United States v. Anthony Stephen Cabbell, 427 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1970). · Go Syfert
United States v. Anthony Stephen Cabbell, 427 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1970). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Chang Han Chen, A/K/A 34, United States of America v. Chong Chao Chen, A/K/A 21 (ca4, 1997-10-31)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Chang Han Chen, A/K/A 34, United States of America v. Chong Chao Chen, A/K/A 21 (2×)
4th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 373 (4th Cir.) (holding in extortion case that imprecise quid pro quo instruction, if erroneous, was harmless), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 124 , 133 L.Ed.2d 73 (1995); United States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 464 (4th Cir.1994) (holding "that, even if the application of the willful blindness instruction to [the defendant] was error, ... such error was harmless"); United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (holding that although "the trial court's jury instructions did not state the law with strict accurac…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Chen
4th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361 , 373 (4th Cir.) (holding in extortion case that imprecise quid pro quo instruction, if erroneous, was harmless), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 124 (1995); United States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 464 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding "that, even if the application of the willful blindness instruction to [the defendant] was error, . . . such error was harmless"); United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that although "the trial court's jury instructions did not state the law with strict accuracy," the error was harmless…
cited Cited "see" United States v. Willie Langston, Charles Dean, Pete Melton, A/K/A Robert E. Melton
11th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Cabbell, 427 F.2d 147 (4th Cir.1970).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Anthony Stephen CABBELL, Appellant
14140_1.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Jun 10, 1970.
427 F.2d 147
Warren H. Coolidge, U. S. Atty., and David W. Long, Asst. U. S. Atty., for appellee., David S. Henderson, for appellant.
Bryan, Craven, Lewis, Per Curiam.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

A September 13, 1969 indictment charged Anthony Stephen Cabbell with stealing Government property valued in excess of one hundred dollars in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. Tried by a jury, he was found guilty of unlawfully taking hand grenades from a Camp Lejeune Marine Base magazine. A five-year prison term was imposed on October 24, 1969. Finding oral argument of this appeal unnecessary, we summarily affirm.

Cabbell raises for our consideration three issues. The first involves the sufficiency of the evidence regarding both asportation of the property and Government ownership. A review of the record convinces us that the proof was satisfactory on these elements.

Next, Cabbell urges error in the failure of the trial judge to instruct on a lesser included offense. At trial, no objection was raised. We see no reason to reverse, particularly in view of the uncontradicted evidence establishing the value of the grenades at over one hundred dollars. See Logan v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 411 F.2d 679, 682 (1968).

Finally, Cabbell seeks reversal on the ground that the instruction of the District Court, defining the stat[*148] utory term “steal”, [1] did not detail the element of asportation. United States v. Brown, 285 F.2d 528 (4 Cir. 1961). However, no objection was raised at trial. In these circumstances, with evidence abundantly establishing this element, we think the charge was not prejudicial. See Kramer v. United States, 408 F.2d 837, 840 (8 Cir. 1969); cf. United States v. Davis, 320 F.2d 660, 661 (4 Cir. 1963).

Affirmed.

1

. The trial judge stated: “The word ‘steal’ as used in the statute means any dishonest transaction whereby one person obtains that which rightfully belongs to another and deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership.”