124 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hundleygreen2 sentences2026See People - 21 - v. Hundley, 156 Ill. 2d 135, 138 (1993) (“An inventory search is a judicially created exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.”). 2011“An inventory search is a judicially created exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.” People v. Hundley, 156 Ill. 2d 135, 138 (1993). | 11 | 11 |
Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grovegreen2 sentences2015We also note that plaintiff continues to attempt to allege a cause of action under the common-law special duty exception. ¶ 58 The “special duty doctrine arose as a judicially created exception to the nonliability principles of the public duty rule, and is applicable in certain limited instances where a governmental entity has assumed a special relationship to an individual ‘so as to elevate that person’s status to something more than just being a member of the public.’ ” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 32 -33 (quoting Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill. 2011As explained above, the “special duty doctrine arose as a judicially created exception to the nonliability principles of the public duty rule, and is applicable in certain limited instances where a governmental entity has assumed a special relationship to an individual ‘so as to elevate that person’s status to something more than just being a member of the public.’ ” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 32 -33 (citing Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill. | 4 | 6 |
Hughey v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1998Res judicata "is a judicially created doctrine resulting from the practical necessity that there be an end to litigation and that controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose." Hughey v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Ill.2d 577, 582 , 31 Ill.Dec. 787 , 394 N.E.2d 1164 (1979). 1998Res judicata “is a judicially created doctrine resulting from the practical necessity that there be an end to litigation and that controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose.” Hughey v. Industrial Comm’n, 76 Ill. 2d 577, 582 (1979). | 3 | 7 |
Bradley v. The City of Marion Illinoisgreen2 sentences2021See Stanphill v. Ortberg, 2018 IL 122974, ¶ 31 (question of law is subject to de novo review). ¶ 33 We first observe that “[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine that is not technically a question of jurisdiction, but a matter of self-restraint and relations between the courts and administrative agencies.” Bradley v. City of Marion, 2015 IL App (5th) 140267 , ¶ 35. 2020See Stanphill v. Ortberg, 2018 IL 122974, ¶ 31 (question of law is subject to de novo review). ¶ 33 We first observe that “[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine that is not technically a question of jurisdiction, but a matter of self-restraint and relations between the courts and administrative agencies.” Bradley v. City of Marion, 2015 IL App (5th) 140267 , ¶ 35. | 3 | 5 |
Stanphill v. Ortberggreen2 sentences2021See Stanphill v. Ortberg, 2018 IL 122974, ¶ 31 (question of law is subject to de novo review). ¶ 33 We first observe that “[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine that is not technically a question of jurisdiction, but a matter of self-restraint and relations between the courts and administrative agencies.” Bradley v. City of Marion, 2015 IL App (5th) 140267 , ¶ 35. 2020See Stanphill v. Ortberg, 2018 IL 122974, ¶ 31 (question of law is subject to de novo review). ¶ 33 We first observe that “[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine that is not technically a question of jurisdiction, but a matter of self-restraint and relations between the courts and administrative agencies.” Bradley v. City of Marion, 2015 IL App (5th) 140267 , ¶ 35. | 3 | 3 |
Zimmerman v. Village of Skokiegreen2 sentences2015We also note that plaintiff continues to attempt to allege a cause of action under the common-law special duty exception. ¶ 58 The “special duty doctrine arose as a judicially created exception to the nonliability principles of the public duty rule, and is applicable in certain limited instances where a governmental entity has assumed a special relationship to an individual ‘so as to elevate that person’s status to something more than just being a member of the public.’ ” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 32 -33 (quoting Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill. 2015The supreme court subsequently reaffirmed this position in Zimmerman: “Because the special duty doctrine is a judicially created exception to the public duty rule, the special duty doctrine cannot, and was not intended to, contravene the immunities provided to governmental entities under the Tort Immunity Act.” Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 46 . | 2 | 10 |
People v. Gipsongreen2 sentences2024However, “[a]n inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is a judicially created exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.” Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 304 . ¶ 39 Inventory searches serve three objectives: “(1) protection of the owner’s property; (2) protection of the police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of the police from potential danger.” Id. 2024However, “[a]n inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is a judicially created exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.” Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 304 . ¶ 39 Inventory searches serve three objectives: “(1) protection of the owner’s property; (2) protection of the police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of the police from potential danger.” Id. | 2 | 6 |
