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Issue: judicial estoppel doctrineTX ↗
Issue: judicial estoppel doctrineNH ↗
Issue: party from asserting claimTX ↗
Quoted verbatim 5×
98.7 score
G Cite
cited 25× by 22 distinct cases, 2012–2026 · 7 courts ·
(1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.
at p. 574
⚠ not in text
Topic ↗
cited 8× by 8 distinct cases, 2011–2023 · 5 courts ·
…the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding.
at p. 573
⚠ not in text
Topic ↗
cited 6× by 6 distinct cases, 2013–2023 · 4 courts ·
…because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, courts may apply it flexibly to achieve substantial justice.
at p. 576
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2011
2018
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Babin v. Plaquemines Parish
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
we now affirm the judgment of the district court and state a general rule that, absent unusual circumstances, an innocent trustee can pursue for the benefit of creditors a judgment or cause of action that the debtor fails to disclose in bankruptcy.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Nicole Alward v. Emery Johnston, M.D. & a.
(6×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
the purpose of judicial estoppel ... in this context is to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
ASARCO, LLC v. Montana Resources, Inc.
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, courts may apply it flexibly to achieve substantial justice.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Stephenson Ex Rel. Al-Mansoob v. Malloy
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
jjudicial estoppel must be applied in such a way as to deter dishonest debtors ... while protecting the rights of creditors to an equitable distribution of the assets of the debtor's estate.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
absent unusual circumstances, an innocent bankruptcy trustee may pursue for the benefit of creditors a judgment or cause of action that the debt- or - having concealed that asset during bankruptcy - is himself estopped from pursuing.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wightman v. Ameritas Life Ins
Courts must consider whether: “(1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation modified).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Jackie Burson v. Oil Patch Group, Inc.
(3×)
Constr., Inc., 2025 WL 43585 , at *5 (citing Reed, 650 F.3d at 574).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Larry David Legan v. Travis Hargrave et al.
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
“This approach ‘protect[s] the integrity of the bankruptcy system by deterring debtors from concealing assets’ while also being ‘consistent with the core bankruptcy goal of obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for creditors.’” (In re Parker), 789 F. App’x at 464 (quoting Reed, 650 F.3d at 577).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Charla Turner v. NewRez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, et al.
In the bankruptcy context, “judicial estoppel must be applied in such a way as to deter dishonest debtors, whose failure to fully and honestly disclose all their assets undermines the integrity of the bankruptcy system, while protecting the rights of creditors to an equitable distribution of the assets of the debtor’s estate.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
St. Charles Surgical Hospital, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity D/B/A Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Louisiana, Inc. and Hmo Louisiana, Inc.
Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (reformatted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cadence Bank v. Johnson
But assuming arguendo that it does, the Johnsons had to show (1) Cadence “has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Dundon Capital Partners LLC v. Ebersol
Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Trusty v. Navistar Defense
“The doctrine of judicial estoppel is equitable in nature and can be invoked by a court to prevent a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a position taken in a previous proceeding.” Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
McKinstry Co., LLC v. Nucor Insulated Panel Group LLC, d/b/a Metl-Span
Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (Sth Cir. 2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Keathley v. Buddy Ayers
In a situation like this one, where the personal injury lawsuit was filed in a different district (and even a different circuit) and involves a defendant unrelated to the ongoing bankruptcy proceedings, I believe it best to defer to the bankruptcy court’s evaluation regarding whether the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed. 1 “[W]e apply judicial estoppel against the backdrop of the bankruptcy system and the ends it seeks to achieve.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Royal American Construction, Inc. v. Roofing Designs by JR, LLC
Courts have recognized the importance of judicial estoppel when bankruptcy proceedings are involved because bankruptcy aims to “bring about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s estate among creditors holding just demands’ and to ‘grant a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Kothe v. B.C.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Occidental Petroleum v. Wells Fargo
Because the lodestar when applying judicial estoppel is “achiev[ing] substantial justice,” courts should apply the doctrine “guided by a sense of fairness” and “with the facts of the particular dispute in mind.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574, 576 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Charitable DAF Fund LP v. Highland Capital Management LP
A court examines three criteria when determining the applicability of judicial estoppel: “(1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Porter v. Howard Univ. Hospital
(4×)
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has counseled that the doctrine is not subject to “inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining [its] applicability.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mary Ann Roberts
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 576-79 (5th Cir. 2011), underscored the fundamental purpose of the bankruptcy system in ensuring a fair and equitable distribution of assets to creditors.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Steven Brice Wibracht v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America
Courts look to the following elements: “(1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sambrano v. United Airlines Inc
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
In determining whether to apply judicial estoppel, courts primarily look for the presence of the following criteria: “(1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Id. at 574 (citations omitted).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. Reyes
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
III Judicial estoppel “is ‘an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion’ to ‘protect the integrity of the judicial process.’” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001)). “[J]udicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding.” Id. at 573-74.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hudson v. Skinner
Analysis and Discussion “The doctrine of judicial estoppel is equitable in nature and can be invoked by a court to prevent a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a position taken in a previous proceeding.” Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ikechukwu H. Okorie
Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011). with the courts to suit the exigencies of self interest.” In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330 , 334 (5th Cir. 2004); see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (“[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Byrne v. Wilson
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
“The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Larsen v. Selmet, Inc.
