At page 742 holding that “the specific provisions of the 10-20-Life statute with regard to mandatory minimums control over the general provisions of section 775.082 regarding statutory maximums3 citing cases
- Guzman v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-20220 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2020). The question before the Florida Supreme Court was whether “the mandatory minimum terms of twenty-five years to life [under section 775.087, Florida Statutes] provide the trial judge with discretion to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-f…
- Thomas Dexter Lewis v. State of Florida, 413 So. 3d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025).published(holding that “the specific provisions of the 10-20-Life statute with regard to mandatory minimums control over the general provisions of section 775.082 regarding statutory maximums)
- Christopher Lamar Sols v. State of Florida, 310 So. 3d 422 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).publishedPitts, 202 So. 3d at 884-85 ; see also Mendenhall, 48 So. 3d at 742 (same); Broadway, 179 So. 3d at 562 (same).
At page 748 Section 775.087(2)(e) makes reference to section 775.082 and states that the mandatory minimum, when it exceeds the statutory maximum, must be imposed.2 citing cases
- Sheppard v. State, 113 So. 3d 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).published (Section 775.087(2)(e) makes reference to section 775.082 and states that the mandatory minimum, when it exceeds the statutory maximum, must be imposed.)
- Brock v. Garner Window & Door Sales, Inc., 187 So. 3d 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).published“This is because legislative intent is determined primarily from the statute’s text.” Id. at 748 (citations omitted).
At page 751 Pariente, J., dissenting1 citing case
- Tyrone Williams v. State of Florida, No. SC16-785 (Fla. Dec. 21, 2017).published (Pariente, J., dissenting)
Other citing cases
- State of Florida v. Peter Peraza, 226 So. 3d 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).published
- State v. Caamano, 105 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).published
v.
Michael James COREY, Respondent
We initially accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Corey v. Corey, 29 So.3d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), based on express and direct conflict with decisions of other district courts of appeal. The conflict issue under review is whether the Legislature’s enactment of section 61.121, Florida Statutes, abrogated the judicial presumption against rotating custody. [1] After further consideration of the issue involved, and in light of the Legislature’s repeal of section 61.121 and substantial revision to section 61.13, Florida Statutes, effective October 1, 2008, [2] we have determined that we should exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.. Section 61.121 was enacted on July 1, 1997, and provided that a court "may order rotating custody if the court finds that rotating custody will be in the best interest of the child.” See ch. 97-242, § 2, Laws of Fla.
. See ch. 2008-61, §§ 6, 8, Laws of Fla. In 2009, the Legislature further revised section 61.13(2)(c)(l) to provide that there is "no presumption for or against the father or mother of the child or for or against any specific time-sharing schedule when creating or modifying the parenting plan of the child.” Ch. 2009-180, § 3, Laws of Fla.