People v. Pricegreen2 sentences2020Thus, as to defendants, the void sentence rule functioned as a judicially created exception to the forfeiture doctrine. [Citations.]” Price, 2016 IL 118613, ¶¶ 16-17 . 2019See 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2014) (any claim of substantial denial of constitutional right not raised in the original or an amended petition is forfeited); Price, 2016 IL 118613, ¶ 16 (“the void sentence rule functioned as a judicially created exception to the forfeiture doctrine”). ¶ 142 The takeaway from these Illinois cases is not the extremely broad holding articulated by the majority. | 2 | 4 |
Village of Itasca v. Village of Lislegreen2 sentences2020“No fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; rather, in every case the question is whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation.” Village of Itasca v. Village of Lisle, 352 Ill. 2019“No fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; rather, in every case the question is whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation.” Village of Itasca v. Village of Lisle, 352 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2017People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 302 (2011) (“challenge to an alleged void order is not subject to forfeiture”); Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d at 27 (“argument that an order or judgment is void is not subject to waiver”). ¶ 17 Castleberry abolished the void sentence rule because it was constitutionally unsound. 2016People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 302 (2011) (“challenge to an alleged void order is not subject to forfeiture”); Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d at 27 (“argument that an order or judgment is void is not subject to waiver”). ¶ 17 Castleberry abolished the void sentence rule because it was constitutionally unsound. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2017People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 302 (2011) (“challenge to an alleged void order is not subject to forfeiture”); Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d at 27 (“argument that an order or judgment is void is not subject to waiver”). ¶ 17 Castleberry abolished the void sentence rule because it was constitutionally unsound. 2016People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 302 (2011) (“challenge to an alleged void order is not subject to forfeiture”); Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d at 27 (“argument that an order or judgment is void is not subject to waiver”). ¶ 17 Castleberry abolished the void sentence rule because it was constitutionally unsound. | 2 | 2 |
Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.green2 sentences2015Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 182, 343 , 848 N.E.2d 1, 92-93 (2005). 2015Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 182, 343 , 848 N.E.2d 1, 92-93 (2005). | 2 | 2 |
Azzano v. Catholic Bishop of Chicagogreen2 sentences2009Azzano v. Catholic Bishop, 304 Ill. 2009Azzano v. Catholic Bishop, 304 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People ex rel. Rosewell v. Heereygreen2 sentences2008“The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is a judicially created doctrine that precludes a party from seeking review in the courts without first pursuing all administrative remedies available.” In re Application of the Cook County Collector for the 1981 Tax Year, 173 Ill. 2008“The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is a judicially created doctrine that precludes a party from seeking review in the courts without first pursuing all administrative remedies available.” In re Application of the Cook County Collector for the 1981 Tax Year, 173 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
| STATE, BY POLLUTION CONTROL AGCY. v. US Steelgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirkgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Pfister v. Shustagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Golla v. General Motors Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| Lipsey v. Human Rights Commissiongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| Matter of SCgreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. LeFloregreen2 sentences2019The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when “police acted with an ‘ “objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct [was] lawful,” ’ or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24 (quoting United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011), quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)). ¶ 36 This “ 2018The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when "police acted with an " 'objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct [was] lawful,' " or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence." People v. LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24, 392 Ill.Dec. 467 , 32 N.E.3d 1043 (quoting United States v. Katzin , 769 F.3d 163 , 171 (2014), quoting Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), quo | 1 | 5 |
Arteman v. CLINTON COM. UNIT SCHOOL DIST.green2 sentences2019Courson observed that section 3-102 is not simply a judicially created exception like that involved in Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 483 , a case where the court refused to extend a judicially created rule so as to prevent immunity under section 2-201. 2019Courson observed that section 3-102 is not simply a judicially created exception like that involved in Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 483 , a case where the court refused to extend a judicially created rule so as to prevent immunity under section 2-201. | 1 | 4 |
