q1 “the consistent use of terminology shows that the legislature intended health care liens and attorney liens to be calculated from the same total award.”0 citing cases
Other citing cases
- McVey v. M.L.K. Enter., LLC, 2015 IL 118143.published
- McVey v. M.L.K. Enter., LLC, 2015 IL 118143, 32 N.E.3d 1112.unpublished
v.
Toolie
FIFTH DIVISION
September 30, 2014
Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Palmer and Justice Gordon concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The present appeal involves two separate cases, both stemming from separate motor vehicle accidents in which plaintiffs suffered personal injuries. Plaintiffs received medical care Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
at John H. Stroger, Jr., Hospital of Cook County (Stroger). The County of Cook (Cook County) filed liens against plaintiffs for unpaid medical bills on behalf of the hospital, pursuant to the Health Care Services Lien Act (Act) (770 ILCS 23/1 et seq. (West 2012)). Subsequently, each plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the other parties involved in the accidents and recovered a settlement. Each plaintiff then filed a motion to adjudicate her health care services liens, arguing that the attorney fees and litigation costs should be deducted from the total recovery before calculating the amount to be distributed to the health care services providers. The central question on appeal is whether attorney fees and litigation costs should be deducted from a plaintiff's total recovery prior to calculating the amount to be distributed to health care professionals and providers pursuant to the Act. The two circuit court judges decided this question differently: in case No. 1-13-2243, the circuit court did not deduct attorney fees and litigation costs from the plaintiff's total recovery before calculating the amount to be awarded to Stroger for its lien against the plaintiff; in case No. 1-13-2552, the circuit court did deduct attorney fees and litigation costs from the plaintiff's total recovery before calculating the amount to be awarded to Stroger for its lien against the plaintiff. Timely appeals were filed in both cases and this court subsequently allowed a motion to consolidate the two cases on appeal due to the identical legal issue presented.
¶2 The Act provides that health care professionals and health care providers that render any service in the treatment, care, or maintenance of an injured person "shall have a lien upon all claims and causes of action of the injured person for the amount of the health care professional's or health care provider's reasonable charges up to the date of payment of damages to the injured person." 770 ILCS 23/10(a) (West 2012). The total amount of liens under the Act is limited and "shall not exceed 40% of the verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise secured by or Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
[*~1155–1159]on behalf of the injured person on his or her claim or right of action." Id. However, the Act also provides that "[t]he statutory limitations under this Section may be waived or otherwise reduced only by the lienholder." (Emphasis added). 770 ILCS 23/10(c) (West 2012).
¶3 The Act further creates a structure to divide the liens between health care professionals and health care providers, dictating that if the total amount of liens under the Act meets or exceeds 40% of the "verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise" then neither the liens of the health care professionals nor the liens of the health care providers shall exceed 20% of the "verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise." 770 ILCS 23/10(c) (West 2012). No individual health care professional or health care provider may receive more than one-third of the "verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise." Id. However, the Act also provides:
"[H]ealth care services liens shall be satisfied to the extent possible for all health care professionals and health care providers by reallocating the amount unused within the aggregate total limitation of 40% for all health care services liens under this Act;
and provided further that the amounts of liens under paragraphs (1) and (2) are subject to the one-third limitation under this subsection." (Emphasis added). Id.
¶4 The Act also provides that when the total amount of liens under the Act exceeds 40% of the "verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise," attorney liens under the Attorneys Lien Act (770 ILCS 5/0.01 et seq. (West 2012)) "shall not exceed 30% of the verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise." 770 ILCS 23/10(c) (West 2012).
¶5 Similarly to the Act, the Attorneys Lien Act provides: Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
[*~1156–1160]"Attorneys at law shall have a lien upon all claims, demands and causes of action *** for the amount of any fee which may have been agreed upon by and between such attorneys and their clients, or, in the absence of such agreement, for a reasonable fee, for the services of such suits, claims, demands or causes of action, plus costs and expenses." (Emphasis added.) 770 ILCS 5/1 (West 2012).
In conjunction with the Act, the Attorneys Lien Act further states:
"In the case of a claim, demand, or cause of action with respect to which the total amount of all liens under the Health Care Services Lien Act meets or exceeds 40% of the sum paid or due the injured person, the total amount of all liens under this [Attorneys Lien] Act shall not exceed 30% of the sum paid or due the injured person."
