Woodson v. City of New York, 715 N.E.2d 96 (NY 1999). · Go Syfert
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Woodson v. City of New York, 715 N.E.2d 96 (NY 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
35 citation events (32 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Piotrowski v. Town of Cheektowaga (nyappdiv, 2024-11-15)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Piotrowski v. Town of Cheektowaga
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · confidence medium
Here, the Town's submissions, including plaintiff's deposition testimony, established that plaintiff fell on the curb ramp in question, which "functionally fulfills the same purpose that a standard sidewalk would serve," and thus constitutes a sidewalk for purposes of the prior written notice provision in Town Code § 168-2 ( Woodson v City of New York , 93 NY2d 936, 938 [1999]; see Hinton v Village of Pulaski , 33 NY3d 931 , 932-933 [2019]; see also Donnelly v Village of Perry , 88 AD2d 764, 765 [4th Dept 1982]).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Randall M. Hinton v. Village of Pulaski (3×)
NY · 2019 · confidence medium
In Woodson v City of New York, this Court determined that a stairway may be classified as a sidewalk for purposes of a prior written notice statute if it “functionally fulfills the same purpose that a standard sidewalk would serve” ( 93 NY2d 936, 937-938 [1999], citing Donnelly v Village of Perry, 88 AD2d 764, 765 [4th Dept 1982] [holding that steps between a roadway and public sidewalk were “the equivalent of a sidewalk” because they “provide(d) a passageway for the public”] and Youngblood v Village of Cazenovia, 118 Misc 2d 1020, 1022 [Sup Ct, Madison County 1982] [holding that s…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Van Wageningen v. City of Ithaca
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Inasmuch as the trail is a paved walkway that connects two public thoroughfares and affords individuals a general right of passage between them, it is "the functional equivalent of a sidewalk or highway" to which the prior written notice statute applies ( Mullen v Town of Hempstead , 66 AD3d 745, 746 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 717 [2010]; see General Municipal Law § 50-e [4]; Woodson v City of New York , 93 NY2d 936, 937 [1999]; Kadlecik v Village of Endicott , 174 AD2d 923, 924 [1991]; Oprisko v Jobbers , 158 AD2d 875, 876 [1990]; cf. Quackenbush v City of Buffalo , 43 AD3d 1386, 1388 [2007])…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. County of Nassau
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the County could *808 require prior written notice of the icy condition because the landing on the exterior steps of the building where the accident occurred provided the public with a general right of passage, and thus served the same functional purpose as a sidewalk, which is one of the locations specifically enumerated in General Municipal Law § 50-e (4) (see Groninger v Village of Mamaroneck, 17 NY3d 125, 129 [2011]; Woodson v City of New York, 93 NY2d 936, 937-938 [1999]; Loiaconi v Village of Tarrytown, 36 AD3d 864, 865 [2007]; Mullen v Town of …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dutka v. Odierno
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Since the plaintiffs did not allege that the Town had received prior written notice of any obstructed sight lines in and around the subject intersection, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the Town’s motion which was to dismiss that claim (see Woodson v City of New York, 93 NY2d 936, 937 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dutka v. Odierno
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
Since the plaintiffs did not allege that the Town had received prior written notice of any obstructed sight lines in and around the subject intersection, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the Town’s motion which was to dismiss that claim (see Woodson v City of New York, 93 NY2d 936, 937 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Oliveri v. Village of Greenport
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the prior written notice provision of Village Law § 6-628 is applicable to the location of her accident (see Holmes v Town of Oyster Bay, 82 AD3d 1047, 1048-1049 [2011]; Malone v Town of Southold, 303 AD2d 651, 652 [2003]; see generally Groninger v Village of Mamaroneck, 17 NY3d 125, 129 [2011]; Woodson v City of New York, 93 NY2d 936, 937 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Groninger v. Village of Mamaroneck (2×)
NY · 2011 · confidence medium
Specifically, this Court noted that the Administrative Code of the City of New York’s definition of “sidewalk” included the term “stairway,” and concluded that the Administrative Code’s notice requirement did not run afoul of General Municipal Law § 50-e (4) because a stairway “functionally fulfills the same purpose” as a standard sidewalk, save for the fact that the former is “vertical instead of horizontal” (Woodson, 93 NY2d at 937, 938 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Giarraffa v. Town of Babylon
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
Contrary to the Town’s contention, the dirt-covered area providing access to boats moored at the slips within Tanner Park is neither a boardwalk nor other functional equivalent of a sidewalk (see Selca v City of Peekskill, 78 AD3d 1160, 1160-1161 [2010] [floating dock was not a sidewalk, highway or pathway]; see also Iannuzzi v Town of Wallkill, 54 AD3d 812, 813 [2008] [unpaved dirt path in a public park did not constitute a sidewalk within the meaning of prior written notice law]; Davis v County of Nassau, 166 AD2d 498, 498 [1990] [“path in a park” did not constitute a sidewalk]; see ge…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holmes v. Town of Oyster Bay
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the area in which she fell was within the purview of the Town’s prior written notice law (see Woodson v City of New York, 93 NY2d 936, 937 [1999]; Mullen v Town of Hempstead, 66 AD3d 745 [2009]; see generally Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d at 474; Doremus v Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook, 18 NY2d 362, 366 [1966]), and the plaintiff does not assert that an exception to the prior written notice requirement is applicable here (see Regan v Town of N. Hempstead, 66 AD3d 863 [2009]; Delgado v County of Suffolk, 40 AD3d 575 [2007]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Antenozzi v. Village of Spencerport
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2009 · confidence medium
A stairway leading from a sidewalk up to a paved path in a municipal park was determined to “functionally fulfill[ ] the same purpose that a standard sidewalk would serve on flat topography, except that it is vertical instead of horizontal” (Woodson v City of New York, 93 NY2d 936, 938 [1999]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Quackenbush v. City of Buffalo
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
We reject the City’s contention that the unimproved “trail” or “path” upon which plaintiff was injured is the functional equivalent of a sidewalk (cf. Woodson v City of New York, 93 NY2d 936, 937-938 [1999]; Garrison v City of New York, 300 AD2d 14 , 15 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 510 [2003]; Rutto v County of Westchester, 298 AD2d 450, 450-451 [2002]; Scoville v Town of Amherst, 277 AD2d 1038 [2000]).
discussed Cited "see" Sanchez v. County of Nassau
N.Y. App. Div. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
The County demonstrated, prima facie, that its prior written notice statute applied here because the concrete island with the protruding metal "served the same functional purpose as a sidewalk" ( Walker v County of Nassau , 147 AD3d at 808 ; see Woodson v City of New York , 93 NY2d at 938 ).
discussed Cited "see" DeMaioribus v. Town of Cheektowaga
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
A stairway, although not explicitly mentioned by the statute, may be subject to the notice requirement when the stairway " 'functionally fulfills the same purpose that a standard sidewalk would serve' " ( Hinton v Village of Pulaski , 33 NY3d 931 , 932 [2019]; see Woodson v City of New York , 93 NY2d 936, 937-938 [1999]).
cited Cited "see" Torain v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Judith M., 93 N.Y.2d at 933, 693 N.Y.S.2d 67 , 715 N.E.2d at 96 ; Loughry, 67 N.Y.2d at 377-78 , 502 N.Y.S.2d 965 , 494 N.E.2d at 74 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Larry B. Woodson, Respondent,
v.
City of New York, Appellant
New York Court of Appeals.
Jun 3, 1999.
715 N.E.2d 96
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel of New York City (Paul L. Herzfeld and Francis F. Caputo of counsel), for appellant., Seligson, Rothman & Rothman, New York City (Alyne I. Diamond, Martin S. Rothman and Andrea Freund of counsel), for respondent.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Bellacosa, Smith, Levine, Ciparick, Wesley and Rosenblatt Concur in Memorandum.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with[*937] costs, and the complaint dismissed.

