In Re Pulido, 372 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. 1978). · Go Syfert
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In Re Pulido, 372 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
53 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Mark Twain Illinois Bank v. Clinton County (illappct, 1999-01-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark Twain Illinois Bank v. Clinton County
Ill. App. Ct. · 1999 · confidence medium
We realize that actual or constructive notice is generally a necessary predicate of any duty on the part of a public entity under section 3 — 102(a). 745 ILCS 10/3—102(a) ( West 1992 ); Lansing v. County of McLean, 69 Ill. 2d 562, 572 , 372 N.E.2d 822, 827 (1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tina Hintz v. Leslie Jamison, as Dix Township Road Commissioner, and Township of Dix, Defendants/third Party v. Robert Hintz, Third-Party
3rd Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
That case did not involve governmental immunity, but rather a defense that had been unaffected by Molitor. 69 Ill.2d at 571 , 14 Ill.Dec. at 547 , 372 N.E.2d at 826 (the city’s defense “did not indeed rest on a doctrine of governmental immunity, but rather upon the absence of liability in circumstances where the [county] had taken no action contributing to the injury.”).
discussed Cited "see" Monson v. City of Danville (2×)
Ill. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lansing v. County of McLean , 69 Ill. 2d 562 , 572-73, 14 Ill.Dec. 543 , 372 N.E.2d 822 (1978) (actual or constructive notice requirement in section 3-102 of the Act is a necessary predicate of a duty on the part of the defendant public entity); Glass v. City of Chicago , 323 Ill.
cited Cited "see" Trull v. Town of Conway
N.H. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lansing v. County of McLean, 372 N.E.2d 822, 827 (Ill. 1978).
discussed Cited "see" Trevino v. Flash Cab Co. (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lansing, 69 Ill.2d at 570 , 14 Ill.Dec. 543 , 372 N.E.2d 822 ; Serritos, 153 Ill.App.3d at 272 , 106 Ill.Dec. 243 , 505 N.E.2d 1034 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hussey v. Chase Manor Condominium Assoc. (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence low
In other words, a "sidewalk" is part of the street-part of the publicly maintained right of way, adjacent to private property, that is intended for pedestrian use. *791 ¶ 66 That definition is consistent with a long line of supreme court decisions holding that a sidewalk is not private property, but rather "is considered a part of the street which has been set aside for pedestrian use." City of Carbondale v. Brewster , 78 Ill. 2d 111 , 116, 34 Ill.Dec. 838 , 398 N.E.2d 829 (1979) ; see also Lansing v. County of McLean , 69 Ill. 2d 562 , 572, 14 Ill.Dec. 543 , 372 N.E.2d 822 (1978) (" 'The sid…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Bland v. Davison County (4×)
S.D. · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Lansing v. County of McLean, 69 Ill.2d 562 , 14 Ill.Dec. 543 , 372 N.E.2d 822 (1978)(posting warning signs everywhere of conditions resulting from general snow and ice impractical and expensive); Workman v. Sioux City, 218 Iowa 217 , 253 N.W. 909 (1934)(to hold cities liable for ice and snow on roads, with its thawing and freezing, would establish a rule of liability forcing them into bankruptcy).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Patch v. Township of Persifer
Ill. App. Ct. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Lansing v. County of McLean (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 562 , 372 N.E.2d 822 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re ERNESTO PULIDO, a Minor, Appellant.—(The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee.)
50298.
Illinois Supreme Court.
Jan 13, 1978.
372 N.E.2d 822
Sam Adam, of Chicago, for appellant., Bernard Carey, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger and James V. Marcanti, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

After a finding of juvenile delinquency and commitment to a correctional facility, the defendant moved for bond pending appeal. Both the trial court and appellate court denied the motion on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Supreme Court Rule 660(a) (65 Ill. 2d R. 660(a)) provides that appeals from final judgments in delinquent minor proceedings shall be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases, except as otherwise provided. Rule 609(b) (58 Ill. 2d R. 609(b)) provides for bail pending appeal where a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment. There is no statutory provision or rule providing that Rule 609 does not apply in juvenile delinquency cases, and the trial court and appellate court were in error in holding that they lacked jurisdiction to fix bond. Since applications for bond pending appeal should be addressed in the first instance to the trial court, we express no opinion as to whether bond should be allowed. It is ordered, in the exercise of this court’s supervisory jurisdiction, that the circuit court of Cook County, juvenile division, consider defendant’s application for bond pending appeal.

It is unnecessary to consider the motion by petitioner for bond pending appeal, or, in the alternative, to remand this cause to the trial court with instructions.

The motion by petitioner for leave to present oral argument on motion for bond pending appeal is denied.

Supervisory order entered.