Id.
¶6 The procedural facts from the circuit courts' decisions disclose the following. Kimberly Wolf, plaintiff in case No. 1-13-2243, was a passenger in an automobile driven by Bernard Toolie that was involved in a one-vehicle accident on March 21, 2010. 1 She received outpatient treatment for her injuries at Stroger and incurred medical bills totaling $5,093.10. Wolf filed suit against Toolie and ultimately recovered a settlement of $27,000.
¶7 On April 28, 2010, Cook County issued a notice of lien against Wolf on behalf of Stroger pursuant to the Act.
Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
¶8 On April 18, 2013, Wolf filed an amended motion for adjudication of medical liens in which she indicated that, in addition to the lien served against her by Cook County on behalf of Stroger, 2 she had health care liens totaling $12,257.18 from four separate health care professionals: Affiliated Health Care Associates, Bassam Osman, M.D., Lake Shore Open MRI, and Richard S. Conen, D.D.S. Wolf also alleged that her attorney fees for litigating the suit totaled $8,100 and costs of the lawsuit totaled $751.26. In the motion, Wolf argued that, pursuant to an appellate court decision from the Fifth District, Stanton v. Rea, 2012 IL App (5th) 110187, any health care services liens should be adjudicated on the net amount remaining after her attorney fees and litigation costs are subtracted from her total recovery. In applying the Stanton calculations, Wolf first subtracted the $8,100 in attorney fees and the $751.26 for the costs of the lawsuit from her total recovery of $27,000, leaving a new subtotal of $18,148.74. Wolf then argued that the health care lien claimants were entitled to 40% of the $18,148.74 subtotal to be split evenly between the categories, 20% of the subtotal going to health care professionals and 20% to health care providers; therefore, the health care professionals were entitled to $3,629.75, divided pro rata, and Stroger, as the sole health care provider, was entitled to $3,629.75.
¶9 On April 22, 2013, Cook County filed a response to Wolf's amended motion, arguing that Stanton did not apply. More specifically, Cook County argued that because the total amount of health care liens, $17,350.28, exceeded 40% of Wolf's total recovery of $27,000, the health care professionals were entitled to a total of 20% of the $27,000 recovery, divided pro rata, and Stroger as the sole health care provider was entitled to a total of 20% of the $27,000 recovery, or Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
[*~1157–1161]$5,400. Because 20% of Wolf's total recovery, or $5,400, exceeded Stroger's $5,093.10 lien amount against Wolf, Cook County argued that Stroger was entitled to the full amount of its lien.
¶ 10 On April 23, 2013, the circuit court entered an order adjudicating the liens of the health care professionals to an amount of $3,629.75 and dismissed the case with prejudice as to those liens. The circuit court also retained jurisdiction to adjudicate Stroger's lien.
¶ 11 On June 17, 2013, in a written order, the circuit court concluded that Stroger should receive the full amount of its $5,093.10 lien. The court observed that the plaintiff in Stanton received nothing from her judgment and the Stanton court held that a plaintiff should receive 30% of the total amount of a settlement. Stanton, 2012 IL App (5th) 110187, ¶ 17. The circuit court, however, reasoned that "[u]nder the limited facts of this case where the calculations show that Plaintiff would receive money, even after her attorney received 30% of the settlement, costs were paid, and Stroger Hospital received 20% of the settlement, the Stanton Court's objective is satisfied."
¶ 12 On July 10, 2013, Wolf timely appealed from the circuit court's June 2013 order.
¶ 13 Nora Larmena, plaintiff in case No. 1-13-2552, was the driver of a vehicle when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident on August 11, 2006. She received treatment for her injuries at Stroger and incurred medical bills, of which $4,185.60 remained unpaid. On August 11, 2011, Larmena filed suit against defendant James Campbell, the driver of the other vehicle, alleging that he proximately caused her injuries. On March 12, 2013, the lawsuit resulted in a settlement of $24,110.60, in favor of Larmena.
¶ 14 On August 10, 2009, and July 15, 2010, Cook County issued notices of lien to Larmena on behalf of Stroger pursuant to the Act.
