v.
Matthew Keith
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL E
APRIL 11, 2003
DONALD RAY MCCRAY, APPELLANT
V.
MATTHEW KEITH, APPELLEE
FROM THE 136TH DISTRICT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY;
NO. D-167,023; HONORABLE MILTON G. SHUFFIELD, JUDGE
Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ., and BOYD, S.J.1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this appeal, appellant Donald Ray Keith, a penitentiary inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis brings this appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of his suit against Chapter 14 of the Code applies to suits brought by an inmate who has filed “an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs.” Section 14.02. The procedural requirements placed on suits filed by indigent inmates under Chapter 14 are designed to control the flood of frivolous lawsuits filed in the courts of this state by prison inmates consuming valuable judicial resources with little offsetting benefits. Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.–Waco 1996, no pet.). Requiring indigent inmates to file affidavits related to their previous filings, to exhaust their administrative remedies, to file suit within 31 days after the decision on their grievances and to dismiss their suits if they do not comply furthers the legitimate, even compelling, state interest in protecting scarce judicial resources by protecting against the filing of frivolous civil lawsuits. Hicks v. Brysch, 989 F.Supp. 797, 823 (W.D. Tex. 1997). Prohibiting prisoners with a history of instituting frivolous and malicious litigation from proceeding in forma pauperis clearly serves to deter such abuses of our judicial system. Hickson, 926 S.W.2d at 399; Hicks, 989 F.Supp. at 823. The standard for review of a dismissal under Chapter 14 is whether in doing so the trial court abused its discretion. Hickson, 926 S.W.2d at 398. A court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986).
Chapter 14.005(b) of the Code provides that “a court shall dismiss a claim if the inmate fails to file the claim before the 31st day after the date the inmate receives the written decision from the grievance system.” Parenthetically, the supreme court has explicated that “shall” is generally construed as mandatory unless the legislature indicates otherwise. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Tex. 1999). Although appellant received the grievance written decision on February 25, 2002, he did not file his lawsuit until April 15, 2002, a period in excess of 31 days from the date of its receipt. The trial court’s action was in compliance with the statute and it did not abuse its discretion. See Sanders v. Palunsky, 36 S.W.3d 222, 226-27 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court must be, and is hereby, affirmed.
John T. Boyd Senior Justice