McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). · Go Syfert
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McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2006 · …an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. at p. 489 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …the jury is free to believe whomever they wish. at p. 488 ✓
51 citation events (43 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Matthew C. Foster v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (indctapp, 2017-11-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 43 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Matthew C. Foster v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kevin Thien v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ronnie M. Williams v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) William G. Culler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Alacia Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.S. v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The jury, acting as the trier-of-fact, is “‘free to believe whomever they wish.’” Klaff v. State, 884 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Derrick Anthony Duncan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses, Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 2002), as the jury, acting as the trier-of-fact, is “‘free to believe whomever they wish.’” Klaff v. State, 884 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). [8] “[A] conviction may be based purely on circumstantial evidence.” Hayes v. State, 876 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Moore v. State, 652 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A04-1505-CR-509…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Montrail Williams v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses, Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 2002), as the jury, acting as the trier-of-fact, is “‘free to believe whomever they wish.’” Klaff v. State, 884 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). [15] “[A] conviction may be based purely on circumstantial evidence.” Hayes v. State, 876 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)), trans. denied. “‘On appeal, the ci…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles Arnold v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses, Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 2002), as the jury, acting as the trier-of-fact, is “‘free to believe whomever they wish.’” Klaff v. State, 884 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). [10] “[A] conviction may be based purely on circumstantial evidence.” Hayes v. State, 876 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)), trans. denied. “‘On appeal, the ci…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter of the Involuntary Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.R., Minor Child and Her Father, J.R., J.R. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jason T. Myers v. Gary W. Myers
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); Riviera Plaza Investments, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 10 N.E.3d 541, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kelli Greene v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Craig Hatchett v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 3 There is no evidence in this case to suggest that Hatchett was accidentally in possession of crack cocaine.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jason G. Squier v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
The trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve witnesses, as it sees fit.’” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rio Michaels v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Charles Howlett v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Clifford Mosley v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jarod G. Allred v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 7 the pills he sold were Ritalin, not Lortab.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sylvester Smith v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Riviera Plaza Investments, LLC and Haresh Shah v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind.2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. ii.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Indiana Michigan Power Company and Steel Dynamics, Inc.
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied; Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 591 N.E.2d at 652 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dawn Jackson v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Brock Rodgers v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
However, despite Rodgers’s claim that Chapman’s testimony should not have been believed, it is well-settled that in a criminal proceeding, “‘[t]he jury is free to believe whomever they wish.’” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Michael v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (Ind. 1983)); see also Kocher v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1344 (Ind. 1982) (providing that when the 6 evidence is in conflict, the jury is free to believe whomever they wish); Hammond v. State, 594 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (providing that the trial court was not obligated to beli…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert v. Allen v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
However, contrary to Allen’s claim, it is well- settled that in a criminal proceeding, “‘[t]he jury is free to believe whomever they wish.’” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Michael v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (Ind. 1983)); see also Kocher v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1344, 1345 (Ind. 1982) (providing that when the evidence is in conflict, the jury is free to believe whomever they wish); Hammond v. State, 594 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (providing that the trial court was not obligated to believe Hammond’s testimony), trans. denied.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rondell Boyd v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schalk v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ind. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mishler v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Klaff v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
It is the function of the trier of fact to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses and as a result, the jury is “ ‘free to believe whomever they wish.’ ” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (quoting Michael v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (Ind.1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Deshazier v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
The statute cited by Deshazier “provides a defense for those unwittingly duped into possession of illegal [contraband] because such [contraband has] been planted on their person or hidden on their property without their knowledge.” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dylak v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
"An issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). 3 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Duren v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) O'NEAL v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See id.; McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (“The trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve witnesses, as it sees fit [citation omitted].”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Friedel
Ind. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
“An issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Randolph v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Elliott v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Intent involves a mental state, McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), the determination of which rests with the trier of fact.
cited Cited "see" A.S. and J.S. v. D.C. (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that a party cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal).
discussed Cited "see" Larry Hoover d/b/a Quality Electric, Inc. v. John Schuler (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally, McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (providing that the trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve witnesses as it sees fit).
cited Cited "see" Steve Allen Sherron v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that a party cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal).
discussed Cited "see" Lora (McIlwain) Marshall v. Gregory McIlwain (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally, McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (providing that the trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve witnesses as it sees fit). [25] With respect to the remaining loans, Husband does not challenge the assertion that he was leasing a Jeep through Chrysler Financial at the time of the parties’ marriage, that he had a small amount of credit card debt, and that he had not yet satisfied the debt relating to Wife’s engagement ring.
discussed Cited "see" Barbara Loomis v. James Loomis
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (providing that the trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve witnesses as it sees fit).
cited Cited "see" Bradley v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) ("The trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve witnesses, as it sees fit.").
discussed Cited "see" Love v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See O’Neal v. State, 716 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. “ ‘The trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve witnesses, as it sees fit.’ ” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (citation omitted).
cited Cited "see" Burton v. Estate of Davis
Ind. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). 5 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Carlton McCLENDON, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
02A03-9603-CR-104.
Indiana Court of Appeals.
Oct 15, 1996.
671 N.E.2d 486
1996 Ind. App. LEXIS 1365
1996 WL 589212
Steven J. Glaser, Fort Wayne, for Appellant., Pamela Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Andrew L. Hedges, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
Staton, Garrard, Robertson.
Cited by 44 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

STATON, Judge.

Carleton McClendon ("McClendon") was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine, a class D felony. [1] On appeal McClendon raises two issues, which we restate:

(1) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction; and
(2) Whether his conviction is against the weight of the evidence.