[*~1158–1162]Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
¶ 15 On May 15, 2013, Larmena filed a motion to adjudicate and/or quash any and all liens. She alleged that she had health care liens totaling $23,734.24, including liens from Stroger, Pain Net Medical Group, Chinatown Rehabilitation, Preferred Open MRI, and Jackson Park Hospital; attorney fees totaling $7,233.18, or 30% of her $24,110.60 recovery; and court costs totaling $3,480.92. Larmena argued that, pursuant to Stanton, the health care services liens should be adjudicated on the net amount remaining after her attorney fees and litigation costs are subtracted from her total recovery. In applying the Stanton calculations, Larmena first subtracted the $7,233.18 in attorney fees and the $3,480.92 for the costs of the lawsuit from her total recovery of $24,110.60, leaving a new subtotal of $13,396.50. Larmena then argued that the health care lien claimants were entitled to 40% of the $13,396.50 subtotal to be split evenly between the categories, 20% of the subtotal going to health care professionals and 20% to health care providers. Therefore, Larmena concluded that the health care professionals were entitled to $2,673.90, divided pro rata, and the two health care providers, Stroger and Jackson Park Hospital, were each entitled to half of the $2,673.90, or $1,336.95.
¶ 16 On June 20, 2013, the circuit court entered a written order in which the liens of Jackson Park Hospital and Chinatown Rehabilitation were adjudicated to zero.
¶ 17 On June 25, 2013, Cook County filed a response to Larmena's motion, indicating that its lien amount against Larmena was $4,185.60. Cook County argued that, as the only lienholder to perfect its lien, it was entitled to up to one-third of Larmena's total $24,110.60 recovery, or $8,036.86, pursuant to the Act. Cook County concluded that because Stroger's lien was less than the $8,036.86 one-third of Larmena's total recovery, Stroger was entitled to its full lien amount of $4,185.60. In the alternative, Cook County argued that even if the other remaining lienholders perfected their liens, they were health care professionals entitled to 20% of the recovery, divided Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
[*~1159–1163]pro rata, and Stroger would still be entitled to 20% of Larmena's total recovery of $24,110.60, or $4,822.12, as the sole health care provider. Because 20% of Larmena's total recovery, or $4,822.12, exceeded Stroger's $4,185.60 lien amount against Larmena, Cook County argued that Stroger was still entitled to the full amount of its lien. Cook County also claimed that Stanton did not apply.
¶ 18 On July 11, 2013, in a written order, the circuit court found that the Stanton lien calculation was the proper methodology and that, after attorney fees and costs were deducted from a plaintiff's recovery, health care liens should be calculated from the resulting subtotal. The court awarded Stroger $2,673.90 of its $4,185.60 lien, or 20% of the $13,396.50 subtotal after deducting plaintiff's attorney fees and litigation costs from the total recovery of $24,110.60.
¶ 19 On August 5, 2013, Cook County timely appealed from the circuit court's July 2013 order on behalf of Stroger.
¶ 20 On appeal, the central question is whether, under the Act, health care services liens are to be calculated from the plaintiff's total recovery or from the subtotal resulting after attorney fees and costs have been subtracted from the total recovery. In addition to the briefs filed by the parties, we also allowed an amicus curiae brief to be filed by the Illinois State Medical Society and the Illinois Hospital Association in support of Stroger.
¶ 21 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Taylor v. Pekin Insurance Co., 231 Ill. 2d 390, 395 (2008). "The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature." Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541, 552 (2006). The language of the statute is the best indication of the legislature's intent and therefore must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 553. If the language is unambiguous, the statute must be given effect without the use of other aids of construction. Id. We cannot "depart from Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
[*~1160–1164]the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature." Id. at 567-68. A court should not consider words and phrases in isolation, but instead should interpret each word and phrase in light of the statute as a whole. Id. at 553. "Each word, clause and sentence of a statute must be given reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous." Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lay, 2013 IL 114617, ¶ 26. Statutes should be interpreted as a whole, "meaning different sections of the same statute should be considered in reference to one another so that they are given harmonious effect." Jayko v. Fraczek, 2012 IL App (1st) 103665, ¶ 14.
