Town motion in New York

2021Since the Town defendants failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the Town, Humphreys, and Mullaney were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the Town defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against the Town, Humphreys, and Mullaney regardless of the sufficiency of the papers submitted in opposition ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320, 324 ).

2012Here, the Town defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]) by submitting affidavits of Pfeiffer and Long relating their legitimate concerns about Moulton’s ability to perform the job.

2012Here, the Town defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]) by submitting affidavits of Pfeiffer and Long relating their legitimate concerns about Moulton’s ability to perform the job.

2012Here, the Town defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]) by submitting affidavits of Pfeiffer and Long relating their legitimate concerns about Moulton’s ability to perform the job.

2017Where, as here, a municipality has enacted a prior written notice law, it may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a defect or dangerous condition which comes within the ambit of the law unless it has received written notice of the alleged defect or dangerous condition, or an exception to the written notice requirement applies (see Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d 471, 474 [1999]; DeSalvio v Suffolk County Water Auth., 127 AD3d 804, 805 [2015]; Braver v Village of Cedarhurst, 94 AD3d 933, 934 [2012]).

2001Therefore, the Town’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it should have been granted (see, Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d 471 ; Poirier v City of Schenectady, 85 NY2d 310 ; Greenberg v McLaughlin, 242 AD2d 603 ; Nelson v Town of Hempstead, 238 AD2d 391 ; Gutierrez v Cohen, 227 AD2d 447 ).

2021Even assuming that the Town defendants established that the officers were engaged in a governmental function when they entrusted the vehicle to Tatavitto, they failed to establish, prima facie, that the officers did not owe the plaintiff a special duty ( see Applewhite v Accuhealth, Inc. , 21 NY3d 420, 430-431 ; McLean v City of New York , 12 NY3d 194, 200 ), that the officers' actions were discretionary, meaning conduct involving the exercise of reasoned judgment ( see Valdez v City of New York , 18 NY3d 69, 76 ; Haddock v City of New York , 75 NY2d 478, 484 ; Santaiti v Town of Ramapo , 162

2021The Town defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the officers, through their affirmative acts, assumed an affirmative duty to the plaintiff, whether the officers had reason to believe that releasing the vehicle to Tatavitto would permit him to drive the vehicle in violation of law, which increased the risk of an accident, and whether their conduct "lulled" the plaintiff into a false sense of security and induced him either to relax his own vigilance or forgo other avenues of protection—which was not offered by the officers—and thereby placed him in a worse position

2025"A municipality is immune from liability where the actions of its employees in performing governmental functions involve[ ] the exercise of discretion" ( Morales v City of New York , 235 AD3d 595 , 597 [1st Dept 2025]; see McLean v City of New York , 12 NY3d 194, 202-203 [2009]). "[A]mbulance assistance rendered by first responders . . . should be viewed as a classic governmental, rather than proprietary, function" ( Applewhite v Accuhealth , Inc ., 21 NY3d 420, 430 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[D]iscretionary . . . acts involve the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typ

2021Even assuming that the Town defendants established that the officers were engaged in a governmental function when they entrusted the vehicle to Tatavitto, they failed to establish, prima facie, that the officers did not owe the plaintiff a special duty ( see Applewhite v Accuhealth, Inc. , 21 NY3d 420, 430-431 ; McLean v City of New York , 12 NY3d 194, 200 ), that the officers' actions were discretionary, meaning conduct involving the exercise of reasoned judgment ( see Valdez v City of New York , 18 NY3d 69, 76 ; Haddock v City of New York , 75 NY2d 478, 484 ; Santaiti v Town of Ramapo , 162

2017Town Law § 65 (3) provides that, “no action shall be maintained against a town upon or arising out of a contract entered into by the town unless the same shall be commenced within eighteen months after the cause of action thereof shall have accrued.” “A cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract accrues ... at the time of the alleged breach” (Meadowbrook Farms Homeowners Assn., Inc. v JZG Resources, Inc., 105 AD3d 820, 822 [2013]; see Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Westchester, 65 AD3d 1226, 1228 [2009]). “[W]here a duty imposed prior t