We affirm.

On March 3, 1995, at about 3:00 a.m., Fort Wayne police stopped the car in which McClendon was a passenger. The driver of the car was arrested for outstanding warrants, requiring police to tow the vehicle. Police asked McClendon to exit the vehicle so that it could be towed. When McClendon stepped out of the car he dropped a baggie of[*488] cocaine on the street. McClendon was subsequently arrested and convicted for possession of cocaine.

L.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

McClendon produced the driver of the car as a witness at trial, who testified that the cocaine McClendon dropped in the street actually belonged to the driver. The driver testified that when he saw police he handed the cocaine to McClendon and told McClen-don to get rid of it. According to the driver, McClendon only possessed the cocaine for about twenty minutes before dropping the cocaine on the street.

"Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or constructive." Hutcherson v. State, 178 Ind.App. 8, 381 N.E.2d 877, 879 (1978). "Actual possession means exactly what it implies, ie, actual physical control." Corrao v. State, 154 Ind. App. 525, 290 N.E.2d 484, 487 (1972). "Actu al possession is shown where there is a showing the accused has an intent and capability of maintaining dominion and control over the contraband item." Wilburn v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1098, 1101 (Ind.1982), reh. denied, (citations omitted). MeClendon does not deny he had actual physical possession of the cocaine. Instead McClendon contends that the testimony of his witness should have been interpreted by the jury to establish the defense that McClendon did not have time to terminate his possession. [2]

When reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind.1995), reh. denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be affirmed if evidence of probative value exists from which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

McClendon presented his defense theory, through his witness, for consideration by the jury. After having heard this defense evidence, the jury deliberated, weighed all the evidence, and convicted. It is the function of the trier of fact to "determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. The trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve witnesses, as it sees fit." Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied, cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1182, 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995) (citing Hall v. State, 634 N.E.2d 837 (Ind.Ct.App.1994)). "The jury is free to believe whomever they wish." - Michael v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (Ind.1983). See also Hammond v. State, 594 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied, ("'The trial court was not obligated to believe Hammond's testimony ..."). Mchendon "asks us to reweigh the evidence and reweigh the credibility of the witnesses, and this we will not do." Moore, supra, at 822.

The judicial restraint our standard of review imposes not withstanding, McClendon's argument fails on its merits. McClendon asserts that in order to protect a friend he accepted possession of the cocaine only for the purpose of concealing the cocaine from police. McClendon portrays himself as a good Samaritan who should not be punished for his kind deed. The law, however, criminalizes knowing possession. "True ownership," as perhaps evidenced by a deed of ownership or certificate of title, is not an element of the crime. Thus, a drug courier or drug dealer falls within the purvey of IC 35-48-4-6; it is no defense that they are delivering or selling drugs that "really" belong to someone else. Likewise, it is no defense for McClendon to assert that he had possession of the cocaine only to hide it from police and it was not "really" his cocaine. IC 35-41-2-1 does not provide a defense for those who knowingly possess illicit drugs in order to aid someone else's illegal drug sales or use. Rather, IC 35-41-2-1 provides a defense for those unwittingly duped into possession of illegal drugs because such drugs have been planted on their person or hidden on their property without their knowledge.[*489] McClendon's use of this defense, therefore, is inappropriate.

McClendon also argues for the first time on appeal that he was not aware that the substance in the baggie was cocaine, and that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to establish that his possession was knowing. An issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Lock v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (Ind.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 991, 112 S.Ct. 1686, 118 L.Ed.2d 400 (1992). This is especially true where it appears from the record that this issue was deliberately avoided at trial as a conscious trial tactic to prevent the prosecution from entering McClendon's prior conviction for possession of cocaine into evidence. Record, p. 121. This waiver not withstanding, McClendon's argument fails on its merits.

"Intent is a mental state and therefore a trier of fact may resort to reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine if the requisite intent exists." Hammond, supra, at 515. "The knowing possession of a drug concerns the defendant's mental state. Therefore, the trier of fact is entitled to make reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding cireum-stances." Id. See also Collins v. State, 549 N.E.2d 89 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), trams. denied. McClendon asks us once again to ignore the jury's sifting of evidence and determinations of fact. McClendon's "plea ... is merely an invitation for this court to engage in the forbidden reweighing of evidence." Woods v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). his we will not do.

IL.

Against the Weight of the Evidence

McClendon next contends that the verdict of guilty is against the weight of the evidence. We will disturb a judgment as being against the weight of the evidence only where all the evidence adduced at trial leads inalterably to but one conclusion, and the judgment below is contrary to that conch sion. Hughes v. State, 510 N.E.2d 741, 743-744 (Ind.Ct.App.1987). McClendon relies on the same argument advanced for a reversal due to insufficiency of the evidence to support his claim that the jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

The only evidence in the record is that McClendon had actual possession of the cocaine. McClendon's own witness testified that McClendon had possession of the cocaine for approximately twenty minutes, and the arresting officer testified that he saw McClendon drop a baggie of cocaine from his hand to the street. This uncontradicted evidence does not erode confidence in the jury verdict. Quite the opposite, all the evidence supports the conclusion that McClendon had possession of the cocaine.

Affirmed.

GARRARD and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.
1

. Inp.Copr § 35-48-4-6: "(a) A person who, without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of his professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses cocaine (pure or adulterated) or a narcotic drug (pure or adulterated) classified in schedule I or II commits possession of cocaine or a narcotic drug, a Class D felony ..."

2

. Inp.Cope § 35-41-21: "(b) If possession of property constitutes any part of the prohibited conduct, it is a defense that the person who possessed the property was not aware of his possession for a time sufficient for him to have terminated his possession."