malicious prosecution claim in New York

2024For the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, a Grand Jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause for the criminal proceeding (Colon v City of New York, 60 NY2d 78, 82 [1983]).

2019Turning now to the malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff's indictment created a presumption of probable cause for the criminal proceeding ( Colon v New York , 60 NY2d 78, 82-83 [1983]; see also De Lourdes Torres , 26 NY3d at 761 ]).

2022To make out a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the underlying proceeding was terminated in his/her favor ( Martinez v City of Schenectady , 97 NY2d 78, 84-85 [2001]).

2022To make out a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the underlying proceeding was terminated in his/her favor ( Martinez v City of Schenectady , 97 NY2d 78, 84-85 [2001]).

2010This notice of claim was timely with respect to the petitioner’s malicious prosecution claim, but untimely with respect to his false arrest and false imprisonment claims (see Roche v Village of Tarrytown, 309 AD2d 842, 843 [2003]).

2010This notice of claim was timely with respect to the petitioner’s malicious prosecution claim, but untimely with respect to his false arrest claim (see Roche v Village of Tarrytown, 309 AD2d 842, 843 [2003]).

2024To prevail on a federal claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a plaintiff must show a violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law (Manganiello v City of New York, 612 F3d 149, 161 [2d Cir 2010]).

2012“In order to prevail on a [42 USC] § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law” (Manganiello v City of New York, 612 F3d 149, 160-161 [2010] [citations omitted]).

2013However, the malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed because defendant Robert Weir had probable cause to bring the Surrogate’s Court proceeding, which sought, inter alia, to remove Eric as a trustee (see Butler v Ratner, 210 AD2d 691, 693 [3d Dept 1994], Iv dismissed 85 NY2d 924 [1995]).

2013However, the malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed because defendant Robert Weir had probable cause to bring the Surrogate’s Court proceeding, which sought, inter alia, to remove Eric as a trustee (see Butler v Ratner, 210 AD2d 691, 693 [3d Dept 1994], Iv dismissed 85 NY2d 924 [1995]).

2025Malicious Prosecution The malicious prosecution claim requires Plaintiffs to prove the initiation of a criminal proceeding, favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and actual malice, as articulated in Nardelli v. Stamberg, 44 NY2d 500 (1978) and Hollender v. Trump Village Co-op., Inc., 58 NY2d 420 (1983).

2024It is the plaintiff's burden to prove all these elements, and a failure to prove any one of the elements is fatal to a malicious prosecution claim (see Hollender v. Trump Village Co-op., Inc., 58 NY2d 420,461 [1983]).

2019Turning now to the malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff's indictment created a presumption of probable cause for the criminal proceeding ( Colon v New York , 60 NY2d 78, 82-83 [1983]; see also De Lourdes Torres , 26 NY3d at 761 ]).

2019Turning now to the malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff's indictment created a presumption of probable cause for the criminal proceeding ( Colon v New York , 60 NY2d 78, 82-83 [1983]; see also De Lourdes Torres , 26 NY3d at 761 ]).

2019The malicious prosecution claim was correctly dismissed because there is no evidence in the record from which a fact-finder could reasonably infer that the probable cause at the time of plaintiff's arrest had dissipated by the time of his arraignment ( see Brown v City of New York , 60 NY2d 893, 894-895 [1983]; Thomas v City of New York , 562 Fed Appx 58, 60 [2d Cir 2014]; Lowth v Town of Cheektowaga , 82 F3d 563, 571 [2d Cir 1996]).

2019The court properly dismissed the malicious prosecution claim, as there was probable cause for the arrest and the absence of evidence that such probable cause dissipated between the arrest and commencement of criminal proceedings ( see Brown v City of New York , 60 NY2d 893, 894-895 [1983]; see also Broughton v State of New York , 37 NY2d 451, 457-458 [1975], cert denied 423 US 929 [1975]).

2025Accordingly, the Court evaluates each of the claims made by plaintiff in opposition of his motion, separated by factor, as follows: A) Termination in his Favor For the purpose of a malicious prosecution claim, it is well settled that “any termination of a criminal prosecution, such that the criminal charges may not be brought again, qualifies as a favorable termination, so long as the circumstances surrounding the termination are not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused” (Cantalino v Danner, 96 NY2d 391, 395 [2001]; see Smith-Hunter, 96 NY2d at 199 ).

