judicial estoppel doctrine in Texas

2024By contrast, “[c]ontradictory positions taken in the same proceeding may raise issues of judicial admission but do not invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel.” Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 6 (emphases added).* We also emphasize that while the prior inconsistent statement must have been intentionally made, the doctrine does not require a court to conclude that a party aimed to purposefully deceive either the first or the second court.

2023See Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2008) (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘precludes a party from adopting a position inconsistent with one that is maintained successfully in an earlier proceeding.’” (citation omitted)); Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Tex. 2000) (“Quasi- estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another’s disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken” and “applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced, or f

2018In order for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply, a party must show the following: “(1) the opposing party made a sworn, inconsistent statement[10] in a prior judicial proceeding; (2) the opposing party making the statement gained some advantage by it; (3) the statement was not made inadvertently or because of mistake, fraud, or duress; and (4) the statement was deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.” Galley v. Apollo Associated Servs., Ltd., 177 S.W.3d 523 , 528–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871 , 875–76 (Tex. 1964); Long v. Knox, 2

2018See Long v. Knox, 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1956) (“Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, as distinguished from equitable estoppel by inconsistency, a party is estopped merely by the fact of having alleged or admitted in his pleadings in a former 13 proceeding under oath the contrary to the assertion sought to be made.” (emphasis added)); In re Marriage of Butts, 444 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Owen v. Knop, 853 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (noting that “the doctrine of judicial estoppel serves to uphold the sanctity of the

2014See Spera v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 25 S.W.3d 863, 871-72 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding that a statement could not be a basis for application of the judicial-estoppel doctrine because it was not sworn); Vinson & Elkins, 946 S.W.2d at 396 (holding that statement by party’s attorney could not be a basis for application of the judicial-estop-pel doctrine because it was not sworn).

2001In Texas, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “bars a party, who has successfully maintained a position in a pri- or judicial proceeding, from later adopting an inconsistent position, unless he can show the prior statement was made inadvertently due to mistake, fraud, or duress.” Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 396 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ dism’d by agr.); Long v. Knox, 155 Tex. 581 , 291 S.W.2d 292 (1956).

2018In order for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply, a party must show the following: “(1) the opposing party made a sworn, inconsistent statement[10] in a prior judicial proceeding; (2) the opposing party making the statement gained some advantage by it; (3) the statement was not made inadvertently or because of mistake, fraud, or duress; and (4) the statement was deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.” Galley v. Apollo Associated Servs., Ltd., 177 S.W.3d 523 , 528–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871 , 875–76 (Tex. 1964); Long v. Knox, 2

2012Galley v. Apollo Associated Servs., 177 S.W.3d 523 , 528–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). ―The doctrine of judicial estoppel ‗precludes a party from adopting a position inconsistent with one that it maintained successfully in an earlier proceeding.‘‖ Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2008) (quoting 2 ROY W.

2010Texas courts look to the law governing the previous proceeding when considering a judicial estoppel claim, see Dallas Sales Co. v. Carlisle Silver Co., 134 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied), while federal courts generally apply the law governing the subsequent proceeding, see Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 602-04 (9th Cir.1996). .

2010Texas courts look to the law governing the previous proceeding when considering a judicial estoppel claim, see Dallas Sales Co. v. Carlisle Silver Co., 134 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied), while federal courts generally apply the law governing the subsequent proceeding, see Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 602-04 (9th Cir.1996). [6] We are likewise not persuaded by Truck's argument that the federal coverage decision expressly incorporates Mid-Continent's statements regarding the possible effects on Truck in its ruling.

2024Materials Corp. of Am., 295 S.W.3d 642, 643 (Tex. 2009) (discussing the doctrine of judicial estoppel)). 5 Permitting Appellant notes that the court in J.S. declined to decide whether a parent who opposes an extension 5 must object before the automatic dismissal date passes.

2016Appellees initially contend appellants waived these issues because 10 See also Ferguson, 295 S.W.3d at 644 (doctrine of judicial estoppel did not apply to bar claims because parties had taken neither a clearly inconsistent position nor obtained an unfair advantage by failing to initially disclose personal injury claim in bankruptcy proceeding). 11 See also In re Paige, 610 F.3d 865, 877 (5th Cir. 2010); Perryman, 2016 WL 796073, at *10 (recognizing court not required to apply judicial estoppel even if elements met) (citing Long, 798 F.3d at 271–72). –17– they failed to timely object to Farmer’

2024“Judicial estoppel bars a party from successfully maintaining a position in one action and then maintaining an inconsistent position in a subsequent action.” Bailey-Mason v. Mason, 334 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).

