In Re Richard R. Ryder, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967). · Go Syfert
In Re Richard R. Ryder, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
52 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 30 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1968 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1968 1997 2026
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At page 714 Determining attorney-client privilege and professional responsibility4 citing casesstolen money and sawed-off shotgun1 citing court put it this way
  • Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1986).published
    It has been held “an abuse of a lawyer’s professional responsibility knowingly to take possession of and secrete the instrumentalities of a crime.” (In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 [4th Cir.1967].) A defendant in a criminal case may not per…
  • Robert C. Glass v. Louis B. Heyd, Crim. Sheriff of the Par. of Orleans, 457 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1972).published 2 cites
    SHEA, Judge presiding on Thursday, October 8, 1970". p. 5 6 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed. Vol. 8, p. 600, Sec. 2311: "The mere relation of an attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality, and the circumstances are to i…
  • In the Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 22 N.E.3d 927 (Mass. 2015).published 2 cites
    (stolen money and sawed-off shotgun)
  • People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).published
holding that an attorney abuses his professional responsibility by knowingly taking possession of and secreting the fruits and instrumentalities of a crimeno pin page on record · 2 citing cases listed
  • In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 89 Ohio St. 3d 544 (2000).published
    (holding that an attorney abuses his professional responsibility by knowingly taking possession of and secreting the fruits and instrumentalities of a crime)
  • In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 733 N.E.2d 1135 (Ohio 2000).published
    (holding that an attorney abuses his professional responsibility by knowingly taking possession of and secreting the fruits and instrumentalities of a crime)
At page 713 “an abuse of a lawyer's professional responsibility knowingly to take possession of and secrete the instrumentalities of a crime.”0 citing cases2 citing courts quote it · passage not found verbatim in the opinion (91%)
    Other citing cases6 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
    Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
    In Re Richard R. RYDER, Appellant
    11315.
    Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
    Jul 20, 1967.
    Published opinion
    381 F.2d 713
    1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5558
    Edward A. Marks, Jr., and David J. Mays, Richmond, Va. (Leith S. Bremner, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellant., C. V. Spratley, Jr., U. S. Atty. (Samuel W. Phillips and John D. Schmidtlein, Asst. U. S. Attys., on brief), for the United States.
    Sobeloff, Boreman, Winter.
    Cited by 43 opinions  |  Published
    PER CURIAM:

    This is the appeal of Richard R. Ryder from an order by the Judges of the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting en banc, adjudging him guilty of unprofessional conduct and suspending him from practice before that court for a period of 18 months.

    The essential facts are not in dispute. In the course of his representation of an individual suspected of bank robbery, Ryder transferred from that person’s safe deposit box to his own, stolen money and a sawed-off shotgun, in violation of state and federal law. At least one purpose, avowed by Ryder, was to conceal the articles and thereby avoid the presumption of guilt which would arise if the money and the weapon were found in the client’s possession. Viewed in any light, the facts furnished no basis for the assertion of an attorney-client privilege. It is an abuse of a lawyer’s professional responsibility knowingly to take possession of and secrete the fruits and instrumentalities of a crime. Ryder’s acts bear no reasonable relation to the privilege and duty to refuse to divulge a client’s confidential communication. Ryder made himself an active participant in a criminal act, ostensibly wearing the mantle of the loyal advocate, but in reality serving as accessory after the fact.

    We have carefully considered the exculpatory arguments made in Ryder’s behalf in the District Court and again advanced on appeal. They have all been dealt with thoroughly and satisfactorily in the District Court’s opinion, 263 F.Supp. 360 (E.D.Va.1967), and there is[*715] no need for elaborate repetition. The District Court’s opinion is adopted as our own and its judgment, which we think lenient in the circumstances, is affirmed.

    Having reached this conclusion on the complete record, briefs and arguments, we can do no less than suspend Ryder from practice before this court for the duration of his suspension from the District Court. It is so ordered.

    Affirmed.