Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
18 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1938–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bernier v. Berniergreen1 sentence2024See Bernier v. Bernier, 449 Mass. 774, 797 (2007) ("Before a claim will be barred on the ground of claim preclusion, it must be established that the claim was actually and necessarily decided in a prior action or that there was a full and fair opportunity to have done so that was not taken" [emphasis added]). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Watkinsgreen1 sentence2023See Watkins, 425 Mass. at 840 ("We presume that a jury follow all instructions given to [them] . . ."). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Proulxgreen2 sentences2019See Proulx , 61 Mass. App. Ct. at 464 , 811 N.E.2d 993 ("the [present] case was not tried on the theory now advanced on appeal"). 2019See Proulx , 61 Mass. App. Ct. at 464 , 811 N.E.2d 993 ("the [present] case was not tried on the theory now advanced on appeal"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Millsgreen1 sentence2018See Commonwealth v. Mills , 436 Mass. 387 , 391 (2002) (defendant made general motion for required finding, but raised specific argument on appeal, which court reviewed without reservation). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sandersgreen1 sentence2015See Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 463 Mass. 37, 48-49 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 300 (2008), and Commonwealth v. *184 Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 848 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Oliveiragreen1 sentence2015See Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 463 Mass. 37, 48-49 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 300 (2008), and Commonwealth v. *184 Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 848 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Szlachtagreen1 sentence2015See Commonwealth v. Szlachta, 463 Mass. 37, 48-49 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 300 (2008), and Commonwealth v. *184 Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 848 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Urserygreen1 sentence1998See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288-289 (1996) (applying two-part analytical framework); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963) (introducing seven factor analysis). | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen1 sentence1998See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288-289 (1996) (applying two-part analytical framework); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963) (introducing seven factor analysis). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Robertsgreen1 sentence1998See Commonwealth v. Roberts, 378 Mass. 116, 130 (1979) (as long as instructions are “adequate and clear ... on the applicable law, the phraseology, method and extent of the charge are matters within [the judge’s] discretion”). | 1 | 1 |
O'Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc.green1 sentence1994The case stands like O’Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 905, 906 (1993), where we said that “a party cannot create a disputed issue of fact by the expedient of contradicting by affidavit statements previously made under oath at a deposition.” On the undisputed material facts, the motion judge correctly allowed Precise’s motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ramosgreen1 sentence1993See Ramos, supra at 215 n.5. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Stokesgreen1 sentence1981Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 590-591 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Hankerson v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences1980The charge in question was given before the decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684 (1976); the Supreme Court had given the Mullaney case "complete retroactive effect" in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 241, 243 (1977); and we did not require "clairvoyance on the part of defense counsel." But we need not "apply a narrow and precise test"; the charge must "be examined in its entirety to determine whether the constitutional requirements have been met." We will "bring greater expectations, and consequently more careful scrutiny 1980The charge in question was given before the decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684 (1976); the Supreme Court had given the Mullaney case “complete retroactive effect” in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 241, 243 (1977); and we did not require “clairvoyance on the part of defense counsel.” But we need not “apply a narrow and precise test”; the charge must “be examined in its entirety to determine whether the constitutional requirements have been met.” We will “bring greater expectations, and consequently more careful scrutiny | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Wingogreen1 sentence1980These factors, as stated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), are the following: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” This is the precise test expressly applied in United States v. Campbell, supra at 1335 , and in United States v. Campisi, supra at 694 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. O'LEARYgreen1 sentence1967See Commonwealth v. O’Leary, 347 Mass. 387, 389-390 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lucente
green
2 sentences1993Thus, as the Supreme Court of Illinois has stated, “the precise standard lies somewhere between mere denials on the *50 one hand and proof by a preponderance [of the evidence] on the other.” Lucente, supra at 152 . 1988While the court in Lucente did state a preference for case-by-case determinations of Franks issues where anonymous informants are involved, the same court also cautioned that “the precise standard lies somewhere between mere denials on the one hand and proof by a preponderance on the other.” Lucente, supra at 152 . | 2 | 1988–1993 |
Commonwealth v. Rutkowski
green
