At page 795 Determining the scope of the warrant's authority3 citing casesholding that courts should not draw a distinction between a holding over after the execution of a deed and a holding over after the rendition of a judgment, whether the judgment is adversary in nature or by consent, and that ―the continued possession of land after the rendition of a judgment divest…
- Horrocks v. Horrocks, 608 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980).publishedGreen v. Vance, 311 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston) writ ref’d n. r. e. per curiam, Green v. Vance, 158 Tex. 550 , 314 S.W.2d 794, 795 (1958).
- Will Ann Brewer v. Tom D. Skutca & Neaves A. Skutca, No. 02-10-00305-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 10, 2011).published (holding that courts should not draw a distinction between a holding over after the execution of a deed and a holding over after the rendition of a judgment, whether the judgment is adversary in nature or by consent, and…)
v.
John T. VANCE Et Al., Respondents
We approve the principal holding of the Court of Civil Appeals in this case, 311 S.W.2d 738, namely, that a logical distinction is not to be drawn between a holding over after the execution of a deed and a holding over after the rendition of a judgment which is either adversary in nature or by consent. In other words, the continued possession of land after the rendition of a judgment divesting the one in possession of title and vesting it in another is not adverse until notice of a hostile claim is brought to the prevailing patty as required by law.
An unqualified refusal of the application for writ of érror cannot be given for the reason that the Court of Civil Appeals passed on certain points that are not before us for consideration. Therefore the application is refused, no reversible error.