The Fifth Circuit took a different approach in Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F3d 571, 579 (5th Cir 2011), holding that, although judicial estoppel may preclude a debtor from bene- fitting from a concealed claim, judicial estoppel simply did not apply against a bankruptcy trustee who was substituted as the real party in interest because “an innocent bankruptcy trustee may pursue for the benefit of creditors a judgment or cause of action that the debtor—having concealed that asset during bankruptcy—is himself estopped from pursuing.” The 474 Larsen v. Selmet, Inc. court explained that �…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph F. Coates
Ed. 2d 146 (2014) (articulating denial of discharge, judicial sanctions, and criminal sentencing as examples of ways in which courts could address dishonest debtors); Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting how “judicial estoppel must be applied in such a way as to deter dishonest debtors, whose failure to fully and honestly disclose all their assets undermines the integrity of the bankruptcy system”); In re Ira Haupt & Co., 361 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1966) (“The conduct of bankruptcy proceedings not only should be right but must seem right.”)). 64 See ECF …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph F. Coates
Ed. 2d 146 (2014) (articulating denial of discharge, judicial sanctions, and criminal sentencing as examples of ways in which courts could address dishonest debtors); Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting how “judicial estoppel must be applied in such a way as to deter dishonest debtors, whose failure to fully and honestly disclose all their assets undermines the integrity of the bankruptcy system”); In re Ira Haupt & Co., 361 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1966) (“The conduct of bankruptcy proceedings not only should be right but must seem right.”)). 64 See ECF …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re: Kimble
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ed. 2d 968 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he Supreme Court has refused to establish inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel . . . .” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wright & Miller, Preclusion of Inconsistent Positions—Judicial Estoppel, 18B Fed.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Guyton v. Johnson
The purpose of judicial estoppel is “to ‘protect the integrity of the judicial process.’” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (quoting New Hampshire v Maine, 532 U.S. 742 , 749–50 (2001)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Elaine Palasota
(2×)
Whether the elements of judicial estoppel are met The elements of judicial estoppel are: (1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.94 For the first element, Debtor con- tends that Prosperity’s current position in Proofs of Claim Nos. 9, 10, and 11 requesting a sum total of $2,659,668.70 is plainly inconsistent with Prosperity filing three proofs of claim in BVS and Mr. Palasota’s First Bankruptcy and basing it o…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
JANE HM DOE v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF THE DIOCESE OF PHOENIX
Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Carter v. Rollie Transport Inc.
Furthermore, “[b]ecause judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, courts may apply it flexibly to achieve substantial justice.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 576 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McDavid v. McDavid
The Fifth Circuit has stated that judicial estoppel is properly invoked where “(1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Barber v. Wolfgang Puck Worldwide
In the context of bankruptcy, “judicial estoppel must be applied in such a way as to deter dishonest debtors, whose failure to fully and honestly disclose all their assets undermines the integrity of the bankruptcy system, while protecting the rights of creditors to an equitable distribution of the assets of the debtor’s estate.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Bollwitt v. Baptist Memorial Hospital - Golden Triangle, Inc.
