J-S74027-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : FRANK ROSELLI, : : Appellant : No. 891 EDA 2014 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 10, 2012, Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County, Criminal Division at No. CP-46-CR-0000820-2011 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E, DONOHUE and STRASSBURGER*, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JANUARY 13, 2015 Frank Roselli (“Roselli”) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his convictions of burglary and theft by unlawful taking.1 Following our review, we affirm. The trial court ably summarized the operative facts as follows: These charges arose out of an incident that occurred on January 19, 2011[,] a little after midnight. At that time, Officer James Lee was called to 1728 DeKalb Street in Norristown, Pa. for a report of a burglary in progress. As he arrived at 1728 DeKalb Street and walked up the driveway, Officer Lee saw two other officers dealing with [Roselli] who was on the ground at that time. He also noticed a woman by the name of Rochelle Wisniewski who was yelling, and Joseph Staiber who identified himself as the homeowner. Prior to Officer Lee’s arrival, Staiber and Wisniewski returned home from a dinner at approximately 12:15 a.m. on January 19, 2011. As they were pulling up

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a), 3921(a). *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S74027-14 the driveway, Wisniewski saw someone in the home and said something to the effect of “that’s not Joey,’ referring to their 19-year-old son. Staiber looked up and also saw an individual who he did not recognize in the home. Staiber threw his phone at Wisniewski and told her to call the police while he got out of the car. As he entered the home through the main entrance, Staiber grabbed a hockey stick that was propped up against the house for protection. When he got into his home, he saw [Roselli] moving fast toward the front of the house. [Roselli] was holding Wisniewski’s red suitcase with wires hanging out of it and Staiber noticed [that] [Roselli] was carrying two laptops, two iPads, and bottles of liquor underneath his arms. [Roselli] exited through the front door and Staiber followed him down the driveway and then north on DeKalb Street. Staiber continued to follow [Roselli] who was dropping Staiber’s items onto the ground, which was covered in ice and snow at the time. After circling the block, [Roselli] eventually ran back toward Staiber’s home and when [Roselli] became within 15-20 feet from Wisniewski, Staiber hit him with the hockey stick. At that point the police had arrived. The police took [Roselli] into their custody while Staiber and Officer Lee retraced the path to try to recover Staiber’s property. When they returned to their home, Staiber and Wisniewski noticed their entire house was ransacked and multiple items were missing. Additionally, [Roselli] was searched after being taken into custody and said search yielded multiple items including U.S. [c]urrency; seven rings; nine earrings; seven pendants; three watches; five bracelets; thirteen necklaces; one hair barrette; an ornamental cross; a tie tack; three bottles of medication prescribed to Staiber and Wisniewski; a Garmin GPS unit; a Nikon camera; two small book reading lights; two mini LED flashlights; a corkscrew; and a golf ball marker. At the police station the next J-S74027-14 day, Staiber identified all of these items as belonging to him and his girlfriend, Wisniewski. A [c]riminal [c]omplaint was issued January 19, 2011 and [Roselli] was ultimately convicted by a jury of [b]urglary and [t]heft by [u]nlawful [t]aking on April 12, 2012. On July 10, 2012, this court sentenced [Roselli] to serve a mandatory term of imprisonment of [twenty-five] to [fifty] years under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2). Trial Court Opinion, 6/10/14, at 1-3. The procedural history following Roselli’s conviction is somewhat complicated, but it is sufficient to note that he filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied after a hearing thereon. Roselli’s trial counsel, the Public Defender’s Office, filed an untimely notice of appeal, which this Court quashed. Roselli’s direct appeal rights were subsequently reinstated as result of a PCRA petition filed on Roselli’s behalf. This timely appeal follows. Roselli presents the following eight issues on appeal:

I. Whether the weight of the evidence fails to support the jury’s finding [that] [Roselli] committed the crimes of [b]urglary [] and [t]heft by [u]nlawful [t]aking [], and specifically that Joseph Staiber was inside 1728 DeKalb Street in Norristown on January 19, 2011?

II. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress the physical evidence found during a warrantless search of [Roselli]?

III. Whether Joseph Staiber’s statement to police should have not been given to the jury during J-S74027-14 deliberations as this was not admitted as evidence at the time of trial?

IV. Whether [Roselli] should be awarded a new trial or resentenced without application of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9714(a)(2) because the jury’s finding that Joseph Staiber was inside 1728 DeKalb Street in Norristown on January 19, 2011 at the same time as [Roselli] is not supported by competent evidence of record, and without such a finding the [b]urglary conviction does not fall within the definition of “crime of violence” within the meaning of “three-strikes law” and that the application of the “three-strikes law” for an enhanced sentence is illegal in this case?

V. Whether Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum statute set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9714 is unconstitutional in that it permits an automatic increase of a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum, without notice and without a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt for its application in violation of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, as well as Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 ([U.S.] 2013)?

VI. Whether Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum statute set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9714 is unconstitutional as applied to this matter in that it permitted an automatic increase of a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum, without notice and without a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt for its application in violation of United States Constitutions, as well as Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 ([U.S.] 2013)?