1 sentence2015The defendant’s argument is unavailing because the judge instructed the jury in accordance with Rutkowski, supra. 12 A judge is not required to give the precise instruction proposed by the defendant or as set forth in Gould . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
1 sentence2012However, pursuant to art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Massachusetts courts employ a more precise standard based on the principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Spinelli v. United States
red
1 sentence2012However, pursuant to art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Massachusetts courts employ a more precise standard based on the principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Upton
green
1 sentence2012In Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 (1985), the Court reaffirmed the application of the Aguilar-Spinellistandard in Massachusetts. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences1980The charge in question was given before the decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684 (1976); the Supreme Court had given the Mullaney case "complete retroactive effect" in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 241, 243 (1977); and we did not require "clairvoyance on the part of defense counsel." But we need not "apply a narrow and precise test"; the charge must "be examined in its entirety to determine whether the constitutional requirements have been met." We will "bring greater expectations, and consequently more careful scrutiny 1980The charge in question was given before the decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684 (1976); the Supreme Court had given the Mullaney case “complete retroactive effect” in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 241, 243 (1977); and we did not require “clairvoyance on the part of defense counsel.” But we need not “apply a narrow and precise test”; the charge must “be examined in its entirety to determine whether the constitutional requirements have been met.” We will “bring greater expectations, and consequently more careful scrutiny | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Mullaney v. Wilbur
green
2 sentences1980The charge in question was given before the decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684 (1976); the Supreme Court had given the Mullaney case "complete retroactive effect" in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 241, 243 (1977); and we did not require "clairvoyance on the part of defense counsel." But we need not "apply a narrow and precise test"; the charge must "be examined in its entirety to determine whether the constitutional requirements have been met." We will "bring greater expectations, and consequently more careful scrutiny 1980The charge in question was given before the decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684 (1976); the Supreme Court had given the Mullaney case “complete retroactive effect” in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 241, 243 (1977); and we did not require “clairvoyance on the part of defense counsel.” But we need not “apply a narrow and precise test”; the charge must “be examined in its entirety to determine whether the constitutional requirements have been met.” We will “bring greater expectations, and consequently more careful scrutiny | 1 | 1980–1980 |
United States v. William B. Campbell
green
1 sentence1980These factors, as stated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), are the following: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” This is the precise test expressly applied in United States v. Campbell, supra at 1335 , and in United States v. Campisi, supra at 694 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
United States v. Anthony Campisi, Peter S. Campisi, Peter A. Campisi, Carman Charles Campisi. Appeal of Peter A. Campisi
green
1 sentence1980These factors, as stated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), are the following: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” This is the precise test expressly applied in United States v. Campbell, supra at 1335 , and in United States v. Campisi, supra at 694 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Andre v. Maguire
green
1 sentence1970Andre v. Maguire, 305 Mass. 515, 516 .” The harshness of this doctrine that enables an owner to receive the benefit of some of the work without payment was recognized in Fi cana v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Ficara v. Belleau
green
1 sentence1970Andre v. Maguire, 305 Mass. 515, 516 .” The harshness of this doctrine that enables an owner to receive the benefit of some of the work without payment was recognized in Fi cana v. Belleau, 331 Mass. 80 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Carlton v. City of Salem
green
1 sentence1951But on page 260 in discussing the case of Carlton v. Salem, 103 Mass. 141 , the court may possibly have failed to give full recognition to the fact that subsequently to the Carlton case the statute had been completely redrafted and broadened by St. 1898, c. 490,. § 1, and that the precise requirement that the town must have voted “to raise [[money)] by taxation or pledge of its credit, or to pay from its treasury” had been superseded by the simple provision, “When a city or town or any of its officers or agents are about to raise or expend money or incur obligations . . ..” Dowling v. Assessor | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Dowling v. Board of Assessors
green
1 sentence1951But on page 260 in discussing the case of Carlton v. Salem, 103 Mass. 141 , the court may possibly have failed to give full recognition to the fact that subsequently to the Carlton case the statute had been completely redrafted and broadened by St. 1898, c. 490,. § 1, and that the precise requirement that the town must have voted “to raise [[money)] by taxation or pledge of its credit, or to pay from its treasury” had been superseded by the simple provision, “When a city or town or any of its officers or agents are about to raise or expend money or incur obligations . . ..” Dowling v. Assessor | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Fifty Associates v. Grace
neutral
1 sentence1938Fifty Associates v. Grace, 125 Mass. 161, 163 . | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.