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when “police acted with an ‘ “objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct [was] lawful,” ’ or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24 (quoting United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011), quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)). ¶ 36 This “ 2018The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when "police acted with an " 'objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct [was] lawful,' " or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence." People v. LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24, 392 Ill.Dec. 467 , 32 N.E.3d 1043 (quoting United States v. Katzin , 769 F.3d 163 , 171 (2014), quoting Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), quo | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2019The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when “police acted with an ‘ “objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct [was] lawful,” ’ or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24 (quoting United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011), quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)). ¶ 36 This “ 2018The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when "police acted with an " 'objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct [was] lawful,' " or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence." People v. LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24, 392 Ill.Dec. 467 , 32 N.E.3d 1043 (quoting United States v. Katzin , 769 F.3d 163 , 171 (2014), quoting Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), quo | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Harry Katzingreen2 sentences2019The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when “police acted with an ‘ “objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct [was] lawful,” ’ or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24 (quoting United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011), quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)). ¶ 36 This “ 2018The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when "police acted with an " 'objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct [was] lawful,' " or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence." People v. LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24, 392 Ill.Dec. 467 , 32 N.E.3d 1043 (quoting United States v. Katzin , 769 F.3d 163 , 171 (2014), quoting Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), quo | 1 | 2 |
| VonHoldt v. Barba & Barba Construction, Inc.green | 1 | 2 |
| Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Board of Education v. Houlihangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors Adjustment Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Allied American Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bibiji Kaur Puri v. Sopurkh Kaur Khalsagreen | 1 | 1 |
| First Midwest Trust Co., NA v. Brittongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Peoples Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cates v. Catesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Landrum v. Gonzalezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hopkins v. Powersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
The Village of Bartonville v. Lopez
green
2 sentences2023Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 45 . ¶ 24 Res judicata is a judicially created doctrine that arises from “the practical necessity that there be an end to litigation and that controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose.” Village of Bartonville v. Lopez, 2017 IL 120643 , ¶ 49. 2022Res judicata is a judicially-created doctrine, based on the practical necessity that there be “an end to litigation and that controversies once decided on their merits should remain in repose.” Village of Bartonville v. Lopez, 2017 IL 120643, ¶ 49 . | 6 | 2019–2023 |
Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy
green
2 sentences2021Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction bars a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies involving the same cause of action.” Richter, 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 21 . 2021Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction bars a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies involving the same cause of action.” Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 21 . | 4 | 2019–2021 |
Peoria Firefighters Local 544 v. Korn
green
2 sentences2017This court therefore will not engage itself in a semantical exercise in order to skirt the judicially created doctrine of res judicata.” Id. at 1006 . 2017This court therefore will not engage itself in a semantical exercise in order to skirt the judicially created doctrine of res judicata.” Id. at 1006 . | 4 | 2005–2017 |
Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership
green
2 sentences2011Thus, the current position of our supreme court is that the “special duty doctrine simply allows courts to impose liability upon a municipality by making an exception to the public duty rule in cases in which the legislature has not granted immunity to the municipality.” Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 347 . 2011Thus, the current position of our supreme court is that the “special duty doctrine simply allows courts to impose liability upon a municipality by making an exception to the public duty rule in cases in which the legislature has not granted immunity to the municipality.” Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 347 . | 4 | 2001–2011 |
People v. Bonilla
green
2 sentences2022People v. Bonilla, 2018 IL 122484, ¶ 35 ; see also People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 24 . 2019Bonilla , 2018 IL 122484 , ¶ 35 ; LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24, 392 Ill.Dec. 467 , 32 N.E.3d 1043 . | 3 | 2019–2022 |
People v. Nash
green
2 sentences2022As noted, “[w]hen a vehicle is lawfully impounded, an inventory search is a judicially created exception to the warrant requirement.” Nash, 409 Ill. 2019Id. at 346-47 . ¶ 12 An inventory search is “a judicially created exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.” Id. at 348 . | 2 | 2019–2022 |
People v. Maron
green
2 sentences2021People v. Maron, 2019 IL App (2d) 170268, ¶ 54 . 2021People v. Maron, 2019 IL App (2d) 170268, ¶ 54 . | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Courson v. Danville School Dist.
