Brown v. City of New York, 458 N.E.2d 1248 (NY 1983). · Go Syfert
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Brown v. City of New York, 458 N.E.2d 1248 (NY 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
44 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Moore v. City of New York (ca2, 2021-05-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Although “probable cause [may] dissipate” after an arrest if “the groundless nature of the charges [is] made apparent by the discovery of some intervening fact,” Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1996), Moore does not identify any evidence indicating that the appellees “had knowledge of some intervening fact exonerating” him, Brown v. City of New York, 458 N.E.2d 1248, 1249 (N.Y. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The People v. Daria N. Epakchi
NY · 2021 · confidence medium
Carlin Const. Co., 89 NY2d 992, 994 [1997]; Brown v City of New York, 60 NY2d 893, 894 [1983]). -8- -9- No. 19 In our 1884 case of People v D’Argencour ( 95 NY 624 ), we intimated that our court might be able to review decisions granting a new trial in the interest of justice to determine if the appellate court abused its discretion (see id. at 625 [“The power conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Code of Criminal Procedure on appeal in a criminal action, to grant a new trial . . . where justice requires it . . . is discretionary, and where it does not appear that the discretion has been…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Flavin v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
The court properly dismissed the malicious prosecution claim, as there was probable cause for the arrest and the absence of evidence that such probable cause dissipated between the arrest and commencement of criminal proceedings ( see Brown v City of New York , 60 NY2d 893, 894-895 [1983]; see also Broughton v State of New York , 37 NY2d 451, 457-458 [1975], cert denied 423 US 929 [1975]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rogers v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
The malicious prosecution claim was correctly dismissed because there is no evidence in the record from which a fact-finder could reasonably infer that the probable cause at the time of plaintiff's arrest had dissipated by the time of his arraignment ( see Brown v City of New York , 60 NY2d 893, 894-895 [1983]; Thomas v City of New York , 562 Fed Appx 58, 60 [2d Cir 2014]; Lowth v Town of Cheektowaga , 82 F3d 563, 571 [2d Cir 1996]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Phin v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · confidence medium
Nor does the record show that there were any material changes in fact to undermine the probable cause between her arrest and the filing of charges against her ( see Brown v City of New York , 60 NY2d 893, 894-895 [1983]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Elizabeth McGovern v. Mount Pleasant Central School District
NY · 2015 · confidence medium
On appeal to us, McGovern contends that she is exempt from section 3813 (l)’s notice-of-claim requirement for two reasons: the monetary damages that she demands are merely incidental to her primary claim for equitable relief; and/or she seeks to enforce tenure rights by estoppel. * Even if the Appellate Division may have considered one or both of these arguments, McGovern did not raise them at Supreme Court; therefore, they are unpreserved for our review (see generally Brown v City of New York, 60 NY2d 893, 894 [1983]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Altshuler Shaham Provident Funds, Ltd. v. GML Tower, LLC
NY · 2013 · confidence medium
The Court of Appeals, by contrast, generally lacks power to review unpreserved issues even where the Appellate Division has chosen to do so (see Brown v City of New York, 60 NY2d 893, 894 [1983]; see also Hecker v State of New York, 20 NY3d 1087, 1087 [2013]). .
cited Cited "see" Banyan v. Sikorski
S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · signal: accord · confidence high
Dec. 29, 2016) (further quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Brown v. City of New York, 458 N.E.2d 1248, 1249 (N.Y. 1983).
discussed Cited "see" Kinge v. State
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
Although a grand jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause (see Colon v City of New York, 60 NY2d at 82 ), that presumption is overcome by evidence of “fraud, perjury or the misrepresentation or falsification of evidence” (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied 423 US 929 [1975] [emphasis added]; see Brown v City of New York, 92 AD2d 15, 17-18 [1983], affd 60 NY2d 893 [1983]; Boose v City of Rochester, 71 AD2d 59, 69 [1979]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Borisova v. Friberg
E.D.N.Y · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence low
It was also well established, for purposes of § 1983, that probable cause could dissipate with a “discovery of some intervening fact.” Kinzer, 316 F.3d at 144 (citation omitted); see also Brown v. City of New York, 92 A.D.2d 15, 20 , aff’d, 60 N.Y.2d 893 (1983) (same under New York law).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Vincent B. Brown, Appellant,
v.
City of New York, Respondent, Et Al., Defendants
New York Court of Appeals.
Nov 23, 1983.
458 N.E.2d 1248
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Bernard Meyerson and Benjamin Rubenstein for appellant., Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Corporation Counsel (Richard P. Swanson of counsel), for respondent.
Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Meyer, Simons and Kaye Concur.
Cited by 36 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

These actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution arose out of plaintiff’s arrest on January 16, 1978 for endangering the welfare of a child, unlawfully dealing with a child, criminal facilitation, and sexual abuse. The complainant, a 15-year-old runaway, twice identified plaintiff as one of three men who had abducted her, raped her, and forced her to engage in prostitution. Plaintiff was arraigned on January 17, 1978. After two adjournments, the case was dismissed as the complaining witness had failed to appear.

In the instant action, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the City of New York on plaintiff’s claim for false arrest. The jury found for the plaintiff, however, on his malicious prosecution claim and awarded damages,

The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint on the ground that there were inconsistent verdicts, but defendant at trial did not raise timely objection to the jury’s decision. Although the Appellate Division denominated its reversal as “on the law,” inasmuch as the unpreserved error was reviewed by the Appellate Division, this court construes the reversal as an exercise of discretion which is beyond this court’s power to review (see Feinberg v Saks & Co., 56 NY2d 206, 210-211).

The only question properly before this court is whether dismissal of the complaint was proper. This corrective action would be appropriate in this case “only if there was no evidence at trial that the defendant, between the time of detention and the time of instituting the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, had knowledge of some intervening fact exonerating plaintiff” (Feinberg v Saks & Co., supra, at p 211 [emphasis in original]). Viewing the record in the present appeal in the light most favorable to plaintiff,- there is no evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that probable cause, held by[*895] police at the time of arrest, had dissipated by the time of arraignment some 24 hours later. Plaintiff relies on the assertion of an alibi at the time of arrest. Given the indefinite and insubstantial nature of the asserted alibi and complainant’s identification of plaintiff, no reasonable inference could be drawn to support a finding of malice.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Meyer, Simons and Kaye concur.

Order affirmed, without costs, in a memorandum.