Miss. 2016) (citing Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2011)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
SynQor Inc. v. Vicor Corporation
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 , 750–51 (2001); Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harrison, Jr v. Simon
Kan. 1984)). 37 Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011). 38 Reed, 650 F.3d at 574 . 39 Simon's Schedule B and Amended Schedule B describe D Squared in almost identical words, Case No. 19-11330, P-8, p. 6; and P-14, p. 7; Plaintiff's Exhibit 81. 40 Rex-Tech International, LLC v. Rollings (In re Rollings), 451 F.App'x 340, 348 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Bohrer, 266 B.R. 200, 201 (Bankr.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
The Charitable DAF Fund LP v. Highland Capital Management LP
A court examines three criteria when determining the applicability of judicial estoppel: “(1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Weary v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc
Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (“We have held that judicial estoppel is particularly appropriate where a party fails to disclose an asset to a bankruptcy court, but then pursues a claim in a separate tribunal based on that undisclosed asset.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)); e.g., Harrah v. DSW Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 900, 908 (N.D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Optimistic Investments LLC v. Kangaroo Manufacturing Incorporated
This issue was not briefed and will not be considered at this time. 1 quotation marks and citations omitted). 2 Here, the Court “appl[ies] judicial estoppel ‘against the backdrop of the bankruptcy 3 system and the ends it seeks to achieve.’” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th 4 Cir. 2011) (citing Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197 , 208 5 (5th Cir.1999)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Federal National Mortgage Association v. Carroll
“In assessing whether judicial estoppel should apply, [courts] look to see whether the following elements are present: (1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hughes Technical Services, LLC v. Global Consulting and Mechanical Services, LLC
In determining whether judicial estoppel applies, courts in the Fifth Circuit must find three elements: “(1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). 2 Hughes Technical Services, LLC v. Global Consulting & Mechanical Services, LLC, Case No. 5:20-cv-03885, (E.D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lea v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
A “[J]udicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding.” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cannon v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.
V. “[T]o the extent that Plaintiff's claims are the property of the bankruptcy estate, judicial estoppel does not apply to prevent the Trustee from pursuing Plaintiff's claims.” Evans, 2011 WL 4548307 , at *4; cf. Auday v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc., 698 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2012) (“It is by no means clear that the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies when a trustee brings a claim.”); Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574-75 (Sth Cir. 2011) (en banc); Biesek v. Soo Line R.R.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Finalrod IP, LLC v. Endurance Lift Solutions, Inc.
Defendant responds that judicial estoppel “is ‘an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion’ to ‘protect the integrity of the judicial process.’” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Shields v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co
The court may still apply this equitable doctrine “flexibly to achieve substantial justice,” Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 576 (5th Cir. 2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc. v. E-B Display Company, Inc.Do not docket in the case. Case remanded to (239TH Judicial District Court of Brazoria County, Texas).
DISCUSSION A. Forum-Selection Clause EB argues that Matheson consented to this court’s jurisdiction because the Agreements’ forum-selection clause stated that the parties “agree to consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Texas with regard to any dispute arising [thereunder.]”25 A forum-selection clause is “prima facie valid and 20 Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Hall, 327 F.3d at 396 (citing first two elements). 21 Aherns v. Perot Sys.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Simpson v. CLC of West Point
Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574-75 (Sth Cir. 2011).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Diane G. REED, Real party in Interest, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF ARLINGTON, Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee.
v.
CITY OF ARLINGTON, Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee.
08-11098.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Feb 24, 2011.
Jones, Chief Judge, and King, Jolly, Davis, Smith, Garza, Benavides, Stewart, Dennis, Clement, Prado, Owen, Elrod, Southwick and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Published
Todd Alan Hoodenpyle (argued), Larry A. Levrick, Singer & Levick, P.C., Addison, TX, for Reed.
Michael A. McConnell (argued), Marianne Marsh Auld, Matt David Stayton, Kelly, Hart & Hallman, L.L.P., Fort Worth, TX, Denise V. Wilkerson, Asst.[*770] City, Atty., Arlington, TX, for City of Arlington.
Stephen W. Sather, Barbara M. Barron, Barron, Newburger & Sinsley, P.L.L.C., Austin, TX, for Commercial Law League of America, Amicus Curiae.
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and KING, JOLLY, DAVIS, SMITH, GARZA, BENAVIDES, STEWART, DENNIS, CLEMENT, PRADO, OWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.[1]
BY THE COURT:
A member of the court having requested a poll on the petition for rehearing en banc, and a majority of the circuit judges in regular active service and not disqualified having voted in favor,
It is ordered that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc with oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a briefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.
1 Judge Graves did not participate in the poll.