extension doctrine in Illinois

2006Given the clearly rural nature of the property in question, neither the Restatement exception for possessors of urban land (see Restatement (Second) of Torts '363(2), at 258 (1965)), nor the extension of that exception to owners of residential land (see Mahurin, 71 Ill.

2006Given the clearly rural nature of the property in question, neither the Restatement exception for possessors of urban land (see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363(2), at 258 (1965)), nor the extension of that exception to owners of residential land (see Mahurin, 71 Ill.

1999General Insurance, 272 Ill.

1999General Insurance, 272 Ill.

1998Dolatowski , 197 Ill.

1998Dolatowski, 197 Ill.

1996People v. Bronson (1991), 216 Ill.

1993People v. Bronson (1991), 216 Ill.

1995(See Cesena v. Du Page County (1990), 201 Ill.App.3d 96, 112 , 146 Ill.Dec. 1044 , 558 N.E.2d 1378 , rev'd on other grounds (1991), 145 Ill.2d 32 , 163 Ill.Dec. 911 , 582 N.E.2d 177 .) Moreover, matters a client intends to disclose to third parties who are not agents of either the attorney or the client are not treated as privileged. ( In re Himmel (1988), 125 Ill.2d 531, 542 , 127 Ill.Dec. 708 , 533 N.E.2d 790 ; Cesena, 201 Ill.App.3d at 112 , 146 Ill.Dec. 1044 , 558 N.E.2d 1378 .) In Indiana, the defendant appeared in open court represented by Work and used the name Gerald Bailey.

1995(See Cesena v. Du Page County (1990), 201 Ill.

1995(People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 252 , 454 N.E.2d 220 .) Illinois courts have held that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to the identity of the client unless the extension of the privilege is shown to be in the public interest or if it appears that the client will be prejudiced in "some substantial way” by the disclosure.

1995(People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 252 , 454 N.E.2d 220 .) Illinois courts have held that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to the identity of the client unless the extension of the privilege is shown to be in the public interest or if it appears that the client will be prejudiced in "some substantial way” by the disclosure.

1981In the absence of such an extension of the rule in Miranda by the Supreme Court, this court shall continue to adhere to the rule that in order for a search with consent to be reasonable the consent must be voluntary, and that the question of whether the consent was freely and intelligently given is to be determined according to the circumstances in each case.” (Phillips v. People (1969), 170 Colo. 520, 527-28 , 462 P.2d 594, 597 .) We agree with the Colorado Supreme Court that lacking clearer direction from the Supreme Court, our proper inquiry is into the voluntariness of the consent to searc

1981In the absence of such an extension of the rule in Miranda by the Supreme Court, this court shall continue to adhere to the rule that in order for a search with consent to be reasonable the consent must be voluntary, and that the question of whether the consent was freely and intelligently given is to be determined according to the circumstances in each case.” (Phillips v. People (1969), 170 Colo. 520, 527-28 , 462 P.2d 594, 597 .) We agree with the Colorado Supreme Court that lacking clearer direction from the Supreme Court, our proper inquiry is into the voluntariness of the consent to searc

1992App. 3d at 257 , citing Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785 .) Domine further opined that the public policy of Illinois does not favor the extension of the doctrine of strict liability to a successor corporation.

1992App. 3d at 257 , citing Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 17 , 329 N.E.2d 785 .) Domine further opined that the public policy of Illinois does not favor the extension of the doctrine of strict liability to a successor corporation.

1992Hernandez emphasized an additional reason to reject the “product line” exception in reliance on statements enunciated in Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc. (7th Cir. 1977), 565 F.2d 437 .

1991In Hernandez this court found an additional reason to reject the product line exception in reliance on statements enunciated in Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc. (7th Cir. 1977), 565 F.2d 437 .

1989(Kramer v. Chicago Title & Insurance Co. (1979), 69 Ill.

1983App. 3d 1015, 1018 , 387 N.E.2d 1105 : “Estoppel by verdict or collateral estoppel is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata. [Citation.] It is based on the principle that a question once adjudicated by a proper court is to be considered as finally settled and conclusive on the unsuccessful parties. [Citation.] Estoppel by verdict or collateral estoppel is applicable even where the parties are not arrayed on opposite sides in prior litigation or formal issues have not been drawn up between them. [Citations.]” (See also Creeco Co. v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. (1966), 73 Ill.

1981Respondent appears to seek an extension of the rule announced in People v. Fife (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 418 , 392 N.E.2d 1345 .

1981Respondent appears to seek an extension of the rule announced in People v. Fife (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 418 , 392 N.E.2d 1345 .

1970In People v. Valentine, 60 Ill App2d 339, 208 NE2d 595 , this court noted at page 348 that the then existing rule was “. . . if a case in which constitutional questions were raised was transferred to this court, it was presumed that the Supreme Court had determined that the constitutional questions were not genuine or that the questions were not material to the disposition of the appeal. [Citing cases.] There now must be an extension of this rule because of the possible alternative presumption that the constitutional questions are deemed well settled by the prior decisions of the court.” We ca

1970App.2d 339 , 208 NE2d 595 , this court noted at page 348 that the then existing rule was "... if a case in which constitutional questions were raised was transferred to this court, it was presumed that the Supreme Court had determined that the constitutional questions were not genuine or that the questions were not material to the disposition of the appeal. [Citing cases.] There now must be an extension of this rule because of the possible *356 alternative presumption that the constitutional questions are deemed well settled by the prior decisions of the court." We cannot hold that such a tran

2025Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 69-70 .