2013A fact admitted by a prevailing party in a judicial proceeding “is established as a matter of law; the admitting party may not in a second proceeding dispute the admission or introduce evidence contrary to it.” Bailey-Mason v. Mason, 334 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied); see also Ochoa v. Craig, 262 S.W.3d 29, 32 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (“Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a judicially admitted fact is established as a matter of law, and the ad *34 mitting party may not dispute it or introduce evidence contrary to it.”).

2014Long v. Knox, 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1956); Balaban v. Balaban, 712 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2002Long v. Knox , 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1956); Balaban v. Balaban , 712 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2010Texas courts look to the law governing the previous proceeding when considering a judicial estoppel claim, see Dallas Sales Co. v. Carlisle Silver Co., 134 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied), while federal courts generally apply the law governing the subsequent proceeding, see Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 602-04 (9th Cir.1996). .

2010Texas courts look to the law governing the previous proceeding when considering a judicial estoppel claim, see Dallas Sales Co. v. Carlisle Silver Co., 134 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied), while federal courts generally apply the law governing the subsequent proceeding, see Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 602-04 (9th Cir.1996). [6] We are likewise not persuaded by Truck's argument that the federal coverage decision expressly incorporates Mid-Continent's statements regarding the possible effects on Truck in its ruling.

2012In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 206 .

2005See In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 206-07 .

2018See Long v. Knox, 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1956) (“Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, as distinguished from equitable estoppel by inconsistency, a party is estopped merely by the fact of having alleged or admitted in his pleadings in a former 13 proceeding under oath the contrary to the assertion sought to be made.” (emphasis added)); In re Marriage of Butts, 444 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Owen v. Knop, 853 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (noting that “the doctrine of judicial estoppel serves to uphold the sanctity of the

2000The doctrine of judicial estoppel “bars a party, who has successfully maintained a position in a prior judicial proceeding, from later adopting an inconsistent position, unless he can show the prior statement was made inadvertently due to mistake, fraud, or duress.” Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 396 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ dism’d by agr.) (citing Owen v. Knop, 853 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied)).

2014“This rule is based on the public policy that it would be absurd and manifestly unjust to permit a party to recover after he has sworn himself out of court by a clear and unequivocal statement.” In re Spooner, 333 S.W.3d at 764 ; Bowen v. Robinson, 227 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see also Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.2008) (“Contradictory positions taken in the same proceeding may raise issues of judicial admission but do not invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel.”); Eckland Consultants, Inc. v. Ryder, Stilwell Inc., 174

2014“This rule is based on the public policy that it would be absurd and manifestly unjust to permit a party to recover after he has sworn himself out of court by a clear and unequivocal statement.” In re Spooner, 333 S.W.3d at 764 ; Bowen v. Robinson, 227 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see also Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2008) (“Contradictory positions taken in the same proceeding may raise issues of judicial admission but do not invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel.”); Eckland Consultants, Inc. v. Ryder, Stilwell Inc.,

2014See Graves, 329 S.W.3d at 138 ; Vinson & Elkins, 946 S.W.2d at 396-97 .

2014See Graves, 329 S.W.3d at 138 ; Vinson & Elkins, 946 S.W.2d at 396-97 .

2014See id. (“The public policy concerning judicial admissions is that it would be unjust to permit a party to recover after he has sworn himself out of court by a clear, unequivocal statement.”); see also Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 6 (noting that “essential function” of related doctrine of judicial estoppel “is to prevent the use of intentional self-contradiction as a means of obtaining unfair advantage”).

2014See id. (“The public policy concerning judicial admissions is that it would be unjust to permit a party to recover after he has sworn himself out of court by a clear, unequivocal statement.”); see also Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 6 (noting that “essential function” of related doctrine of judicial estoppel “is to prevent the use of intentional self-contradiction as a means of obtaining unfair advantage”).

2014“The doctrine of judicial estoppel is designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing a party from ‘playing fast and loose’ with the courts to suit his own purposes.” Bailey-Mason v. Mason, 334 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (citing Webb v. City of Dallas, 211 S.W.3d 808, 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied)).

2007Peck v. Peck, 172 S.W.3d 26, 31 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied); see also Webb v. City of Dallas, 211 S.W.3d 808, 820 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. filed).

2013See Gevinson v. - 16 - 04-11-00496-CV CONCLUSION Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel and because there was no evidence to support the finding that the notice of foreclosure had not been posted twenty-one days before the foreclosure sale, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 5 Karen Angelini, Justice Manhattan Construction Co., 449 S.W.2d 458, 466 (Tex. 1969) (explaining that while “[i]t has been said that one who introduces a document vouches for its accuracy and will not be allowed to impeach or contradict its recitals,” thi

1997See Gevinson v. Manhattan Construction Co. of Oklahoma, 449 S.W.2d 458, 466 (Tex.1969); see also Thomas v. St.