2025Accordingly, the Court evaluates each of the claims made by plaintiff in opposition of his motion, separated by factor, as follows: A) Termination in his Favor For the purpose of a malicious prosecution claim, it is well settled that “any termination of a criminal prosecution, such that the criminal charges may not be brought again, qualifies as a favorable termination, so long as the circumstances surrounding the termination are not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused” (Cantalino v Danner, 96 NY2d 391, 395 [2001]; see Smith-Hunter, 96 NY2d at 199 ).

2023Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant initiated or continued the criminal proceeding against him ( Vizcaino v City of New York , 201 AD3d 538 , 538 [1st Dept 2022]; Brown v Sears Roebuck & Co. , 297 AD2d 205, 208 [1st Dept 2002]).

2015Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paul Wooten, J.), entered December 13, 2013, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgement dismissing the malicious prosecution cause of action, unanimously affirmed, without costs. *550 Dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim was warranted where the record, including plaintiffs threatening emails to defendant, demonstrates that the criminal proceeding against him did not lack probable cause (see generally Brown v Sears Roebuck & Co., 297 AD2d 205 , 208 [1st Dept 2002]).

2021The record demonstrates that plaintiff cannot show that defendants' employees either initiated the criminal prosecution against her or acted with actual malice in providing information to the District Attorney's office ( see Colon v City of New York , 60 NY2d 78, 82 [1983]; Present v Avon Prods., Inc. , 253 AD2d 183, 189 [1st Dept 1999], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 1032 [1999]; Nardelli v Stamberg , 44 NY2d 500 , 502-503 [1978]).

2021The record demonstrates that plaintiff cannot show that defendants' employees either initiated the criminal prosecution against her or acted with actual malice in providing information to the District Attorney's office ( see Colon v City of New York , 60 NY2d 78, 82 [1983]; Present v Avon Prods., Inc. , 253 AD2d 183, 189 [1st Dept 1999], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 1032 [1999]; Nardelli v Stamberg , 44 NY2d 500 , 502-503 [1978]).

2023These allegations sufficed to give defendants notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved in asserting the malicious prosecution claim in the proposed first amended verified complaint ( see Demir v Sandoz Inc. , 155 AD3d 464, 465 [1st Dept 2017]).

2023These allegations sufficed to give defendants notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved in asserting the malicious prosecution claim in the proposed first amended verified complaint ( see Demir v Sandoz Inc. , 155 AD3d 464, 465 [1st Dept 2017]).

2023The dismissals do not undermine the allegations in the complaint, which clearly put defendants on notice of the malicious prosecution claim ( see Pendleton v City of New York , 44 AD3d 733, 736 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Tiller v Atlantic Coast Line , 323 US 574, 581 [1945]).

2023The dismissals do not undermine the allegations in the complaint, which clearly put defendants on notice of the malicious prosecution claim ( see Pendleton v City of New York , 44 AD3d 733, 736 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Tiller v Atlantic Coast Line , 323 US 574, 581 [1945]).

2023The dismissals do not undermine the allegations in the complaint, which clearly put defendants on notice of the malicious prosecution claim ( see Pendleton v City of New York , 44 AD3d 733, 736 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Tiller v Atlantic Coast Line , 323 US 574, 581 [1945]).

2023The dismissals do not undermine the allegations in the complaint, which clearly put defendants on notice of the malicious prosecution claim ( see Pendleton v City of New York , 44 AD3d 733, 736 [2d Dept 2007]; see also Tiller v Atlantic Coast Line , 323 US 574, 581 [1945]).

2022The malicious prosecution claim failed to sufficiently allege "the absence of probable cause" to commence or continue the Dennis Action ( see Facebook, Inc. v DLA Piper LLP (US) , 134 AD3d 610, 614 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 28 NY3d 903 [2016]).

2018Neither in his complaint nor in the reworked theory presented in his appellate brief does he identify any proceeding favorably terminated for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim ( see Facebook, Inc. v DLA Piper LLP (US) , 134 AD3d 610, 613 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 28 NY3d 903 [2016]).