¶ 22 According to the plain language of the Act and the Attorneys Lien Act, if the total amount of health care liens exceeds 40% of plaintiff's verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise, then attorney liens are limited to 30% of the verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise. Contrary to the interpretation plaintiffs are suggesting, nothing in the language of the Act or the Attorneys Lien Act suggests that healthcare liens must be calculated from the net amount of a plaintiff's verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise, after costs and attorneys fees have been deducted. Statutes are to be read together in harmony. Jayko, 2012 IL App (1st) 103665, ¶ 14. We note that both the Act and the Attorneys Lien Act use the exact same language in regard to the percentage limitations for both health care liens and attorney liens. The total amount of liens under the Act "shall not exceed" 40% of the "verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise." 770 ILCS 23/10(a) (West 2012). If the total amount of liens under the Act exceeds 40% of the "verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise," then attorney liens "shall not exceed" 30% of the "verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise." 770 ILCS 5/1 (West 2012); 770 ILCS 23/10(c) (West 2012). The words "verdict, judgment, award, settlement, [and] compromise" are not defined by the Act or the Attorneys Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
[*~1161–1165]Lien Act, however the consistent use of terminology shows that the legislature intended health care liens and attorney liens to be calculated from the same total. Interpreting the statute as plaintiffs suggest would require us to read into the Act and the Attorneys Lien Act an exception that was not expressed by the legislature, which we cannot do. Krautsack, 223 Ill. 2d at 567-68.
¶ 23 Moreover, the definitions of these words do not alter our understanding of the statutes. According to Black’s Law Dictionary: "verdict" is defined as a "jury's finding or decision on the factual issue of a case" or "in a nonjury trial, a judge's resolution of the issues of a case" (Black's Law Dictionary 1554 (7th ed. 1999)); "judgment" is defined as a "court's final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a case" (at 846); "award" is defined as a "final judgment or decision, esp. one by an arbitrator or by a jury assessing damages" (at 132); "settlement" is defined as an "agreement ending a dispute or lawsuit" (at 1377); and "compromise" is defined as an "agreement between two or more persons to settle matters in dispute between them" (at 281). None of the words used in the statute suggest that the legislature intended a health care lien to be calculated based on the "verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise" after the subtraction of attorney fees and costs. The statute simply says that the health care lien total may not exceed 40% of the "verdict, judgment, award, settlement, or compromise."
¶ 24 The Act expressly provides that health care liens "shall be satisfied to the extent possible" and that the statutory limitations may be reduced or waived "only by the lienholder." 770 ILCS 23/10(c) (West 2012). This shows that the legislature intended for health care providers to receive as much of their liens as possible within the limitations of the statute. See In re Estate of Wade, 156 Ill. App. 3d 844, 848 (1987) (finding that, under the Hospital Lien Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
- 10 - Nos. 1-13-2243 & 1-13-2552 (cons.)
1985, ch. 82, ¶ 97), once a hospital lien was established, "the trial court has no discretion to reduce the amount of the lien"). As a court, we are limited by the rules of statutory construction and cannot add words to a statute to change its meaning. Hyster Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 125 Ill. App. 3d 867, 869 (1984) (citing Harvey Firemen's Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 75 Ill. 2d 358, 363 (1979)). Neither can we read into the statutes an exception that was not expressed by the legislature. Krautsack, 223 Ill. 2d at 567-68. Here, the plain language of the Act and the Attorneys Lien Act is unambiguous and the language must therefore be given effect without other aids of statutory construction. Id. at 553. Based on the plain language of the Act and the Attorneys Lien Act, we hold that both health care liens and attorney liens are calculated from the same total: they must be calculated based on an injured plaintiff's total recovery resulting from the plaintiff's claims or causes of action based on the injury.
¶ 25 Our interpretation of the statute is supported by case law. Our supreme court has held that shifting attorney fees to a health care lienholder is not permitted. See Maynard v. Parker, 75 Ill. 2d 73, 75-76 (1979); Wendling v. Southern Illinois Hospital Services, 242 Ill. 2d 261, 271 (2011). In Maynard, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and filed suit to recover damages for the injuries he sustained. Maynard, 75 Ill. 2d at 74; Maynard v. Parker, 54 Ill. App. 3d 141, 142 (1977). The hospital's bill for services in treating the plaintiff totaled $11,027.96 and the hospital served a notice of lien on the plaintiff in that amount pursuant to the Hospital Lien Act. Maynard, 75 Ill. 2d at 74. The plaintiff's suit was settled for $37,500 and the plaintiff filed a petition to adjudicate the rights of the parties. Id. The circuit court ordered the hospital to pay the plaintiff's attorney one-third of the litigation costs incurred and one-third of the amount