2011See Schmidt v. State, 278 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); Davidson v. State, 111 S.W.2d 942 , 948 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, pet. ref’d) (explaining that judicial estoppel prevents a "party who has taken a position in an earlier proceeding from taking a contrary position at a later time," and therefore holding that a defendant was prohibited on appeal from contesting the cause of a victim’s death when the defendant's counsel conceded at trial that the death was caused by gunshot wounds). .In the trial court, within a response to one of appellant’s writ applications, the State claimed that s

2011See Schmidt v. State, 278 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009); Davidson v. State, 737 S.W.2d 942, 948 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, pet. ref'd) (explaining that judicial estoppel prevents a "party who has taken a position in an earlier proceeding from taking a contrary position at a later time," and therefore holding that a defendant was prohibited on appeal from contesting the cause of a victim's death when the defendant's counsel conceded at trial that the death was caused by gunshot wounds). [14] In the trial court, within a response to one of appellant's writ applications, the State claimed th

2009See Brown v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc ., 124 S.W.3d 883, 898 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

2009See Brown v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 883, 898 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

2005See Jernigan v. Langley, 111 S.W.3d 153, 156-57 (Tex.2003) (noting that waiver is defined as "an intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right"); Long, 291 S.W.2d at 295 ("Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel ... a party is estopped merely by the fact of having alleged or admitted in his pleadings in a former proceeding under oath the contrary to the assertion sought to be made.”).

2005See Jernigan v. Langley, 111 S.W.3d 153, 156-57 (Tex. 2003) (noting that waiver is defined as “an intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right”); Long , 291 S.W. at 295 (“Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel . . . a party is estopped merely by the fact of having alleged or admitted in his pleadings in a former proceeding under oath the contrary to the assertion sought to be made.”).

2005See Brandon v. Interfirst Corp. , 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988).

2005See Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir.1988).

2004The judicial estoppel doctrine is not true estoppel at all, but arises from “positive rules of procedure based on justice and public policy issues.” Loveless, 64 S.W.3d at 578 ; DeWoody, 951 S.W.2d at 944 .

2004The judicial estoppel doctrine is not true estoppel at all, but arises from “positive rules of procedure based on justice and public policy issues.” Loveless , 64 S.W.3d at 578 ; DeWoody , 951 S.W.2d at 944 .

2004The judicial estoppel doctrine is not true estoppel at all, but arises from “positive rules of procedure based on justice and public policy issues.” Loveless, 64 S.W.3d at 578 ; DeWoody, 951 S.W.2d at 944 .

2004The judicial estoppel doctrine is not true estoppel at all, but arises from “positive rules of procedure based on justice and public policy issues.” Loveless , 64 S.W.3d at 578 ; DeWoody , 951 S.W.2d at 944 .

2018In order for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply, a party must show the following: “(1) the opposing party made a sworn, inconsistent statement[10] in a prior judicial proceeding; (2) the opposing party making the statement gained some advantage by it; (3) the statement was not made inadvertently or because of mistake, fraud, or duress; and (4) the statement was deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.” Galley v. Apollo Associated Servs., Ltd., 177 S.W.3d 523 , 528–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871 , 875–76 (Tex. 1964); Long v. Knox, 2

1988See Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 874-75 (Tex.1964).

2015The Ninth Circuit in Dunmore v. U.S., 358 F.3d 1107 , 1113 n.3, commented only that Dunmore’s omission of certain claims during his Chapter 7 bankruptcy “would ordinarily act as judicial estoppel against his asserting those very same claims against the Government,” but that the district court judge had allowed him to remedy his inconsistent assertions by reopening his bankruptcy case which “was a permissible alternative to judicial estoppel.” 31 Similarly, in Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571 (2011),14 the Fifth Circuit held that while the debtor himself was properly estopped for his dis

2013Further, in the context of a prior bankruptcy proceeding, a court should apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel “against the backdrop of the bankruptcy system and the ends it seeks to achieve.” Reed, 650 F.3d at 574 (citations omitted).

2009The Barnharts relied heavily in the trial court on In re Superior Crewboats, Inc. , 374 F.3d 330 , 333-34 (5th Cir. 2004), to support the application of a judicial estoppel defense to the trustee based on English = s conduct.

2009The Barnharts relied heavily in the trial court on In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 333-34 (5th Cir.2004), to support the application of a judicial estoppel defense to the trustee based on English’s conduct.

2009See Long v. Knox , 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1956); Steffan v. Steffan , 29 S.W.3d 627 , 631 B 32 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

2009See Long v. Knox, 155 Tex. 581 , 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (1956); Steffan v. Steffan, 29 S.W.3d 627, 631-32 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).