2017Town Law § 65 (3) provides that, “no action shall be maintained against a town upon or arising out of a contract entered into by the town unless the same shall be commenced within eighteen months after the cause of action thereof shall have accrued.” “A cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract accrues ... at the time of the alleged breach” (Meadowbrook Farms Homeowners Assn., Inc. v JZG Resources, Inc., 105 AD3d 820, 822 [2013]; see Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Westchester, 65 AD3d 1226, 1228 [2009]). “[W]here a duty imposed prior t

2017Town Law § 65 (3) provides that, “no action shall be maintained against a town upon or arising out of a contract entered into by the town unless the same shall be commenced within eighteen months after the cause of action thereof shall have accrued.” “A cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract accrues ... at the time of the alleged breach” (Meadowbrook Farms Homeowners Assn., Inc. v JZG Resources, Inc., 105 AD3d 820, 822 [2013]; see Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Westchester, 65 AD3d 1226, 1228 [2009]). “[W]here a duty imposed prior t

2017Town Law § 65 (3) provides that, “no action shall be maintained against a town upon or arising out of a contract entered into by the town unless the same shall be commenced within eighteen months after the cause of action thereof shall have accrued.” “A cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract accrues ... at the time of the alleged breach” (Meadowbrook Farms Homeowners Assn., Inc. v JZG Resources, Inc., 105 AD3d 820, 822 [2013]; see Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Westchester, 65 AD3d 1226, 1228 [2009]). “[W]here a duty imposed prior t

2015Even assuming that the other property owners identified by defendants were similarly situated, a finding that the Town does not challenge on appeal, defendants failed to submit proof from which it can be inferred that the Town singled them out with “malevolent intent” or “intent to injure” — the sole impermissible motives upon which defendants rely (Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d at 631; see Matter of 303 W. 42nd St.

2008Inasmuch as plaintiff did not establish that it acquired a vested right to mine its property, we conclude that the court also should have granted that part of the Town’s motion for a directed verdict dismissing the second cause of action, which sought damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 based on the alleged violation of its rights under the United States Constitution (see Schlossin v Town of Marilla, 48 AD3d 1118, 1120 [2008]; see generally Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617, 627 [2004]).

2014A landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition under the existing circumstances, and may be liable in tort if the plaintiff can establish that the landowner either affirmatively created or had actual or constructive notice of a hazardous condition (see Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233, 241 [1976]; Berkowitz v Long Is.

2014A landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition under the existing circumstances, and may be liable in tort if the plaintiff can establish that the landowner either affirmatively created or had actual or constructive notice of a hazardous condition (see Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233, 241 [1976]; Berkowitz v Long Is.

2013On the prior appeals we, inter alia, affirmed an order denying the Town’s motion to set aside a jury verdict on liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1) (Bissell, 32 AD3d at 1287), affirmed that part of a judgment determining that Bissell sustained a grave injury in the accident (Bissell, 56 AD3d at 1147) and affirmed a judgment, i.e., the Town judgment, directing M&H to indemnify the Town for all amounts the Town paid pursuant to a judgment issued in Bissell’s favor in the main action (Bissell v Town of Amherst, 56 AD3d 1149 , 1149 [2008]).

2013On the prior appeals we, inter alia, affirmed an order denying the Town’s motion to set aside a jury verdict on liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1) (Bissell, 32 AD3d at 1287), affirmed that part of a judgment determining that Bissell sustained a grave injury in the accident (Bissell, 56 AD3d at 1147) and affirmed a judgment, i.e., the Town judgment, directing M&H to indemnify the Town for all amounts the Town paid pursuant to a judgment issued in Bissell’s favor in the main action (Bissell v Town of Amherst, 56 AD3d 1149 , 1149 [2008]).

