Ficara v. Belleau, 117 N.E.2d 287 (Mass. 1954). · Go Syfert
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Ficara v. Belleau, 117 N.E.2d 287 (Mass. 1954). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1999 · …it is not the policy of our law to award damages which would put a plaintiff in a better position than if the defendant had carried out his contract. at p. 82 ✓
68 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Guilfoile v. Shields (mad, 2021-09-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1957 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1957 1991 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Guilfoile v. Shields
D. Mass. · 2021 · confidence medium
Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82 (1954) (noting that a plaintiff is “entitled to be made whole and no more”); see Nat’l Fire Protection Ass’n v. Intern.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scottsdale Insurance Company v. Byrne
D. Mass. · 2018 · confidence medium
If the insurer’s refusal to defend was made in “good faith,” as is here, “there is no reason not to apply normal contract principles.” Polaroid Corp., 414 Mass. at 763 (citing Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82-83 (1954)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Holber v. Suffolk Construction Co. (In re Red Rock Services Co.)
Bankr. E.D. Pa. · 2012 · confidence medium
Corp, 362 Mass. 306 , 285 N.E.2d 904, 907 (1972) quoting Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80 , 117 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1954) (internal citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) 275 Washington Street Corp. v. Hudson River International, LLC
Mass. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
Ordinarily, in actions for breach of contract, “[t]he plaintiff is entitled to be made whole and no more.” Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82 (1954).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Normandin v. Eastland Partners, Inc.
Mass. App. Ct. · 2007 · confidence medium
Co., 272 Mass. 49, 54 (1930); Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82 (1954); Foster v. Bartolomeo, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 592, 595-596 (1991).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kattar v. Demoulas
Mass. · 2000 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82 (1954) (contract); Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 280-281 (1943) (tort).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cooney Industrial Trucks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
1st Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has said, “[i]t is not the policy of our law to award damages which would put a plaintiff in a better position than if the defendant had carried out his contract.” Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82 , 117 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1954).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cooney Industrial v. Toyota Motors Sales (2×)
1st Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has said, "[i]t is not the policy of our law to award damages which would put a plaintiff in a better position than if the defendant had carried out his contract." Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82, 117 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1954).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Foster v. Bartolomeo
Mass. App. Ct. · 1991 · confidence medium
Bartlett Tree Expert Co. v. Hartney, 308 Mass. 407, 412 (1941); Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82 (1954); Louise Caroline Nursing Home, Inc. v. Dix Constr.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pas-Teur, Inc. v. Energy Sciences, Inc.
Mass. App. Ct. · 1981 · confidence medium
See Jewett v. Warriner, 237 Mass. 36, 38 (1921); Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 81 (1954); Mayer v. Boston Metropolitan Airport, Inc., supra at 354.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roblin Hope Industries, Inc. v. J. A. Sullivan Corp.
Mass. App. Ct. · 1980 · confidence medium
By his decision in our case the trial judge did not put Hope’s in a better position than if it had received and performed the subcontract (cf. Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82 [1954]), but merely awarded Hope’s what (so far as disclosed by the evidence) would have put Hope’s “in as good a position as if” it had not been deprived wrongfully of the opportunity to perform the subcontract. 4 See Concannon v. Galanti, 348 Mass. 71, 74 (1964).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McKenna v. Begin (2×)
Mass. App. Ct. · 1977 · confidence medium
Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82 (1954).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Newton Housing Authority v. Cumberland Construction Co.
Mass. App. Ct. · 1977 · confidence medium
Its first contention, in substance, is that the general guaranty (see fn. 2) supplanted the Authority’s common law right to recover from Cumberland contract damages for defective work (see Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 81 [1954]; Restatement: Contracts, §346 [1932]) and barred recovery unless the Authority had, under the general guaranty, given Cumberland notice of and requested that it remedy Moore’s failure to install the gutter lining system and unless Cumberland had thereupon refused to remedy the defects in the system.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DiMare v. Capaldi
Mass. · 1957 · confidence medium
This is true notwithstanding the master’s finding that the defendant has not made “substantial performance in good faith.” Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 81-82 (by which the rule in the lines of cases headed by Sipley v. Stickney, 190 Mass. 43, 46 , and Glazer v. Schwartz, 276 Mass. 54 , was held inapplicable to facts comparable to those here presented, where the plaintiff owners are attempting to recover damages for the defendant’s wilful breach and malperformance).
discussed Cited "see" JANEY CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTING, INC. v. RANDI LOUISE WHITMORE GUSCOTT & Others. (2×)
Mass. App. Ct. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82 (1954).
cited Cited "see" Polaroid Corp. v. the Travelers Indemnity Co.
Mass. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82-83 (1954).
cited Cited "see" P. J. Riley & Co. v. Aberthaw Construction Co.
Mass. App. Ct. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82-83 (1954); Dimare v. Capaldi, 336 Mass. 497, 501-502 (1957); and Louise Caroline Nursing Home, Inc. v. Dix Constr.
discussed Cited "see" Kirk Reid Company v. Fine (2×)
Va. · 1965 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80 , 117 N. E. 2d 287 ; DiMare v. Capaldi, 336 Mass. 497 , 146 N. E. 2d 517 .
cited Cited "see" Concannon v. Galanti
Mass. · 1964 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 82 ; DiMare v. Capaldi, 336 Mass. 497, 502 . 3.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cashman Equipment Corp. v. United States Fire Insurance (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2010 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 81 , 117 N.E.2d 287 (Mass.1954).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cashman Equipment Corp. v. United States Fire Insurance (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2010 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 81 , 117 N.E.2d 287 (Mass.1954).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Williams v. Gulf Insurance
Mass. App. Ct. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Ficara v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80, 81 (1954); Colangeli v. Construction Serv.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Samuel Ficara vs. Ernest Belleau & Another
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Jan 27, 1954.
117 N.E.2d 287
1954 Mass. LEXIS 459
Edward M. Dangel, (Leo E. Sherry & William F. Regan with him,) for the plaintiff., Richard L. Sisk, for the defendants.
Qua, Lummus, Wilkins, Spalding, Counihan.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published
Wilkins, J.

