Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Appellant Twila Young filed a notice of appeal on May 30, 2007. However, she did not pay the $125 filing fee required from appellants under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 5. Nor did she file an affidavit of indigence per Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1. By letter from this Court dated June 25, 2007, we informed appellant that "the filing fee in the amount of $125.00 has not been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee within ten (10) days from the date of this notice may result in a dismissal." Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c); see Holt v. F. F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. ref'd). The deadline lapsed, and the fee was not received.
Because appellant failed to pay the requisite filing fee as directed by the court, we dismiss the appeal pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(c).
Per Curiam
rial\', sans-serif">In\ doing so, we acknowledge that while guilt by association is contrary to our system of justice, Allen v. State,\ 249 S.W.3d 680, 702 (Tex.App.–Austin 2008, no pet.), “[t]he line between knowing possession and guilt by\ association can be very thin.” U.S. v. Phillips, 496 F.2d 1395, 1397 (5th Cir. 1974).
\
'
var WPFootnote10 = ' During Officer Ware’s direct examination, he was asked if he heard anything when approaching the\
garage. He answered, “I couldn’t really remember what was said. They were saying later on that we didn’t\
have a right to be in their garage.” (Emphasis added). In its brief, the State mentions Officer Ware’s\
testimony as an incriminating statement indicating consciousness of guilt. While the record is unclear as to\
who “they” were, in all likelihood, “they” referenced Kelly and/or Appellant because Shackelford was inside\
the house and did not know the officers were there until they came to her door to inform her that Kelly and\
Appellant had been arrested. An “incriminating statement” is a statement that tends to establish the guilt of an accused. Black’s\
Law Dictionary, 1417 (7th ed. 1999). Regardless of who made the statement, we find that this sort of\
statement is simply not the type that tends to establish a consciousness of guilt. Assuming, arguendo, that\
Appellant even made the statement, we find that it does not rationally tend to link him to the drugs. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414. Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414. Undisputed facts are those facts upon which the parties either agree or assume to be true. Evans,\
202 S.W.3d at 163. For purposes of our factual sufficiency analysis, we have considered this to be a non-factor. See\
footnote 9, supra. Under the facts of this case, we are not required to decide whether this fact alone tends\
to connect Appellant to the drugs for purposes of a factual sufficiency review. Merely because the State chooses not to cross-examine a witness, the jury is not required to believe\
that testimony. For example, even though Kelly and Margie both testified that Appellant was present solely\
to check on Kelly’s welfare (leading to the inference that he was not there for any other purpose), the jury was\
free to believe or disbelieve that testimony. For purposes of our factual sufficiency analysis, we consider any inference of guilt to be drawn from\
such a statement as not rationally supporting a finding of guilt. See footnote 10, supra. See pgs. 6-7, supra; e.g., ownership or control of the place where the drugs were found; an odor\
indicating the presence of drugs; evidence of recent consumption of drugs; furtive gestures; incriminating\
statements; nervousness; the presence of drug paraphernalia on Appellant’s person; or the possession of\
large sums of money.
\