VII. Whether the Commonwealth failed to prove that the enhanced sentencing penalties set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9714 should be applied in this matter because the facts

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underlying the prior convictions were based upon hearsay, as objected to by defense counsel, consisting of [a]ffidavits of [p]robable [c]ause and [b]ills of [i]nformation?

VIII. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Roselli’s] [m]otion for dismissal pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule [sic] 600 because he was not brought to trial within 365 days of the filing of the criminal complaint? Roselli’s Brief at 6-7. Many of these issues involve overlapping considerations, and where issues overlap, we will address them together. We begin with Roselli’s first issue, which is a challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting his two convictions.

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate

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conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused where the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we are mindful that as we review Roselli’s claim, we are not passing on the underlying question of whether the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence, but rather we are considering whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial based upon his claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We are focused, therefore, on evidence that the trial court’s ruling is “manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. Roselli has not presented a relevant argument in light of our standard and scope of our review. He frames his argument in terms of inconsistencies between Mr. Staiber’s trial testimony and the content of the statement he gave to the police, and assails the jury’s fact finding. Roselli’s J-S74027-14 Brief at 20.2 He does not present any argument as to how he believes the trial court abused its discretion in denying his post-sentence motion. Id. at 20-21. Roselli directs his entire argument to the underlying question of whether his convictions are against the weight of the evidence. As stated above, this is not the question before us for review. Roselli has failed to provide us with relevant argument relative to our standard of review, and this Court will not develop an argument on his behalf. See Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006). In addition, however, our independent review of the record provides us with ample support for the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the verdicts in this case were not against the weight of the evidence. We therefore find no merit to Roselli’s claim. In his second issue, Roselli argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress items recovered from when the police searched him, following his arrest, without a warrant. Roselli’s Brief at 21. The trial court concluded that the arrest was adequately supported by probable cause, and therefore, pursuant to “well-settled” Pennsylvania law, the police were entitled to search Roselli following his arrest without a warrant. Trial Court J-S74027-14 Opinion, 6/10/14, at 8 (citing Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2009)). Roselli counters by asserting only that the arrest was invalid because “law enforcement did not possess the requisite information in order to place him under arrest at that point in time[.]” Roselli’s Brief at 21. He does not cite or discuss relevant case law that would support his position.^[3] [I]t is an appellant's duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. [] Gould, 912 A.2d [at] 873 []. The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal authorities. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b), (c). Citations to authorities must articulate the principles for which they are cited. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b). This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Gould, 912 A.2d at 873. Moreover, when defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived. Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007). Roselli’s complete failure to cite or discuss relevant case law significantly impedes our ability to review this issue. The law surrounding warrantless searches and seizures by the police is highly nuanced and the application of this law depends almost entirely on the specific details of a particular case. As such, Roselli’s failure to include citations to and discussion of relevant case law effectively precludes our ability to J-S74027-14 meaningfully review his claim. As stated above, “[this] court will not become the counsel for an appellant” and develop arguments on an appellant’s behalf. Gould, 912 A.2d at 873. We therefore find this issue waived. Next, Roselli argues that the trial court should not have provided the jury Mr. Staiber’s statement to the police during its deliberations because it was never admitted as evidence during trial. Roselli’s Brief at 22. Roselli concedes that his trial counsel did not object to the statement being given to the jury.^[4] He contends, however, that the failure to object “should not preclude appellate review of this issue as it was inappropriate to permit the jury to have a piece of evidence that was not properly admitted at trial.” Id. We cannot agree. It is axiomatic that “[a] defendant must make a timely and specific objection at trial or face waiver of her issue on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Schoff, 911 A.2d 147, 158 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302. We are simply without discretion to overlook Roselli’s failure to lodge a specific and timely objection to the trial court’s ruling, as he encourages us to do. Accordingly, this issue is waived. We now turn to Roselli’s fourth issue, which purports to be an argument regarding the jury’s finding that Mr. Staiber was in the home at J-S74027-14 the same time as Roselli, which is required for the burglary conviction to constitute a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the “three-strikes law,” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 (“§ 9714”). Roselli’s Brief at 6, 23. However, he puts forth no discussion regarding evidence of Mr. Staiber’s presence in the home with Roselli. Rather, the entire argument on this point is dedicated to Roselli’s claim that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth to establish that Roselli had two prior crimes of violence was hearsay, and therefore that the trial court erred in relying on it to conclude that § 9714 applied. Id. at 23-27. Similarly, in his seventh issue, Roselli argues that the evidence put forth by the Commonwealth to prove that § 9714 applied was hearsay, and therefore incompetent to support the trial court’s conclusion. Id. at 29. As these issues present the same argument, we address them together.^[5] Section 9714 is entitled “Sentences for second and subsequent offenses.” It provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Mandatory sentence.--

(1) Any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence shall, if at the time of the commission of the current offense the person had previously been convicted of a crime of violence, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least ten years of