At page 416 Review of trial court discretion in default judgment and rule 11 motions29 citing casesIt is conceded that the grant or denial of a motion for the entry of a default 16 judgment is within the discretion of the court.
- (PC) Johnson v. Beard, No. 2:15-cv-01313 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2023).(It is conceded that the grant or denial of a motion for the entry of a default 16 judgment is within the discretion of the court.)
- (PC) Penton v. Hubard, No. 2:11-cv-00518 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2022).(It is conceded that the grant or denial of a motion for the entry of a default 18 judgment is within the discretion of the court.)
- (PC) Penton v. Hubard, No. 2:11-cv-00518 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019).(It is conceded that the grant or denial of a motion for the entry of a default 20 judgment is within the discretion of the court.)
- Mallory, No. 6:24-cv-01116 (D. Or. Mar. 30, 2026).Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956) (per curiam).
- NY Black & Gold Corp. v. SF Grp. LLC, No. 2:24-cv-01911 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2026).Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956).
- Nw. Sheet Metal Workers Organizational Trust v. Lee Fabricators Inc, No. 2:24-cv-01159 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2025).Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956).
- Rebex CR v. Dang, No. 2:22-cv-00160 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2025).Lau Ah Yew v. 3 Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956).
- JBS Packerland, Inc. v. Phillips Cattle Co., Inc., No. 3:24-cv-01299 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2025).Cal. 1997) 11 (citing Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956)).
- Dassault Systemes SolidWorks Corp. v. Blissera Corp., No. 3:23-cv-03190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2024).“[E]ntry of a default judgment is within the discretion of the court”
- Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. John Doe subscriber assigned IP address 69.181.120.247, No. 3:21-cv-08808 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2023).“[E]ntry of a default judgment is within the discretion of the court”
Show 19 more citing cases
- Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. John Doe subscriber assigned IP address 69.181.120.247, No. 3:21-cv-08808 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2023).“[E]ntry of a default judgment is within the discretion of the court”
- Whitaker v. Lucky Opco LLC, No. 3:21-cv-01478 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2021).“[E]ntry of a default judgment is within the discretion of the court”
- Johnson v. Nuoc Mia Vien Dong 2, LLC, No. 3:21-cv-01618 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2021).“[E]ntry of a default judgment is within the discretion of the court”
- (PC) Johnson v. Beard, No. 2:15-cv-01313 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2021).Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956) (per curiam).
- Lyons v. Clancy, No. 2:20-cv-00866 (D. Ariz. Apr. 20, 2021).The entry of default judgment is entirely “within 3 the discretion of the court.” Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956).
- Idaho Conservation League v. Atlanta Gold Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00161 (D. Idaho Sept. 30, 2020).Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956).
- Chandler v. Extended Stay Am., No. 3:20-cv-00024 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2020).Cal. 1997) (Brewster, J.) (citing Lau Ah Yew v. 23 Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956)).
- Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Solvis Staffing Servs., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-00517 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2019).Cal. 1997) (citing Lau Ah 21 Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956)).
- RingCentral, Inc. v. Quimby, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2010).publishedAldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980); Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir.1956) (affirming district court’s denial of default judgment).
- Warner Bros. Ent. Inc. v. Caridi, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2004).publishedLau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir.1956).
- Robert Draper v. Davis S. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1986).publishedSee Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092-93 (9th Cir.1980); Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir.1956).
- Edinburgh Assurance Co., & Cross-Appellees v. R. L. Burns Corp. & Am. Pac. Int'l, Inc., & Cross-Appellants, 669 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1982).published Thus, if it was error to strike the counterclaim for fraud in the inducement as a sham pleading, see Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956); Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y.1961), it was harmless error.
- Witt v. Arizona Ex Rel. Eyman, 343 F. Supp. 392 (D. Ariz. 1972).publishedThus, in Law Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (1956), the Circuit Court stated: “It is conceded that the grant or denial of a motion for the entry of a default judgment is within the discretion of the court.
- Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. v. Prather, 343 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).publishedThis matter addresses itself to the discretion of the Court, Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, C.A. 9th (1956), 236 F.2d 415, 416 [1]; and, in its discretion, because of the respective postures of the parties, the Court hereby denies such motion at th…
- Shree Shiva, LLC v. City of Redding, No. 2:21-cv-00211 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2021).(finding no abuse of 7 || discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to enter a default judgment after defendant failed to plead 8 | to plaintiff's complaint by the deadline)
- Whitaker v. Joe's Jeans Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00597, 2021 WL 2590155 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021).See Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1956).
- Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Streshly, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2009).published([T]he grant or denial of a motion for the entry of a default judgment is within the discretion of the court.)
- Chipanno v. Champion Int'l Corp., 702 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1983).published See Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir.1956); Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some “Striking” Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 Minn.L.Rev. 1, 34 (1976).
- Lockard v. Kitzhaber, 129 F.3d 126 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublishedSee Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir.1986); see also Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir.1956) (per curiam) (upholding denial of motion for entry of default judgment where answer was not timely).
Other citing cases
- Weikert v. United States, No. 4:21-cv-00290 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2022).
- United States v. Suganuma, 546 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Haw. 2008).published
- Taylor Made Golf Co. v. Carsten Sports, Ltd., 175 F.R.D. 658 (S.D. Cal. 1997).published
- Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).published
v.
John Foster DULLES, Secretary of State of the United States of America, Appellee
Appellant filed in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii a second amended complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of citi[*416] zenship. Said amended complaint was upheld by the trial court as stating a cause of action. Thereafter appellee failed to plead to the second amended complaint within the time required by law, and appellant moved the trial court to enter a default judgment. The motion was denied. This denial is one of the alleged errors relied on by appellant in this appeal. It is conceded that the grant or denial of a motion for the entry of a default judgment is within the discretion of the court. We have examined the facts presented to the trial court in support of ’and in opposition to the motion, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The order denying the motion for default judgment is affirmed.
Subsequent to the filing of the second amended complaint appellee requested and was furnished answers to a set of interrogatories. Thereafter appellee moved the court under Fed.Rules Civ. Proc. rule 11, 28 U.S.C.A., to strike the complaint as sham and false. The interrogatories and answers thereto were introduced in support of the motion. The court ordered the second amended complaint stricken.
Rule 11 deals with the signing of pleadings. The second amended complaint was signed by appellant’s attorney as is permitted under the rule. There is no evidence in this record which would tend to sustain a contention that appellant’s attorney signed the second amended complaint “with intent to defeat the purpose” of Rule 11. There was no evidence that said attorney did not read the pleadings; no evidence that in signing that the attorney to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief did not feel there was good ground to sustain the pleading; and no evidence that the attorney in signing the pleading was interposing it for delay. Measured by the plain language of the rule and the evidence before the court, the order striking the second amended complaint was error and is reversed. The action is remanded to the District Court for such further action as it may deem proper.
Reversed and remanded.