2022Where the prosecution did not result in an acquittal, it is deemed to have ended in favor of the accused, for these purposes, only when its final disposition is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused ( id .; see also Gonzalez v City of Schenectady , 728 F3d 149, 162 [2d Cir 2013]).

2022Where the prosecution did not result in an acquittal, it is deemed to have ended in favor of the accused, for these purposes, only when its final disposition is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused ( id .; see also Gonzalez v City of Schenectady , 728 F3d 149, 162 [2d Cir 2013]).

2019The court properly dismissed the malicious prosecution claim, as there was probable cause for the arrest and the absence of evidence that such probable cause dissipated between the arrest and commencement of criminal proceedings ( see Brown v City of New York , 60 NY2d 893, 894-895 [1983]; see also Broughton v State of New York , 37 NY2d 451, 457-458 [1975], cert denied 423 US 929 [1975]).

2019We recognize that the presumption of probable cause attendant a grand jury indictment applies to a malicious prosecution claim, but not one for false arrest and unlawful imprisonment ( see Broughton v State of New York , 37 NY2d at 456 ).

2011“A criminal proceeding terminates favorably to the accused, for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, when the final disposition of the proceeding involves the merits and indicates the accused’s innocence” (MacFawn v Kresler, 88 NY2d 859, 860 [1996]; see Hollender v Trump Vil.

2011Applying these standards here, the plaintiff failed adequately to plead that the underlying criminal proceeding terminated in his favor for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim (see MacFawn v Kresler, 88 NY2d at 860 ; see generally Kochis v Reveo Pharmacy, 9 AD3d 449, 449 [2004]; Levy v Coates, 286 AD2d 424, 424 [2001]).

2025To prove a malicious prosecution claim, Defendants must show that Plaintiffs initiated an action with malice, without probable cause, which imposes special injury before terminating in failure (Engel v CBS, Inc., 93 NY2d 195, 206 [1999]).

2024A prior civil action that may support a malicious prosecution claim must involve the interference with the plaintiff’s person or property rights, i.e., a “special injury.” (Engel v CBS, Inc., 93 NY2d 195 [1999]).

2007While a malicious prosecution claim can be maintained based upon a prior administrative proceeding (see Groat v Town Bd. of Town of Glenville, 73 AD2d 426, 429-430 [1980], appeal dismissed 50 NY2d 928 [1980]), “ ‘when the underlying action is civil in nature the want of probable cause must be patent’ ” (Fink v Shawangunk Conservancy, Inc., supra at 755, quoting Butler v Ratner, 210 AD2d 691, 693 [1994], lv dismissed 85 NY2d 924 [1995]; see Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 120, at 893 [5th ed]).

1991Moreover, the administrative proceedings conducted in this matter contained sufficient attributes of judicial proceedings to satisfy the requirements for instituting a malicious prosecution claim (Groat v Town Bd., 73 AD2d 426 , appeal dismissed 50 NY2d 928 ; Glenn v State of New York, 144 Misc 2d 101 ).

2000A criminal action is “ ‘terminated in the accused’s favor’ ” for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim where a judicial determination of the accused’s innocence has been made on the merits of the action (Ward v Silverberg, supra, at 994 ; Hollender v Trump Vil.

1996Applying the foregoing, we find that the IAS Court properly dismissed, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7), the causes of action of the amended complaint seeking to recover monetary damages for malicious prosecution inasmuch as plaintiff failed to prove that the underlying criminal action, wherein the People’s misdemeanor complaint was dismissed solely because of the District Attorney’s failure to plead sufficient facts to support a menacing charge, was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor on the merits, a necessary element of a malicious prosecution claim (see, MacFawn v Kresler, 88 NY2d 859

2016As to the malicious prosecution claim, Duane Reade failed to establish prima facie that it did not participate in the continuation of the prosecution of plaintiffs and that there was no actual malice (see Smith-Hunter v Harvey, 95 NY2d 191, 195 [2000]).

2002(See, Smith-Hunter v Harvey, 95 NY2d 191, 195 ; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 457 , cert denied sub nom.

2010Tea Co., 208 AD2d 111, 114-116 [1995]; but see MacLeay v Arden Hill Hosp., 164 AD2d 228, 230-231 [1990], lv denied 77 NY2d 806 [1991]).

1997Tea Co., 208 AD2d 111, 113 , supra).