Leal v. Furniture Barn, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. 1978). · Go Syfert
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Leal v. Furniture Barn, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
32 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tolbert Ex Rel. Tolbert v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 657 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2011)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
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Cited for
At page 865 Representing non-existent rights under a layaway agreement12 citing casesholding letter from furniture store stating that all funds previously deposited under layaway agreement would be forfeited if payment was not timely received constituted misrepresentation of rights of parties under agreement in violation of DTPA section 17.46(b)(122 citing courts put it this way · 10 listed here
  • Tolbert Ex Rel. Tolbert v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 657 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2011).published
    Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W,2d 636, 644 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (citing Leal v. Furniture Barn, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1978); Group Hosp.
  • the Cadle Co. v. Munir Munawar, No. 13-02-00225-CV (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 2, 2005).published
    Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co. , 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1983) (citing Leal v. Furniture Barn, Inc. , 571 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1978)); see T ex .
  • Dallas Fire Ins. Co. v. Texas Contractors Sur. & Cas. Agency, 128 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004).published
    Ken Petroleum Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 357 ; Formosa Plastics, 960 S.W.2d at 46-47 ; Best, 786 S.W.2d at 671-72 ; Clary Corp., 949 S.W.2d at 463-64 ; Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 947 S.W.2d at 577-78 ; Kuehnhoefer, 893 S.W.2d at 693 ; see also…
  • Parks v. DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Coop., Inc., 962 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998).published
    Id. (discussing Leal v. Furniture Barn, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1978)).
  • Josefina Hinojosa v. Ramon E. Luna, Sr. Teodora Z. Luna Sylvester Z. Luna & Ausencia R. Luna, No. 03-93-00452-CV (Tex. App.—Austin May 25, 1994).published
    (holding actionable under DTPA a seller's letter that falsely claimed layaway agreement contained term allowing forfeiture of past payments unless payment received by certain date)
  • Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991).published
    Leal v. Furniture Barns Inc., 571 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1978) and Group Hosp. v. One & Two Brookriver Center, 704 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ), illustrate this distinction.
  • Zimmerman v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1990).published
    Cf. Leal v. Furniture Barn, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1978); Melody Home Manufacturing Co., 741 S.W.2d 349 . *697 The appellants established their standing as consumers by the original real estate transaction in which they sought to a…
  • Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983).published 2 cites
    Cf. Leal v. Furniture Barn, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1978).
  • Anderson v. Havins, 595 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1980).published
    Co. v. Bar Consultants, 577 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex.1979); Leal v. Furniture Barn, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1978).
  • Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1984).published
    Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.1981); Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex.1983); see also Leal v. Furniture Barn, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1978).
At page 864 finding violation under section 17.46(b)(12) based on false representation by furniture seller of its right to retain funds paid by purchaser in layaway plan if contract were not completed, where no such provision existed1 citing case1 citing court put it this way
  • Landing Council of Co-Owners v. Durham, 244 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007).published
    (finding violation under section 17.46(b)(12) based on false representation by furniture seller of its right to retain funds paid by purchaser in layaway plan if contract were not completed, where no such provision exist…)
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Benito LEAL Et Ux., Petitioners,
v.
FURNITURE BARN, INC., Respondent
B-7424.
Texas Supreme Court.
Oct 4, 1978.
Published opinion
571 S.W.2d 864
1978 Tex. LEXIS 396
J. David Phillips, Austin, for petitioners., Kendall, Randle, Finch & Osborn, Terrence Kendall, Austin, for respondent.
Barrow.
Cited by 31 opinions  |  Published
BARROW, Justice.

This is a suit for damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 17.41, et seq. Judgment was entered for Benito and Linda Leal after a non-jury trial whereby they recovered against Furniture Barn, Inc. treble their actual damages of $185.00, being the sum of $555.00 plus stipulated attorney fees of $1,000.00. The court of civil appeals, with one justice dissenting, reversed and rendered judgment that the Leals take nothing by this suit. 560 S.W.2d 533. We reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts. On May 12, 1975, Furniture Barn sold the Leals certain furniture for $765.42 on a “layaway” basis. In connection with the sale, the Leals made a down payment of $175.00 and were required to sign a printed retail installment contract which was changed by writing across the face of the printed contract the words: “In Layway (sic) only will pay 40.00 ea month[*865] until paid out.” There are a number of terms and conditions on the written form that are inconsistent with a layaway sale. There is no provision in the form for disposition of Leal’s payments in the event the contract was not completed and there was no agreement as to any charges or costs to be deducted in such event. The furniture was to be delivered when fully paid for and thus remained in the possession of Furniture Barn.

By July 1975, the Leals decided that they could not afford to pay out the furniture and sought a refund of the down payment. A payment of $10.00 was tendered and accepted by Furniture Barn on September 4, 1975, but a subsequent tender of $15.00 was refused on October 11,1975. On October 7, 1975, the following letter was written by Winkley, an employee of Furniture Barn, to the Leals and forms the basis of this suit:

“Under the terms of our agreement on this account it will be necessary for you to pay $40.00 by Saturday, October 11, 1975.
If payment is not received your account will be closed and all monies deposited shall be forfeited.”

The Leals alleged that this letter was a false and misleading statement in representing that the agreement conferred upon Furniture Barn rights or remedies which it did not have in violation of Section 17.-46(b)(12), Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. This section provides in part:

“(b) The term ‘false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices’ includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
(12) representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law;

We agree with the Leals that this letter was a false and misleading statement of Furniture Barn’s rights under the layaway agreement. The clear import of this letter is that Furniture Barn had the right under this agreement to retain all monies deposited by the Leals. This representation was false in that no such right is provided in the installment contract signed by the Leals and, under the stipulated facts, there was no such oral agreement. In fact, Furniture Barn does not contend that it had a right to forfeit the sums deposited by the Leals, but rather, seeks to make certain other charges against these funds. The letter of October 7, 1975, by representing to the Leals that the layaway agreement gave Furniture Barn the right to forfeit all monies deposited by the Leals, constituted á “false, misleading or deceptive act or practice” of the type that the legislature intended to proscribe and subjected Furniture Barn to the statutory penalties provided by said Act.

The judgment of the court of civil appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.