Plaintiff was injured when he fell on a defective concrete stairway leading from a Bronx sidewalk up to a municipal park. The stairway, which was constructed from the same material as the sidewalk below it, was connected at its top with a paved path through the park. Plaintiff sued the City and won a jury verdict that was affirmed by the Appellate Division. The issue before this Court, by our grant of leave to defendant City, turns on whether the City can require prior written notice of the defective condition as a prerequisite to the lawsuit (Administrative Code of the City of NY, tit 7, ch 2, § 7-201 [c] [2]; General Municipal Law § 50-e [4]).

Section 7-201 (c) (2) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York provides, in pertinent part, that no civil action shall be maintained for personal injury sustained as a result of a defect in any sidewalk unless written notice of the condition was previously given to appropriate municipal officials. The Code defines “sidewalk” as including “a boardwalk, underpass, pedestrian walk or path, step and stairway” (Administrative Code, tit 7, ch 2, § 7-201 [c] [1] [b] [emphasis supplied]).

General Municipal Law § 50-e (4) explicitly limits prior written notice statutes to streets, highways, bridges, culverts, sidewalks and crosswalks. Plaintiff argues that a “stairway,” even of the kind involved in this case, is categorically different from a “sidewalk,” and that by urging the necessity for prior written notice of stairway defects, the City would add another location to the six enumerated in section 50-e (4).

Plaintiff’s characterization is unpersuasive. The City’s Administrative Code reasonably recognizes that when stairs are integrated with, or serve as part of, a connected standard sidewalk, they plainly fall within the meaning of that already existing category (see, e.g., Donnelly v Village of Perry, 88 AD2d 764; Youngblood v Village of Cazenovia, 118 Misc 2d 1020, affd on opn below 93 AD2d 962). Since plaintiff did not allege that the City had prior written notice of the defect, the complaint must be dismissed.

This interpretation of General Municipal Law § 50-e (4) and the City Administrative Code, moreover, is consistent with Walker v Town of Hempstead (84 NY2d 360). There, the Court construed “the Legislature’s enumeration of six, specific locations in the exception * * * as evincing an intent to exclude any others not mentioned” and therefore a “prohibition of any notice of defect enactment pertaining to locations beyond the[*938] six specified” (id., at 367, 368). Based on its tightly fitted interpretation of the statute, the Court concluded that the defendant Town could not interpose a prior written notice precondition to a personal injury lawsuit stemming from a defective paddleball court.

The instant case is simply not a Walker situation because a paddleball court is functionally different from each of the six locations enumerated in General Municipal Law § 50-e (4). The stairway in this case functionally fulfills the same purpose that a standard sidewalk would serve on flat topography, except that it is vertical instead of horizontal.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Bellacosa, Smith, Levine, Ciparick, Wesley and Rosenblatt concur in memorandum.

Order reversed, etc.