2012Consequently, the Supreme Court correctly denied that branch the Town’s motion which was to preliminarily enjoin the defendant from using his real property in connection with his landscaping business (see Town of Islip v Modica Assoc. of NY 122, LLC, 45 AD3d 574, 575 [2007]; Town of Southampton v Sendlewski, 156 AD2d 669, 670 [1989]; Town of Oyster Bay v Sodomsky, 154 AD2d 455 [1989]; CPLR 4401).

2012Consequently, the Supreme Court correctly denied that branch the Town’s motion which was to preliminarily enjoin the defendant from using his real property in connection with his landscaping business (see Town of Islip v Modica Assoc. of NY 122, LLC, 45 AD3d 574, 575 [2007]; Town of Southampton v Sendlewski, 156 AD2d 669, 670 [1989]; Town of Oyster Bay v Sodomsky, 154 AD2d 455 [1989]; CPLR 4401).

2012“To establish a claim of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s interference with its prospective business relations was accomplished by ‘wrongful means’ or that defendant acted for the sole purpose of harming the plaintiff’ (Caprer v Nussbaum, 36 AD3d 176, 204 [2006] [some internal quotation marks omitted]; see Carvel Corp. v Noonan, 3 NY3d 182, 190 [2004]; NBT Bancorp v Fleet/Norstar Fin.

2009The Supreme Court erred in, upon reargument, adhering to so much of the order entered January 5, 2007 as denied that branch of the Town’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it. “[A] plaintiff, in order to have standing in a particular dispute, must demonstrate an injury in fact that falls within the relevant zone of interests sought to be protected by law” (Caprer v Nussbaum, 36 AD3d 176, 183 [2006]).

2012Consequently, the Supreme Court correctly denied that branch the Town’s motion which was to preliminarily enjoin the defendant from using his real property in connection with his landscaping business (see Town of Islip v Modica Assoc. of NY 122, LLC, 45 AD3d 574, 575 [2007]; Town of Southampton v Sendlewski, 156 AD2d 669, 670 [1989]; Town of Oyster Bay v Sodomsky, 154 AD2d 455 [1989]; CPLR 4401).

2012Consequently, the Supreme Court correctly denied that branch the Town’s motion which was to preliminarily enjoin the defendant from using his real property in connection with his landscaping business (see Town of Islip v Modica Assoc. of NY 122, LLC, 45 AD3d 574, 575 [2007]; Town of Southampton v Sendlewski, 156 AD2d 669, 670 [1989]; Town of Oyster Bay v Sodomsky, 154 AD2d 455 [1989]; CPLR 4401).

2020Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the subject tax lien is void and unenforceable ( see Lanza v Wagner , 11 NY2d 317, 334 ).

2003Since this is a declaratory judgment action, the Supreme Court should have directed the entry of a judgment making a declaration in favor of the Town defendants (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [1962], cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]).

2015While we agree with the Village that the notice of claim requirements of CPLR 9802 apply to all actions, including actions in equity (see Genesee Brewing Co. v Village of Sodus Point, 126 Misc 2d 827, 831-833 [1984], affd for reasons stated 115 AD2d 313 [1985]; see also Mendik v Incorporated Vil. of Lattingtown, 76 AD3d 616 , 618 [2010]; Greco v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 223 AD2d 674, 674 [1996]), we agree with the Town that an exception to the notice of claim requirement exists where “compliance would prevent obtaining the relief required because of the immediacy [of] the relief warrante

2015While we agree with the Village that the notice of claim requirements of CPLR 9802 apply to all actions, including actions in equity (see Genesee Brewing Co. v Village of Sodus Point, 126 Misc 2d 827, 831-833 [1984], affd for reasons stated 115 AD2d 313 [1985]; see also Mendik v Incorporated Vil. of Lattingtown, 76 AD3d 616 , 618 [2010]; Greco v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 223 AD2d 674, 674 [1996]), we agree with the Town that an exception to the notice of claim requirement exists where “compliance would prevent obtaining the relief required because of the immediacy [of] the relief warrante

