Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. 1975). · Go Syfert
Search
Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
165 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 23 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Johnson v. Edward Orton, Jr. Ceramic Foundation (ilnd, 2021-06-25) · Strongest negative: LaRosa v. Superior Court (calctapp, 1981-08-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1975 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" LaRosa v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
Super. 277 [ 336 A.2d 62, 71 ] [“With this ‘unreasonably dangerous’ element intact, the Restatement rule is as applicable to the sale of a used product as to the sale of a new product”]; Hovenden v. Tenbush (Tex.Civ.App. 1975) 529 S.W.2d 302, 306 [“The Restatement imposes liability on any person who ‘sells’ a defective product which caused injury to person or property”]; but cf. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Company (1975) 61 Ill.2d 17 [ 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 ] [“If strict liability is imposed upon the facts alleged here, the used car dealer would in effect become an insur…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Edward Orton, Jr. Ceramic Foundation
N.D. Ill. · 2021 · confidence medium
The Illinois Supreme Court has noted that liability falls on manufacturers because “losses should be borne by those ‘who have created the risk and reaped the profit by placing the product in the stream of commerce.’” Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1975) (quoting Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Winters, Terry L. v. Fru-Con Incorporated
7th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Hinojasa, 416 N.E.2d at 48 (citing Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ill. 1975)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Winters v. Fru-Con Inc.
7th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Hinojasa, 48 Ill.Dec. 150 , 416 N.E.2d at 48 (citing Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1975)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allenberg v. Bentley Hedges Travel Serv. Inc.
Okla. · 2001 · confidence medium
Co., 286 Or. 747 , 596 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1979) [Commercial seller of used crane was not strictly liable in tort for a defect that was created by the manufacturer.]; Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 786-87 (1975) [Strict liability not imposed to dealer of used automobiles.]; Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Minn.App.1989) [Relying on statute and rationale from other jurisdictions, refused to apply strict liability to commercial seller of used goods unless the commercial seller was more than a *227 middleman and had some involvement with t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 14,943 David King v. Damiron Corporation
7th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Bank, 117 Idaho 724 , 791 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1990) (no common law or statutory basis for imposing strict liability on commercial seher of used products); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1975) (declining to impose strict liability on dealer of used automobiles where no allegation defects were created by dealer); Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 403 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Iowa 1987) (where defect is not caused by dealer nor discoverable by reasonable and customary inspection, strict liability does not apply); Sell v. Bertsch & Co., Inc., 577 F.Supp. 1393…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harber v. Altec Industries, Inc.
W.D. Mo. · 1993 · confidence medium
In Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1975), the court found this factor to be central to its rejection of strict liability because imposing liability here would make the used-goods dealer an insurer against every defect that could arise after manufacture.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cruz v. Midland-Ross Corp. (2×)
N.D. Ill. · 1993 · confidence medium
This does not mean, however, that Illinois law blindly imposes product liability on all re-sellers, no matter how remotely connected to the “stream of commerce.” Rather, in order to be liable to an injured user, the re-seller of a defective product must be deemed to fall within “the original producing and marketing chain.” Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61111.2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1975); Skarski v. Ace-Chicago Great Dane Corp., 138 Ill.App.3d 301 , 93 Ill.Dec. 102, 106 , 485 N.E.2d 1312, 1316 (1985) (“There are many parties who conceivably have some relation with the m…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gorath v. Rockwell International, Inc.
Minn. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31, 34 (S.D.1983); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.
Utah Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
Chance Co., 39 Colo.App. 70 , 565 P.2d 217, 227 (1977); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 786-87 (1975); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Ky.1967); Smith Radio Communications, Inc. v. Challenger Equip., Ltd., 270 Or. 322 , 527 P.2d 711, 713 (1974).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury (6×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Iowa · 1987 · confidence medium
Id. at 787.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc.
W. Va. · 1980 · confidence medium
Chance Co., 565 P.2d 217, 227 (Colo.App. 1977); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17, 20-21 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 786-87 (1975); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Ky.1967); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 600 , 258 A.2d 697, 705 (1969); Smith Radio Communications, Inc. v. Challenger Equipment, Ltd., 270 Or. 322 , 527 P.2d 711 (1974); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943 , 975 (1969) (Supp.)." We have not had occasion in a product liability case to discuss the nature of the right to implied indemnity.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc.
W. Va. · 1980 · confidence medium
Chance Co., 565 P.2d 217, 227 (Colo. App. 1977); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17, 20-21 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 786-87 (1975); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Ky. 1967); Newmark v. Gimbel’s, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 600 , 258 A.2d 697, 705 (1969); Smith Radio Communications, Inc. v. Challenger Equipment, Ltd., 270 Or. 322 , 527 P.2d 711 (1974); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943 , 975 (1969) (Supp.).” We have not had occasion in a product liability case to discuss the nature of the right to implied indemnity.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morningstar v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.
W. Va. · 1979 · confidence medium
Chance Co., 565 P.2d 217, 227 (Colo. App. 1977); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 20-21 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 786-87 (1975); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Ky. 1967); Newmark v. Gimbel’s, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 600 , 258 A.2d 697, 705 (1969); Smith Radio Communications, Inc. v. Challenger Equipment, Ltd., 270 Ore. 322 , 527 P.2d 711 (1974); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943 , 975 (1969) (Supp.). 23 Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand.
discussed Cited "see" Malen v. MTD Products, Inc. (2×)
7th Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 786-87 (1975); Brdar v. Cottrell, Inc., 372 Ill.App.3d 690 , 311 Ill.
discussed Cited "see" Hemphill v. Sayers (2×)
S.D. Ill. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Keene v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 49 Ill.App.3d 480 , 7 Ill.Dec. 341, 343 , 364 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1st Dist.1977).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Tidemann, Roxanne v. Nadler Golf Car
7th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ill. 1975); Timm v. Indian Spring Recreation Ass’n, 543 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ill.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Roxanne Tidemann v. Nadler Golf Car Sales, Inc. (2×)
7th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, 61 Ill.2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1975); Timm v. Indian Springs Recreation Ass’n, 187 Ill.App.3d 508 , 135 Ill.Dec. 155 , 543 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1989); Abel v. General Motors Corp., 155 Ill.App.3d 208 , 108 Ill.Dec. 28 , 507 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (1987).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sobczak v. Flaska (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sobczak v. Slaska (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g. , Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. , 61 Ill. 2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Rahn v. Gerdts , 119 Ill.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gilliland v. Rothermel
Ill. App. Ct. · 1980 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 17, 20 .) Essentially, the defendant is an ultimate user of the gauge along with his occasional customer who requests permission to use the gauge.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Crowe v. PUBLIC BLDG. COM'N OF CHICAGO (4×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1977 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. (1975), 61 Ill.2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
JAMES A. PETERSON, Adm’r, Et Al., Appellees,
v.
LOU BACHRODT CHEVROLET COMPANY, Appellant
46675.
Illinois Supreme Court.
Jun 2, 1975.
329 N.E.2d 785
1975 Ill. LEXIS 240
Reno, Zahm, Folgate, Skolrood, Lindberg & Powell, of Rockford (Robert K. Skolrood, of counsel), for appellant., Maynard & Brassfield, of Rockford (Eugene E. Brass-field, of counsel), for appellees., McConnell, Kennedy, Quinn & Morris, of Peoria (Thomas B. Kennedy, Sr., and R. Michael Henderson, of counsel), for amicus curiae Illinois Retail Farm Equipment Association., Giffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk, Cohen, Bodewes 8c Narmont, of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Automotive Trade Association., Gale S. Molovinsky, of Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae National Automobile Dealers Association.
Goldenhersh, Schaefer.
Cited by 67 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER

delivered the opinion of the court:

On September 3, 1971, Maradean Peterson, age 11, and her brother, Mark Peterson, age 8, were struck by an automobile while they were walking home from school. Maradean Peterson died on the day of the accident, and Mark Peterson suffered severe injuries, including the amputation of one of his legs. The automobile involved in the accident was a used 1965 Chevrolet. James A. Peterson, administrator of the estate of Maradean Peterson, and Mark Peterson, by James A. Peterson, his father and next friend, brought this action against the driver of the used car, its owners, and the defendant involved in the appeal, Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Company.

The circuit court of Winnebago County dismissed two counts of the complaint and found that there was no reason to delay appeal from that judgment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 304(a).) The Appellate Court, Second District, reversed (17 Ill. App. 3d 690), and we granted leave to appeal.

One of the challenged counts sought recovery for the wrongful death of the daughter, the other for the injuries to the son. Each count alleged that the defendant, Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Company, had sold the 1965 Chevrolet on June 11, 1971, in the ordinary course of business, and that at the time the automobile left the defendant’s control it was defective and not reasonably safe for driving and operation in that:

“(a.) A spring or springs in the left front wheel • braking system was missing at the time of its sale;
(b.) One of the left rear brake shoes was completely worn out at the time of the sale;
(c.) A part of the cylinder braking system in the left rear wheel was missing at the time of the sale.”

It was alleged that the injuries and death were a direct and proximate result of the defective conditions.

Two issues are presented on this appeal: first, whether as a matter of law, strict liability extends to the seller of a used car and, second, whether a bystander who has been struck by a defective and unreasonably dangerous car may sue under a theory of strict liability. Our disposition of the first of these issues makes it unnecessary to consider the second.

In Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 612, we held that a manufacturer is liable under a theory of strict liability if the plaintiffs “prove that their injury or damage resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer’s control.” (32 Ill.2d 612, 623.) In Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 339, strict liability was imposed upon a wholesaler thro'ugh whose warehouse the packaged product passed unopened. In that case we pointed out: “The strict liability of a retailer arises from his integral role in the overall producing and marketing enterprise and affords an additional incentive to safety.” (42 Ill.2d 339, 344.) The plaintiffs now ask that the same liability be imposed upon a defendant who is outside of the original producing and marketing chain. We decline to do so.

One of the basic grounds supporting the imposition of strict liability upon manufacturers is that losses should be borne by those “who have created the risk and reaped the profit by placing the product in the stream of commerce.” (32 Ill.2d 612, 619.) Imposition of liability upon wholesalers and retailers is justified on the ground that their position in the marketing process enables them to exert pressure on the manufacturer to enhance the safety of the product. (Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 339, 344; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964), 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-263, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900.) A wholesaler or retailer who neither creates nor assumes the risk is entitled to indemnity. (See Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 612, 624; Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co. (1969), 117 Ill. App. 2d 351; 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability, ch. 3, sec. 16A[4] [b] [i], at 3-268 (1974).) Therefore, although liability is imposed upon anyone who is engaged in the business of selling the product (Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 402A (1965)), the loss will ordinarily be ultimately borne by the party that created the risk.

There is no allegation that the defects existed when the product left the control of the manufacturer. Nor is there any allegation that the defects were created by the used car dealer. (See Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc. (1974), 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440.) If strict liability is imposed upon the facts alleged here, the used car dealer would in effect become an insurer against defects which had come into existence after the chain of distribution was completed, and while the product was under the control of one or more consumers. See Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 402A, Comment/.

The plaintiff asserts that public policy demands that used car dealers be made responsible for discovering all discoverable defects and insuring against all that are undiscoverable. It may well be that a heavy responsibility should be imposed upon used car dealers for the safety of the cars they sell. But we are not aware of any judicial decision that has so held, and the General Assembly seems to have expressed a contrary view. Section 2L was added to the Consumer Fraud Act in 1967. (Laws of 1967, at 2147; 111. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 1211/2, par. 262L.) It provides that new and used motor vehicle dealers are liable to purchasers for specified proportional shares of the cost of repairs of “Power Train” components for a period of 30 days from the date of delivery. The dealer’s share is 50% if the vehicle is not more than 2 years old, 25% if the vehicle is more than 2 but less than 3 years old, 10% if the vehicle is more than 3 but less than 4 years old. The dealer is not liable for any part of the cost of repairs if the motor vehicle is more than 4 years old. No intimations of an expanded public policy concerning a used car dealer’s responsibility for the condition of the car he sells can be drawn from the severely restrictive provisions of this statute.

The judgment of the Appellate Court, Second District, is reversed.

Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.

Dissent

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH,

dissenting:

I dissent. The rationale underlying the application of strict liability to a manufacturer is that losses should be borne by those “who have created the risk and reaped the profit by placing the product in the stream of commerce.” (Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 619.) In Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.2d 339, strict liability was made applicable to a wholesaler and retailer for the reason that “these considerations apply with equal compulsion to all elements in the distribution system.” (42 Ill.2d 339, 344.) These same considerations require application of strict liability principles to the business of selling used automobiles.

It is axiomatic that a used car dealer owes a duty to make a reasonable inspection of an automobile prior to selling it. Just as liability on the part of the manufacturer and the other “elements in the distribution system” can flow from a defect, without proof of negligence, a defect discoverable upon reasonable inspection should invoke strict liability on the part of a used car dealer, without proof of negligence in making the inspection. The complaint here alleged that the automobile, when it left defendant’s control, was defective and not reasonably safe for driving and operation in that:

“(a.) A spring or springs in the left front wheel braking system was missing at the time of its sale;
(b.) One of the left rear brake shoes was completely worn out at the time of the sale;
(c.) A part of the cylinder braking system in the left rear wheel was missing at the time of the sale.”

These defects would have been discovered upon reasonable inspection of the vehicle.

The majority cite Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc. (1974), 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440, and by implication attempt to distinguish it on the ground that there is no allegation “that the defects were created by the used car dealer.” I submit that there is no basis for distinguishing a defect resulting from repairs made by a used car dealer and a defect which exists by reason of his failure to make a reasonable inspection, and that both should be the basis for imposing strict liability.

In Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 Ill. App. 3d 272, appeal denied, 49 Ill.2d 575, the appellate court held strict liability applicable to the lessor of a motor vehicle. No reason presents itself for not applying the principle to a used car dealer who places in the stream of commerce a vehicle rendered unreasonably dangerous by reason of a defect discoverable upon reasonable inspection.

I am aware of the argument made by defendant and amici curiae that many vehicles are sold “as is” and that the cost of repairs in some instances might exceed the value of the vehicle. These pleadings present no such issues, and assuming, arguendo, that in some future case they will arise, there is precedent for weighing the cost of remedying the dangerous condition against the nature and extent of the risk which it creates. Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill.2d 614.

■ I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.