By a contract in writing the defendants agreed to install a heating and cooling system for the plaintiff. An auditor, whose findings of facts were to be final, found that the contract price was $6,200; that the defendants intentionally and wilfully abandoned the contract after the plaintiff had paid them $4,200; that the plaintiff reasonably paid $2,361 to another contractor to perform the balance of the work; and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover $2,361. A judge of the Superior Court ordered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $361, and the plaintiff appealed.

It was the duty of the judge, and is now our duty, to enter the correct judgment on the auditor’s report. Union Old Lowell National Bank v. Paine, 318 Mass. 313, 315.[*81] By the stringent rule of Sipley v. Stickney, 190 Mass. 43, any wilful default in the performance of a contract bars recovery. Walsh v. Atlantic Research Associates, Inc. 321 Mass. 57, 62. Grills v. Miller, 322 Mass. 21, 26. Chaplain v. Dugas, 323 Mass. 91, 93. Morgan-National Woodworking Co. Inc. v. Cline, 324 Mass. 15, 17. Thus, the defendants were barred in their cross action for breach of contract which was tried with the case at bar.

The plaintiff seeks to extend this doctrine in such a way as to collect exemplary damages and to obtain a $6,200 heating and cooling system for $4,200. It will be noted that the same rule of law, if sound and accepted as the court’s idea of justice, would apply if the contract price had been $62,000 and the reasonable cost of completion had been $62,361.

Restatement: Contracts, § 346, states the rule to be: “(1) For a breach by one who has contracted to construct a specified product, the other party can get judgment for compensatory damages for all unavoidable harm that the builder had reason to foresee when the contract was made, less such part of the contract price as has not been paid and is not still payable, determined as follows: (a) For defective or unfinished construction he can get judgment for . . . (i) the reasonable cost of construction and completion in accordance with the contract, if this is possible and does not involve unreasonable economic waste . . ..” See illustrations of subsection (1) 1, 4, and 5; McCormick on Damages, § 169.

We think that this is the proper rule to apply here. The plaintiff relies upon Glazer v. Schwartz, 276 Mass. 54, where a builder of a house for the contract price of $14,700 wilfully defaulted after receiving $13,000. The value of the house as left by the builder fell short by only $700 of what its value would have been if the contract had been fully performed. The builder brought a bill in equity against the owner to establish a mechanic’s lien and was denied relief. The owner sought affirmative relief for damages. “The[*82] trial judge . . . decided that, as the damage to the defendant was less than the unpaid balance of the contract price, no recovery could be had on the defendant’s answer in the nature of a cross bill” (page 58). In reversing the ruling on relief to the owner, it was said, at page 59, “Because of the plaintiff’s intentional default in failing to build the house as required by the specifications the defendant is entitled to affirmative relief, and the amount of her damage is to be based on the cost of making the structure conform in a reasonable way to the contract.” In so far as the Glazer case is an authority against the ruling of the trial judge in the case at bar, we do not follow it. Professor Williston has described the Glazer case as a harsh application of a severe doctrine. Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed.) § 842, note 4. We mention two cases not cited to us. In Pelatowski v. Black, 213 Mass. 428, 431, the court distinguished “cases where a contractor has abandoned his work while yet unfinished, or has left undone some details merely which he ought to have supplied,” where, it was said, “the measure of damages to be recovered or recouped well might be the reasonable cost of completing the work.” This statement as to a possible measure of damages was quoted in Walsh v. Cornwell, 272 Mass. 555, 564. In neither case was the statement necessary to the decision.

It is not the policy of our law to award damages which would put a plaintiff in a better position than if the defendant had carried out his contract. Magnolia Metal Co. v. Gale, 189 Mass. 124, 132-133. Snelling v. Dine, 270 Mass. 501, 506. Bucholz v. Green Bros. Co. 272 Mass. 49, 54. Associated Perfumers, Inc. v. Andelman, 316 Mass. 176, 185-186. “The fundamental principle upon which the rule of damages is based is compensation. . . . Compensation is the value of the performance of the contract, that is, what the plaintiff would have made had the contract been performed.” F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co. v. Hartney, 308 Mass. 407, 412. There is nothing to the contrary in Stevens v. William S. Howe Co. 275 Mass. 398, 402-403.

The plaintiff is entitled to be made whole and no more.[*83] This is true in an action against a defendant for breach of contract, albeit a wilful one, even though the same defendant in suing as a plaintiff on the same contract might be barred by the rule of Sipley v. Stickney.

Order for judgment affirmed.