Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1987). · Go Syfert
Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
19 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Healey v. Healey (texapp, 2017-07-12)
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Healey v. Healey
Tex. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
P. 67; Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 179-80 (Tex. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duncan Land & Exploration, Inc. v. Littlepage (2×)
Tex. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
P. 67; Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 179-80 (Tex.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Conoco, Inc. v. Amarillo National Bank
Tex. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex.1987); Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Tex.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CELOTEX CORPORATION INC v. Gracy Meadow Owners Ass'n
Tex. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Relying on Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex.1987), Gracy Meadow argues that “it is not an abuse of discretion for a court to find that there is no practical difference in the factual development between a breach of implied warranty claim and a DTPA representation claim.” We do not address, however, whether there could ever be a practical distinction between a breach-of-warranty claim and a misrepresentation claim such that a court might abuse its discretion in denying a continuance after a trial amendment had been allowed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) the Celotex Corporation, Inc. and Nelson Johnson v. Gracy Meadow Owners Association, Inc.
Tex. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Relying on Bell v. Meeks , 725 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex. 1987), Gracy Meadow argues that "it is not an abuse of discretion for a court to find that there is no practical difference in the factual development between a breach of implied warranty claim and a DTPA representation claim." We do not address, however, whether there could ever be a practical distinction between a breach-of-warranty claim and a misrepresentation claim such that a court might abuse its discretion in denying a continuance after a trial amendment had been allowed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brownsville Navigation District v. Izaguirre (2×)
Tex. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Further, the standard of review for a trial court's order granting leave to file a post-verdict trial amendment is "abuse of discretion." See Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex.1987); Yo well *251 v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630, 634-35 (Tex.1986) ; Shearer v. Allied Live Oak Bank, 758 S. W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) .
cited Cited "see" Whole Foods Market Southwest, Inc. v. Tijerina
Tex. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 797 (Tex.App.—Waco 1997, no writ) (citing Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.1987)).
cited Cited "see" Libhart v. Copeland
Tex. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 179 (Tex.1987).
cited Cited "see" Aloe Ltd., Inc. v. Koch
Tex. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.1987); Tex.R.Civ.P. 67.
cited Cited "see, e.g." in the Interest of P. D. D., a Child
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
P. 67; see also Bell v. Meeks , 725 S.W.2d 179, 179-80 (Tex. 1987).
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re PDD
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
P. 67; see also Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 179-80 (Tex.1987).
cited Cited "see, e.g." In the Interest of P.D.D., a Child
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
P. 67; see also Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 179-80 (Tex.1987).
cited Cited "see, e.g." RDI Mechanical v. WPVA LP
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
P. 67; see also Bell v. Meeks , 725 S.W.2d 179 , 179–80 (Tex. 1987).
cited Cited "see, e.g." PINE TRAIL SHORES OWNERS'ASS'N, INC. v. Aiken
Tex. App. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence medium
P. 67; see also Duncan Land & Exploration v. Littlepage, 984 S.W.2d 318, 327 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied) (citing Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 179-80 (Tex.1987)).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Benny E. BELL, Et Ux., Petitioners,
v.
Bobby L. MEEKS, Individually and D/B/A Barco, Respondent
C-5680.
Texas Supreme Court.
Feb 18, 1987.
725 S.W.2d 179
1987 Tex. LEXIS 299
Ronald H. Clark, Henderson, Bryant & Wolfe, Sherman, for petitioners., Joseph W. Stewart, Martin T. Bode and Steven R. Pierret, Joseph W. Stewart, P.C., Arlington, for respondent.
Ray.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

RAY, Justice.

This cause arises under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act as amended in 1973 and 1975. The Bells originally brought suit against Meeks seeking recovery on theories of negligence and express and implied warranties. On the last day of the jury trial, and after all the evidence was in, the Bells sought to amend their pleadings to include a claim for damages under the D.T.P.A. on the theory of misrepresentation. After the jury answered special issues the Bells reurged their trial amendment and this time the trial court allowed it and rendered judgment in favor of the Bells. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered a take nothing judgment against the Bells. 710 S.W.2d 789. The Bells complain that the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a trial amendment alleging misrepresentation under the D.T.P.A., when Plaintiffs had previously pleaded a breach of warranty under the D.T.P.A. arising out of the same transaction. We agree.

The amendment was properly granted under Tex.R.Civ.P. 67 because the issue of misrepresentation was tried by consent.[*180] Meeks did not object to the admission of evidence supporting the trial amendment and we fail to see how the issue of misrepresentation would have been tried differently from the warranty issues. Defendant’s reliance on the limitations defense is not persuasive and he has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the trial amendment. The complaint that no issue of misrepresentation was submitted to the jury is without merit. The evidence of misrepresentation was un-controverted and Meeks failed to object, on the ground of lack of pleadings, to the remaining special issues supporting judgment on the issue of misrepresentation, Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Since the trial amendment and the evidence support the judgment of the trial court, we need not address the Bells’ remaining points. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm that of the trial court,