Allen claim in Indiana

2020As part of Allen’s plea agreement, he agreed to consecutive sentences. [9] When determining the appropriateness of a sentence that deviates from an advisory sentence, we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that “makes it different from the typical offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

2020Mardis, 72 N.E.3d at 938 (providing that in challenging the State’s evidence proving his identity as the person who shot and killed the victim, Mardis “simply seeks to have this court reweigh [the witness’s] testimony and reassess his credibility, which we will not do.”). [14] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

2018See Garcia, 979 N.E.2d at 157 (noting that the court is required to withdraw the issue from the jury if the record is devoid of evidence on one or more elements of the offense. 2.

2017Discussion and Decision The dispositive' issue upon which we decide Allen’s challenge to his probation revocation is the issue of his waiver of the right to counsel, “Probation is a favor granted by. the State, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trams, denied.

2017When faced with a petition to revoke probation, a probationer is not entitled to the full panoply of rights he enjoyed prior to the conviction, Rosa v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2016Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1506-CR-601 | May 26, 2016 Page 6 of 10 unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

2014See Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 317-20 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an inmate’s 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim for a continuing denial of medical care accrued for limitations purposes on the last date officials refused to treat his condition or on the date the inmate left jail).

2013Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-7, a mistake of fact defense “is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.” Saunders v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; see also Nolan v. State, 863 N.E.2d 398, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [W]e have held that, “[i]n order for mistake of fact to be a valid defense, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the mistake must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake m

2013Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-7, a mistake of fact defense “is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.” Saunders v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; see also Nolan v. State, 863 N.E.2d 398, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [W]e have held that, “[i]n order for mistake of fact to be a valid defense, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the mistake must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake m

2013Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-7, a mistake of fact defense “is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.” Saunders v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; see also Nolan v. State, 863 N.E.2d 398, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [W]e have held that, “[i]n order for mistake of fact to be a valid defense, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the mistake must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake m

2013However, contrary to Allen’s claim, it is well- settled that in a criminal proceeding, “‘[t]he jury is free to believe whomever they wish.’” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Michael v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (Ind. 1983)); see also Kocher v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1344, 1345 (Ind. 1982) (providing that when the evidence is in conflict, the jury is free to believe whomever they wish); Hammond v. State, 594 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (providing that the trial court was not obligated to believe Hammond’s testimony), trans. denied.

2013However, contrary to Allen’s claim, it is well- settled that in a criminal proceeding, “‘[t]he jury is free to believe whomever they wish.’” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Michael v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (Ind. 1983)); see also Kocher v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1344, 1345 (Ind. 1982) (providing that when the evidence is in conflict, the jury is free to believe whomever they wish); Hammond v. State, 594 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (providing that the trial court was not obligated to believe Hammond’s testimony), trans. denied.

2013However, contrary to Allen’s claim, it is well- settled that in a criminal proceeding, “‘[t]he jury is free to believe whomever they wish.’” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Michael v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (Ind. 1983)); see also Kocher v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1344, 1345 (Ind. 1982) (providing that when the evidence is in conflict, the jury is free to believe whomever they wish); Hammond v. State, 594 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (providing that the trial court was not obligated to believe Hammond’s testimony), trans. denied.

2013However, contrary to Allen’s claim, it is well- settled that in a criminal proceeding, “‘[t]he jury is free to believe whomever they wish.’” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Michael v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (Ind. 1983)); see also Kocher v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1344, 1345 (Ind. 1982) (providing that when the evidence is in conflict, the jury is free to believe whomever they wish); Hammond v. State, 594 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (providing that the trial court was not obligated to believe Hammond’s testimony), trans. denied.

2013Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-7, a mistake of fact defense “is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.” Saunders v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; see also Nolan v. State, 863 N.E.2d 398, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [W]e have held that, “[i]n order for mistake of fact to be a valid defense, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the mistake must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake m

2009Indiana's discovery rules are designed to "allow a liberal discovery process, the purposes of which are to provide parties with information essential to litigation of the issues, to eliminate surprise, and to promote settlement." Brown v. Katz, 868 N.E.2d 1159, 1165 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (quotation omitted).

2008To establish standing pursuant to Article 1, Section 11, our supreme court has stated that “a defendant must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in the premises searched or the property seized.” Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind.1996).

2007As for Allen’s claim of remorse, “substantial deference must be given to a trial court’s evaluation of remorse.” Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

2007“The trial court, which has the ability to directly observe the defendant and listen to the tenor of his or her voice, is in the best position to determine whether the remorse is genuine.” Id.

2003Turner v. State, 738 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ind.2000).

1999See Bellmore v. State, 602 N.E.2d 111, 122 (Ind.1992) (affirming the denial of request for new trial based on the alleged newly discovered evidence that a witness’s trial testimony was “not entirely true” because it was not worthy of credit and would not produce a different result). *457 Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1994See State v. Love (1991), Ind.App., 576 N.E.2d 623 , trans. denied.