blended standard (California) · Go Syfert
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blended standard in California

7 California opinions name it 1 courts 1998–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
San Francisco Human Services Agency v. A.G.green
calctapp · 2013 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017(See T.M., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1219-1221 [collecting cases and applying a blended standard].) Not long ago, we noted that it is unclear “whether the two standards are so different in this context.” (In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092, fn. 7 [ 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 ].) And indeed, we need not reach this issue, as we would come to the same conclusion under any of the articulated standards.

2017(See T.M., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1219-1221 [collecting cases and applying a blended standard].) Not long ago, we noted that it is unclear “whether the two standards are so different in this context.” (In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092, fn. 7 [ 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 ].) And indeed, we need not reach this issue, as we would come to the same conclusion under any of the articulated standards.

22
In Re Marriage of Drakegreen
calctapp · 1997 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998Only then did discretionary considerations come into play in the court’s ruling. *472 In In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1150-1151 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 466 ], the Court of Appeal set forth this blended standard of. review for a case involving both statutory interpretations and discretionary matters: “ 1 “[T]he trial court’s determination to grant or deny a modification of a support order will ordinarily be upheld on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated.” [Citation.] Reversal will be ordered only if prejudicial error is found after examining the record of the pro

1998Only then did discretionary considerations come into play in the court’s ruling. *472 In In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1150-1151 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 466 ], the Court of Appeal set forth this blended standard of. review for a case involving both statutory interpretations and discretionary matters: “ 1 “[T]he trial court’s determination to grant or deny a modification of a support order will ordinarily be upheld on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated.” [Citation.] Reversal will be ordered only if prejudicial error is found after examining the record of the pro

22
In Re CCgreen
calctapp · 2009 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2017
2 sentences

2017(See T.M., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1219-1221 [collecting cases and applying a blended standard].) Not long ago, we noted that it is unclear “whether the two standards are so different in this context.” (In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092, fn. 7 .) And 17 reasoned that a “strict legislative limitation on suspending or denying all parental visitation during the reunification period is no accident: Without visitation of some sort, it is virtually impossible for a parent to achieve reunification.” (C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) It thus construed the language of the statut

2016(See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 27 P.3d 289 ]; In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343 , 1356 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ]; In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1284 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 765 ].) Still, there appears to be some disagreement regarding the standard of review, as some courts have applied the substantial evidence test (see, e.g., In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1492 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ]; In re Mark L, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 ; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 ]), while others ha

13
In Re Dylan T.green
calctapp · 1998 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016(See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 27 P.3d 289 ]; In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343 , 1356 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ]; In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1284 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 765 ].) Still, there appears to be some disagreement regarding the standard of review, as some courts have applied the substantial evidence test (see, e.g., In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1492 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ]; In re Mark L, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 ; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 ]), while others ha

2016(See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 27 P.3d 289 ]; In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343 , 1356 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ]; In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1284 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 765 ].) Still, there appears to be some disagreement regarding the standard of review, as some courts have applied the substantial evidence test (see, e.g., In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1492 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ]; In re Mark L, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 ; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 ]), while others ha

12
Montenegro v. Diazgreen
cal · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016(See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 27 P.3d 289 ]; In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343 , 1356 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ]; In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1284 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 765 ].) Still, there appears to be some disagreement regarding the standard of review, as some courts have applied the substantial evidence test (see, e.g., In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1492 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ]; In re Mark L, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 ; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 ]), while others ha

2016(See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 27 P.3d 289 ]; In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343 , 1356 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ]; In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1284 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 765 ].) Still, there appears to be some disagreement regarding the standard of review, as some courts have applied the substantial evidence test (see, e.g., In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1492 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ]; In re Mark L, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 ; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 ]), while others ha

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
In Re Mark L. green
calctapp · 2001
2 sentences

2016(See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 27 P.3d 289 ]; In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343 , 1356 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ]; In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1284 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 765 ].) Still, there appears to be some disagreement regarding the standard of review, as some courts have applied the substantial evidence test (see, e.g., In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1492 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ]; In re Mark L, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 ; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 ]), while others ha

2016(See, e.g., In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1492; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 577 ; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 ; In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1238 .) Some courts have applied a blended standard.

22016–2016
Sacramento County Department of Health & Human Services v. M.M. green
calctapp · 2016
2 sentences

2017(See T.M., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1219-1221 [collecting cases and applying a blended standard].) Not long ago, we noted that it is unclear “whether the two standards are so different in this context.” (In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092, fn. 7 .) And 17 reasoned that a “strict legislative limitation on suspending or denying all parental visitation during the reunification period is no accident: Without visitation of some sort, it is virtually impossible for a parent to achieve reunification.” (C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) It thus construed the language of the statut

2017(See T.M., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1219-1221 [collecting cases and applying a blended standard].) Not long ago, we noted that it is unclear “whether the two standards are so different in this context.” (In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092, fn. 7 .) And 17 reasoned that a “strict legislative limitation on suspending or denying all parental visitation during the reunification period is no accident: Without visitation of some sort, it is virtually impossible for a parent to achieve reunification.” (C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) It thus construed the language of the statut

12017–2017
In Re Daniel CH green
calctapp · 1990
2 sentences

2016H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814 , 837-838 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 624 ] [no abuse of discretion where substantial evidence supported order]).

2016H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814 , 837-838 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 624 ] [no abuse of discretion where substantial evidence supported order]).

12016–2016
In Re Christopher C. green
calctapp · 2010
1 sentence

2016The court cited In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73 as a case with similar facts, but it is not relevant to the subdivision (b) analysis on appeal.

12016–2016
In Re RR green
calctapp · 2010
2 sentences

2016(See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 27 P.3d 289 ]; In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343 , 1356 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ]; In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1284 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 765 ].) Still, there appears to be some disagreement regarding the standard of review, as some courts have applied the substantial evidence test (see, e.g., In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1492 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ]; In re Mark L, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 ; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 ]), while others ha

2016(See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 27 P.3d 289 ]; In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343 , 1356 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ]; In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1284 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 765 ].) Still, there appears to be some disagreement regarding the standard of review, as some courts have applied the substantial evidence test (see, e.g., In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1492 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ]; In re Mark L, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 ; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 ]), while others ha

12016–2016
In Re Danielle W. green
calctapp · 1989
1 sentence

2016(See, e.g., In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1492; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 577 ; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 ; In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1238 .) Some courts have applied a blended standard.

12016–2016

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