green
2 sentences2019Courson, 333 Ill. 2019Courson, 333 Ill. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Employers Mutual Companies v. Skilling
green
2 sentences2015The supreme court then conducted a second step in its analysis and held that, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the circuit court had “paramount” jurisdiction over the parties’ insurance dispute; the court reasoned that the issue was a question of law and that administrative agencies were “given wide latitude in resolving factual issues but not in resolving matters of law.” Id. at 288-90, 644 N.E.2d at 1166 . ¶ 35 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine that is not technically a question of jurisdiction, but a matter of self-restraint and relations between 2015The supreme court then conducted a second step in its analysis and held that, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the circuit court had "paramount" jurisdiction over the parties' insurance dispute; the court reasoned that the issue was a question of law and that administrative agencies were "given wide latitude in resolving factual issues but not in resolving matters of law." Id. at 288-89, 644 N.E.2d at 1166 . ¶ 35 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine that is not technically a question of jurisdiction, but a matter of self-restraint and relations between | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center
green
2 sentences2007Illinois has long adhered to the judicially created doctrine of “nonreview.” See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 194 Ill. 2d 438, 451-52 , 742 N.E.2d 279 (2000); Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 129 Ill. 2d 497, 506-07 , 544 N.E.2d 733 (1989); Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 123 Ill. 2d 49, 52 , 525 N.E.2d 50 (1988). 2007Illinois has long adhered to the judicially created doctrine of “nonreview.” See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 194 Ill. 2d 438, 451-52 , 742 N.E.2d 279 (2000); Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 129 Ill. 2d 497, 506-07 , 544 N.E.2d 733 (1989); Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 123 Ill. 2d 49, 52 , 525 N.E.2d 50 (1988). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Garibaldi v. Applebaum
green
2 sentences2007Illinois has long adhered to the judicially created doctrine of “nonreview.” See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 194 Ill. 2d 438, 451-52 , 742 N.E.2d 279 (2000); Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 129 Ill. 2d 497, 506-07 , 544 N.E.2d 733 (1989); Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 123 Ill. 2d 49, 52 , 525 N.E.2d 50 (1988). 2007Illinois has long adhered to the judicially created doctrine of “nonreview.” See Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 194 Ill. 2d 438, 451-52 , 742 N.E.2d 279 (2000); Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 129 Ill. 2d 497, 506-07 , 544 N.E.2d 733 (1989); Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 123 Ill. 2d 49, 52 , 525 N.E.2d 50 (1988). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Smallwood green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Rozny v. Marnul green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Adamczyk v. Township High School District 214 green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| Leone v. City of Chicago green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| Matter of Baby Boy Doe green | 2 | 1993–1993 |
| Illinois v. Lafayette green | 2 | 1992–1993 |
| Muhlbauer v. Kruzel green | 2 | 1978–1986 |
| Spiller v. Continental Tube Co. green | 2 | 1986–1986 |
| Housing Authority for La Salle County v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n green | 2 | 1986–1986 |
| Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package MacHinery Co. green | 2 | 1978–1986 |
| Kinnare v. City of Chicago green | 2 | 1966–1978 |
| Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 green | 2 | 1966–1972 |
| People v. Hill green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Lutkauskas v. Ricker green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Rose green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Galan green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Nabozny v. Barnhill green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| In Re Pulido green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Lansing v. County of McLean green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Florida v. Wells green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| South Dakota v. Opperman green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Colorado v. Bertine green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Frazer v. A. F. Munsterman, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Heinrich v. Peabody International Corp. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Williams MacHine & Tool Co. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| United States v. Ward green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Nelson v. Araiza green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.