Rueda v. Galvez, 382 P.2d 239 (Ariz. 1963). · Go Syfert
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Rueda v. Galvez, 382 P.2d 239 (Ariz. 1963). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2010 · 2 courts · …with certain exceptions ..., the power of an appellate court to review judgments of the superior courts is limited by a.r.s. 12-2101(b) to appeals 'from a final judgment. ≈ altered
61 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Short v. Dewald (arizctapp, 2010-12-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1963 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1963 1994 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Short v. Dewald
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
“With certain exceptions ..., the power of [an appellate court] to review judgments of the superior courts is limited by A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) to appeals ‘from a final judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Rueda v. Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131, 132 , 382 P.2d 239, 239 (1963)). ¶ 19 One such exception, codified at A.R.S. § 12-2101(D) (2003), permits a party to appeal from the superior court “any order affecting a substantial right made in any action when the order in effect determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken.” Even assuming that Judge Gaines’ order was no…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Garza v. Swift Transportation Co. (5×) also: Cited "see"
Ariz. · 2009 · confidence medium
“With certain exceptions ..., the power of [an appellate court] to review judgments of the superior courts is limited by A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) to appeals ‘from a final judgment.’ ” Rueda v. Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131, 132 , 382 P.2d 239, 239 (1963). ¶ 13 Garza first argues that the order denying class certification was a final judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which permits entry of final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims in a case when there is “no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” Garza is mistaken; the superio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mezey v. Fioramonti (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Musa, 130 Ariz. at 312 , 636 P.2d at 90 (“In Arizona, with certain exceptions, jurisdiction of appeals is limited to final judgments which dispose of all claims and all parties.”); Rueda, 94 Ariz. at 132, 382 P.2d at 239 (characterizing the basic limit on appellate jurisdiction as review of final judgments and the rest of A.R.S. § 12-2101 as exceptions to that rule); Davis, 168 Ariz. at 304 , 812 P.2d at 1122 (“The general rule is that an appeal lies only from a final judgment.”). ¶ 19 Preserving the fundamental finality requirement is important, as our supreme court has said: Th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walter v. Northern Arizona Title Co. (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
Rule 54(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. reads in part as follows: “A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. * * * ” And our Supreme Court has stated: “After a motion to set aside entry of default has been denied it remains for the trial court to conduct hearings, when appropriate, to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment, and to enter judgment upon the default.” Rueda v. Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131, 132, 133 , 382 P.2d 239, 240 (1963).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Searles v. Haldiman (2×)
unknown court · 1966 · confidence medium
Therefore, the order is not appealable.” Rueda v. *295 Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131, 132, 133 , 382 P.2d 239, 240 (1963).
discussed Cited "see" Boydston v. Strole Development Co. (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rueda v. Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131, 132 , 382 P.2d 239, 239 (1963) (even if the parties do not raise the issue, the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction); Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Lane and Bird Adver., Inc., 102 Ariz. 127, 128 , 426 P.2d 395, 396 (1967) (a corporation cannot appear in court by an officer who is not an attorney and cannot appear in propria persona).
discussed Cited "see" Anonymous Wife v. Anonymous Husband (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rueda v. Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131 , 382 P.2d 239 (1963).
discussed Cited "see" Northeast Phoenix Homeowners' Ass'n v. Scottsdale Municipal Airport (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rueda v. Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131 , 382 P.2d 239 (1963).
discussed Cited "see" Vital v. Johnson (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rueda v. Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131 , 382 P.2d 239 (1963).
discussed Cited "see" McClintock v. Serv-Us Bakers (2×)
Ariz. · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rueda v. Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131 , 382 P.2d 239 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Edward RUEDA and Rosario Rueda, husband and wife, Appellants,
v.
Maria GALVEZ, wife of F. Galvez, Appellee.
7268.
Arizona Supreme Court.
May 29, 1963.
382 P.2d 239
Jennings.
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published

[*132] Jose del Castillo, Tucson, for appellants.

Healy, Laubscher & Dickerson, Tucson, for appellee.

JENNINGS, Justice.

The appellee Maria Galvez brought an action against appellants Edward and Rosario Rueda, seeking possession of certain real property and other affirmative relief. Appellants failed to answer within the time required by law and their default was subsequently entered by the clerk of the superior court. Three days thereafter appellants moved to set aside the default. This motion was denied and appellants appealed from the order denying their motion. No judgment was entered upon the default.

Although the parties have not questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to hear this appeal, we must nevertheless pass upon the Court's power to accept it. Stevens v. Mehagian's Home Furnishings, Inc., 90 Ariz. 42, 365 P.2d 208 (1961). With certain exceptions not here pertinent, the power of this Court to review judgments of the superior courts is limited by A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) to appeals "from a final judgment." Review of orders is limited by A.R.S. § 12-2101(D) to appeals from "any order affecting a substantial right made in any action when the order in effect determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken."

After a motion to set aside entry of default has been denied it remains for the trial court to conduct hearings, when appropriate, to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment,[*133] and to enter judgment upon the default. Ariz.R.Civ.Proc. 55(b), 16 A.R.S. An order denying a motion to set aside default entered by the clerk of the superior court is in no sense a final judgment. Nor does such order determine the action so as to prevent entry of judgment upon the default. Therefore, the order is not appealable. Unger v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. App.2d 706, 339 P.2d 586 (1959); Garcia v. Thompson, 137 Colo. 231, 323 P.2d 280 (1958); Hope v. Hudgins, 98 Ga. App. 856, 107 S.E.2d 252 (1959) (dictum); Fudim v. Kane, 47 R.I. 357, 133 A. 351 (1926).

The appeal is dismissed.

STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.