2020People v. Burton, 2012 IL App (2d) 110769, ¶ 15 .

2018App. 3d at 287 -88 , 245 Ill.Dec. 877 , 728 N.E.2d 1234 . ¶ 19 On appeal, the respondent contended that the extension was error because, when the court entered it, the plenary order had already expired.

2018App. 3d at 287 -88 , 245 Ill.Dec. 877 , 728 N.E.2d 1234 . ¶ 19 On appeal, the respondent contended that the extension was error because, when the court entered it, the plenary order had already expired.

2015Neither the Davis nor Scott court conditioned their sanction of the use of judicial notice upon the level of proof required.” White, 311 Ill.

1995(See Cesena v. Du Page County (1990), 201 Ill.App.3d 96, 112 , 146 Ill.Dec. 1044 , 558 N.E.2d 1378 , rev'd on other grounds (1991), 145 Ill.2d 32 , 163 Ill.Dec. 911 , 582 N.E.2d 177 .) Moreover, matters a client intends to disclose to third parties who are not agents of either the attorney or the client are not treated as privileged. ( In re Himmel (1988), 125 Ill.2d 531, 542 , 127 Ill.Dec. 708 , 533 N.E.2d 790 ; Cesena, 201 Ill.App.3d at 112 , 146 Ill.Dec. 1044 , 558 N.E.2d 1378 .) In Indiana, the defendant appeared in open court represented by Work and used the name Gerald Bailey.

1995(See Cesena v. Du Page County (1990), 201 Ill.App.3d 96, 112 , 146 Ill.Dec. 1044 , 558 N.E.2d 1378 , rev'd on other grounds (1991), 145 Ill.2d 32 , 163 Ill.Dec. 911 , 582 N.E.2d 177 .) Moreover, matters a client intends to disclose to third parties who are not agents of either the attorney or the client are not treated as privileged. ( In re Himmel (1988), 125 Ill.2d 531, 542 , 127 Ill.Dec. 708 , 533 N.E.2d 790 ; Cesena, 201 Ill.App.3d at 112 , 146 Ill.Dec. 1044 , 558 N.E.2d 1378 .) In Indiana, the defendant appeared in open court represented by Work and used the name Gerald Bailey.

1995(See Cesena v. Du Page County (1990), 201 Ill.App.3d 96, 112 , 146 Ill.Dec. 1044 , 558 N.E.2d 1378 , rev'd on other grounds (1991), 145 Ill.2d 32 , 163 Ill.Dec. 911 , 582 N.E.2d 177 .) Moreover, matters a client intends to disclose to third parties who are not agents of either the attorney or the client are not treated as privileged. ( In re Himmel (1988), 125 Ill.2d 531, 542 , 127 Ill.Dec. 708 , 533 N.E.2d 790 ; Cesena, 201 Ill.App.3d at 112 , 146 Ill.Dec. 1044 , 558 N.E.2d 1378 .) In Indiana, the defendant appeared in open court represented by Work and used the name Gerald Bailey.

1995(See Cesena v. Du Page County (1990), 201 Ill.App.3d 96, 112 , 146 Ill.Dec. 1044 , 558 N.E.2d 1378 , rev'd on other grounds (1991), 145 Ill.2d 32 , 163 Ill.Dec. 911 , 582 N.E.2d 177 .) Moreover, matters a client intends to disclose to third parties who are not agents of either the attorney or the client are not treated as privileged. ( In re Himmel (1988), 125 Ill.2d 531, 542 , 127 Ill.Dec. 708 , 533 N.E.2d 790 ; Cesena, 201 Ill.App.3d at 112 , 146 Ill.Dec. 1044 , 558 N.E.2d 1378 .) In Indiana, the defendant appeared in open court represented by Work and used the name Gerald Bailey.

1994In the absence of such an extension of the rule in Miranda by the Supreme Court, this court shall continue to adhere to the rule that in order for a search with consent to be reasonable the consent must be voluntary, and that the question of whether the consent was freely and intelligently given is to be determined according to the circumstances in each case.’ ” (Wegman, 101 Ill.

1994App. 3d at 638 , 428 N.E.2d at 640-41 , quoting Phillips v. People (1969), 170 Colo. 520, 527-28 , 462 P.2d 594, 597 .) The appellate court then found defendant’s consent voluntary.

1992The Missouri Supreme Court in Farmers Mutual Fire & Lightning Insurance Co. v. Crowley (1945), 354 Mo. 649 , 190 S.W.2d 250 , stated that a life tenant has a duty to pay taxes, make ordinary repairs, and keep down interest on encumbrances and his failure to perform these duties falls under the extension of the rule which prohibits waste.

1992The Missouri Supreme Court in Farmers Mutual Fire & Lightning Insurance Co. v. Crowley (1945), 354 Mo. 649 , 190 S.W.2d 250 , stated that a life tenant has a duty to pay taxes, make ordinary repairs, and keep down interest on encumbrances and his failure to perform these duties falls under the extension of the rule which prohibits waste.

1992In Bond v. Lockwood, the Illinois Supreme Court cited the English common law definition of waste: “Any act or omission which diminished the value of the estate or its income, or increased the burdens upon it or impaired the evidence of title thereto, was considered waste.” (Bond v. Lockwood (1864), 33 Ill. 212, 221 .) More recently: “Waste occurs when someone who lawfully has possession of real estate destroys it, misuses it, alters it or neglects it so that the interest of persons having a subsequent right to possession is prejudiced in some way or there is a diminution in the value of the la