2015While we agree with the Village that the notice of claim requirements of CPLR 9802 apply to all actions, including actions in equity (see Genesee Brewing Co. v Village of Sodus Point, 126 Misc 2d 827, 831-833 [1984], affd for reasons stated 115 AD2d 313 [1985]; see also Mendik v Incorporated Vil. of Lattingtown, 76 AD3d 616 , 618 [2010]; Greco v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 223 AD2d 674, 674 [1996]), we agree with the Town that an exception to the notice of claim requirement exists where “compliance would prevent obtaining the relief required because of the immediacy [of] the relief warrante

2015While we agree with the Village that the notice of claim requirements of CPLR 9802 apply to all actions, including actions in equity (see Genesee Brewing Co. v Village of Sodus Point, 126 Misc 2d 827, 831-833 [1984], affd for reasons stated 115 AD2d 313 [1985]; see also Mendik v Incorporated Vil. of Lattingtown, 76 AD3d 616 , 618 [2010]; Greco v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 223 AD2d 674, 674 [1996]), we agree with the Town that an exception to the notice of claim requirement exists where “compliance would prevent obtaining the relief required because of the immediacy [of] the relief warrante

2015In opposing a summary judgment motion as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), “ ‘the opposing party must make an evidentiary showing supporting [the conclusion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, and] mere speculation or conjecture [is] insufficient’ ” (Preferred Capital v PBK, Inc., 309 AD2d 1168, 1169 [2003]).

2015In opposing a summary judgment motion as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), “ ‘the opposing party must make an evidentiary showing supporting [the conclusion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, and] mere speculation or conjecture [is] insufficient’ ” (Preferred Capital v PBK, Inc., 309 AD2d 1168, 1169 [2003]).

2014It is well settled that “the term ‘owner’ is not limited to the titleholder of the property where the accident occurred and encompasses a person ‘who has an interest in the property and who fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for his [or her] benefit’ ” (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864 , 866 [2009], quoting Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565, 566 [1984]).

2014As the majority rightly notes, “the term ‘owner’ is not limited to the titleholder of the property where the accident occurred and encompasses a person ‘who has an interest in the property and who fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for his [or her] benefit’ ” (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864 , 866 [2009], quoting Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565, 566 [1984]).

2014Addressing first the appeal, we agree with the Town that the court erred in denying the Town’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action against it, inasmuch as the Town is not an “owner” for purposes of those statutes (see Sanzone v City of Rome, 292 AD2d 777, 778 [2002]).

2014Addressing first the appeal, we agree with the Town that the court erred in denying the Town’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action against it, inasmuch as the Town is not an “owner” for purposes of those statutes (see Sanzone v City of Rome, 292 AD2d 777, 778 [2002]).

2025Indeed, plaintiff's contentions pertain "to the quality of the care rendered by [Rutenkroger and Rice and,] even if such decisions prove to be erroneous, they do not cast the [Town] in damages" ( id. at 597 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kinsey v City of New York , 141 AD3d 420, 421 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 907 [2016]).

2025Indeed, plaintiff's contentions pertain "to the quality of the care rendered by [Rutenkroger and Rice and,] even if such decisions prove to be erroneous, they do not cast the [Town] in damages" ( id. at 597 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kinsey v City of New York , 141 AD3d 420, 421 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 907 [2016]).

2025Indeed, plaintiff's contentions pertain "to the quality of the care rendered by [Rutenkroger and Rice and,] even if such decisions prove to be erroneous, they do not cast the [Town] in damages" ( id. at 597 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kinsey v City of New York , 141 AD3d 420, 421 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 907 [2016]).

2025Indeed, plaintiff's contentions pertain "to the quality of the care rendered by [Rutenkroger and Rice and,] even if such decisions prove to be erroneous, they do not cast the [Town] in damages" ( id. at 597 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kinsey v City of New York , 141 AD3d 420, 421 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 907 [2016]).