967).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Parliament Industries, Inc. v. William H. Vaughan & Co. (4×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1981 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290 , 228 A.2d 887 (1967); American Heating Co. v. Persell, 182 Pa.Super. 606 , 127 A.2d 764 (1956).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Scott Factors, Inc.
v.
Hartley, Appellant
Appeal, 106.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Apr 18, 1967.
228 A.2d 887
1967 Pa. LEXIS 682
Alan M. Bloch, with him Efron and Bloch, for appellant., David G. Senger, with him Jack I. Kaufman, for appellee.
Bell, Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts.
Cited by 44 opinions  |  Published

Opinion by

Mb. Justice Jones,

This appeal lies from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County refusing to strike off a judgment entered by confession.

On August 24, 1961, Scott Factors, Inc. (Factors), and Donald Hartley (Hartley) entered into a written factoring agreement providing for the purchase by the former and the sale by the latter of certain accounts receivable and a method for the payment for such accounts receivable. In that agreement was the following provision: “27. Should [Hartley] default in any of the terms, herein, [Hartley] hereby empowers any attorney of any court of record, at option of Factors, to appear for [Hartley] and confess judgment in the sum of $50,000.00 and assess damages for the then outstanding balance due Factors, together with costs of suit and attorney’s commission of fifteen percent (15%), without declaration of claim or averment of default having been filed, and this agreement or a copy hereof shall be sufficient warrant therefor.”

On November 27, 1961, a representative of Factors who was not an “attorney of any court of record” en[*292] tered a judgment by confession against Hartley under the warrant of authority authorizing a confession of judgment contained in the factoring agreement. (No. 999 September Term, 1961). This judgment was entered for $50,000.00 plus interest and attorney’s commission (15%). Hartley then petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County to strike off this judgment for two reasons: (a) an “attorney of a court of record” did not appear and confess judgment as required under the warrant of authority contained in the agreement and (b) the prothonotary lacked authority to enter such judgment. On November 27, 1965, the court struck off the judgment.

Factors, acting through an attorney of a court of record, on December 2, 1965, entered another judgment by confession against Hartley (No. 1396 September Term, 1965). In entering this judgment Factors again relied on the warrant of attorney contained in the factoring agreement and the judgment was entered on a copy of such warrant. Hartley then moved to strike off this new judgment for two reasons: (a) that the warrant of attorney contained in the factoring agreement had been exhausted by the entry of the first judgment; (b) the judgment was entered upon a copy, rather than the original, of the warrant of attorney. The court declined to strike off the new judgment and from its order this appeal was taken.

The issue is narrow: did the entry of the first judgment constitute such an exercise of the warrant of attorney so as to exhaust the warrant and preclude its use to enter a second judgment?

In Pennsylvania, we have long recognized and permitted the entry of a judgment by confession upon the authority of a warrant of attorney contained in an agreement between the parties. However, fully cognizant of the possibilities of abuse which might arise from the recognition of the right to enter such judg[*293] ments by confession, onr courts have been strict in passing upon tbe validity of judgments so entered. The entry of a valid judgment by confession can only be accomplished if such entry is accomplished in rigid adherence to the provisions of the warrant of attorney; otherwise, such judgment will be stricken. The determination of the validity of such judgments rests upon a strict construction of the language of the warrant of attorney and any doubt as to the validity of such judgments must be resolved against the party entering the judgments.

The warrant constitutes a grant of authority by one contracting party to the other, upon the happening of a certain event, i.e., a breach of the terms of the agreement wherein the warrant is contained, to enter that which results ordinarily only after a trial of the issue between the parties, i.e., a judgment. Such judgment when entered carries with it the same legal consequences as any judgment of a court. Not only must the given authority be exercised in the exact manner agreed upon between the parties but also the authority, once exercised, ceases to exist.

Under our case law, it is clear beyond question that, once a judgment has been entered under a warrant of attorney, the authority to use the warrant vanishes and the warrant cannot again be exercised. Upon the entry of a judgment by confession under a warrant of attorney, the warrant is exhausted. In Mars National Bank v. Hughes, 243 Pa. 223, 89 A. 1130 (1914), this Court said: “When the first judgment was entered pro confesso, the power of attorney was exhausted and the warrant became functus officio. After the entry of the first judgment, neither the court, the prothonotary, nor the attorney who confessed the judgment, had power to do any act which would have the effect of giving vitality to an exhausted power. This is a settled rule of law in Pennsylvania and has been recognized by our[*294] courts for a century.” (at p. 225). See also: Philadelphia v. Johnson, 208 Pa. 645, 57 A. 1114 (1904); Harr v. Furman, 346 Pa. 138, 29 A. 2d 527 (1943); American Heating Co. v. Persell, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 606, 127 A. 2d 764 (1956); Hogsett v. Lutrario, 140 Pa. Superior Ct. 419, 13 A. 2d 902 (1940); Shuchman on Pa. Judgment Notes, §7.3, p. 34.

In the case at bar, upon the entry of the first judgment, even though such entry was not in accord with the provisions of the warrant of attorney, the warrant of attorney ceased to have vitality upon which to enter the second judgment and the court below should have stricken off the judgment.

The court below, while acknowledging the general rule, relying on Seltzer v. Delfiner, 17 Pa. D. & C. 2d 185 (1958) sought to distinguish between a complete and an imperfect exercise of a warrant of attorney and held that the instant warrant of attorney had been imperfectly exercised when the first judgment was entered and had not been exhausted. In our opinion, Seltzer is neither apposite nor controlling. The distinction adopted by the court below would erode the general rule and would create an exception which would emasculate a rule which has proven salutary. The sense of the rule is that parties are required to live up to that upon which they have agreed.

Order reversed and judgment directed to be stricken from the record.