statutory construction analysis in Florida

2024See, e.g., Ham, 308 So. 3d at 946 ("In interpreting the statute, we follow the 'supremacy-of-text principle'— namely, the principle that '[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.' " (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012))); McCloud v. State, 260 So. 3d 911, 914 (Fla. 2018) (reasoning the purpose of statutory interpretation "is to effectuate the Legislature's intent because 'legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction a

2024Plain Meaning of the Statute “It is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory construction analysis.” State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002).

2021“It is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis.” Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004).

2019In resolving this question, we look to legislative intent, "the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis." Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004).

2016As we have often stated, “[l]egislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory construction analysis.” Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003).

2016As we have often stated, “[l]egislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory construction analysis.” Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla.2003).

2005See State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998).

2004See State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998).

2005See State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998).

2004See State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998).

2006ANALYSIS "[I]t is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis." Reynolds v. State, 842 So.2d 46, 49 (Fla.2002); State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 109 (Fla.2002).

2006ANALYSIS “[I]t is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory construction analysis.” Reynolds v. State, 842 So.2d 46, 49 (Fla.2002); State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 109 (Fla.2002).

2022We examine the statute, and construe its provisions, within the framework established by longstanding principles of statutory construction: Legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis, and “[t]o discern legislative intent, a court must look first and foremost at the actual language used in the statute.” Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008).

2017Legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory construction analysis, and “[t]o discern legislative intent, a court must look first and foremost at the actual language used in the statute.” Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008).

2018“Further, . . . when [a court] construes a statute, ‘[it should] look first at the statute’s plain meaning.’” Id. at 110 (alterations added) (quoting Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1996)); accord Stoletz v. State, 875 So. 2d 572, 575 (Fla. 2004).

2016"In determining that intent . . . 'we look first to the statute's plain meaning.' " Id. (quoting Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v Cauley, 666 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1996)).

2016When construing a statute or constitutional provision, we should first look to the plain meaning of the words used; “[w]hen the language of the statute is- clear and Unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)).

2004See Florida Convalescent Centers v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla.2003) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis").

2015In order to detér-mine legislative intent, “courts should lopk [first] to the statute’s 'actual language.” Bryan v. State, 865 So.2d 677, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

2015In order to determine legislative intent, “courts should look [first] to the statute's actual language.” Bryan v. State, 865 So. 2d 677, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

2022“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for judicial interpretation.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1992).

2017“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for judicial interpretation.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1992).

2016When construing a statute or constitutional provision, we should first look to the plain meaning of the words used; “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)).

2016When construing a statute or constitutional provision, we should first look to the plain meaning of the words used; “[w]hen the language of the statute is- clear and Unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)).

2024See, e.g., Ham, 308 So. 3d at 946 ("In interpreting the statute, we follow the 'supremacy-of-text principle'— namely, the principle that '[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.' " (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012))); McCloud v. State, 260 So. 3d 911, 914 (Fla. 2018) (reasoning the purpose of statutory interpretation "is to effectuate the Legislature's intent because 'legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction a

2022"When the statutory language is clear or unambiguous, [we] need not look behind the statute's plain language or employ principles of statutory construction to determine legislative intent." English v. State, 191 So. 3d 448, 450 (Fla. 2016).

2019The issue of whether the legislature intended the presumption set forth in section 61.13001(3)(d) to operate at a hearing on the merits conducted after the trial court finds good cause not to enter an order allowing relocation is a matter of statutory construction. “‘The polestar of a statutory construction analysis is legislative intent.’” Edwards v. Thomas, 229 So. 3d 277, 283 (Fla. 2017) (quoting W.

2019To require a connection would add words to the statute, contrary to the basic statutory construction principle that courts “are not at liberty to add to a statute words that the Legislature itself has not used in drafting that statute.” Villanueva v. State, 200 So. 3d 47, 52 (Fla. 2016).

2018“Further, . . . when [a court] construes a statute, ‘[it should] look first at the statute’s plain meaning.’” Id. at 110 (alterations added) (quoting Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1996)); accord Stoletz v. State, 875 So. 2d 572, 575 (Fla. 2004).

2017The statutory construction rule of in pari materia requires provisions relating to the same subject to “‘be construed together and compared with each other;’ ” however, “[i]n contrast to the rule permitting in pari materia construction ... is the maxim-instructing that a specific statute controls over a general statute covering the same subject matter,” Cone v. State, Dep’t of Health, 886 So.2d 1007, 1010, 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (quoting Smith, 645 So.2d at 522 ).

2017The statutory construction rule of in pari materia requires provisions relating to the same subject to “‘be construed together and compared with each other;’” however, “[i]n contrast to the rule permitting in pari materia construction . . . is the maxim instructing that a specific statute controls over a general statute covering the same subject matter.” Cone v. State, Dep’t of 12 Health, 886 So. 2d 1007, 1010, 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (quoting Smith, 645 So. 2d at 522 ).

2017See Hackley, 95 So. 3d at 93 .

2017See Zingale v. Powell, 885 So.2d 277, 280 (Fla. 2004) (“[(Constitutional interpretation, like statutory interpretation, is performed de novo.”), The polestar of a statutory construction analysis is legislative intent.

2016Fortune v. Gulf Coast Tree Care Inc., 148 So.3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), “The polestar of a statutory construction analysis is legislative intent.” W.

2015“It is well settled that legislative, intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory construction analysis.” State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 109 (Fla.2002). “[Ljegislative intent may be discerned from the Legislature’s election to use different words to convey different meanings within á statute.” Dep't of Revenue v. Central Dade Malpractice Trust Fund, 673 So.2d 899, 901 (Fla. 1st DCA .1996). “[Wjhere the document has used one term in one place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the different term denotes a different idea.”, A. Scalia & B.

2015“It is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory construction analysis.” State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002). “[L]egislative intent may be discerned from the Legislature’s election to use different words to convey different meanings within a statute.” Dep’t of Revenue v. Central Dade Malpractice Trust Fund, 673 So. 2d 899, 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “[W]here the document has used one term in one place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the different term denotes a different idea.” A. Scalia & B.

2015In determining that intent, we have explained that we look first to the statute's plain meaning." Mathews v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 139 So. 3d 498, 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (quoting Gulf Atl.

2015In determining that intent, we have explained that we look first to the statute’s plain meaning.” Mathews v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 139 So.3d 498, 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (quoting Gulf Atl.

2015Weekly D412 , 2014 WL 656734 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 21, 2014), and avoid addressing the question that was certified by the Fifth District to be of great public importance.1 Instead, I would quash Ingram on the merits, based on express disagreement with the Fifth District’s statutory construction analysis, and answer the certified question in the negative.

2015While I agree that the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s opinion cannot stand, I disagree with the majority’s unusual procedural maneuver to vacate Ingram v. State, 164 So.3d 676 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), and avoid addressing the question that was certified by the Fifth District to be of great public importance. 1 Instead, I would quash Ingram on the merits, based on express disagreement with the Fifth District’s statutory construction analysis, and answer the certified question in the negative.

2014See, e.g., Capone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 116 So.3d 363, 376 (Fla.2013) (quoting Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla.2003)).