Appellant, who conducted his own defense, and was convicted by a California state jury of two counts of obstructing telephones (Cal.Penal Code, § 591) and one count of burglary (Cal.Penal Code, § 459), appeals from an order of the district court denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant claims that he did not intelligently waive counsel.

Counsel was appointed for appellant and he appeared at the preliminary hearing and at the arraignment. On the day set for trial appellant expressed his dissatisfaction with his attorney. At any time he might have had the services of the attorney originally appointed. The Court however would not appoint a substitute and defendant, against the advice of two judges, deliberately chose to represent himself, although as he stated “I don’t think I have the intelligence to represent myself.”

[*640] Now it is asserted that his waiver was not intelligent. Defendant knew that he had a right to a lawyer; he was emphatically warned not to be his own counsel; ^[1] ******he was aware of the fact that he was charged with three felonies and that a conviction could result in long term imprisonment. He was furnished copies of the information and transcript of the preliminary hearing. Appellant was not legally trained but the record shows that he understood what charges were being made against him.

Under the rule announced in Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040 (9 Cir. 1969), the waiver was intelligently made. ^[2]

An evidentiary hearing was not required. The facts here recited appear in the record. No contention is made that the record is not factually accurate. It is contended that the record does not show the facts required before there can be an effective waiver of counsel under the doctrine of Von Moltke v. Gillie, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948). Were the Von Moltke case controlling a reversal would be required. The rule of that case however, which involved a guilty plea, is not applicable to a ease where there has been a trial on the merits. The undisputed facts in the record do disclose a compliance with the applicable rule which was announced in Hodge, supra. See, Jackson v. California, 336 F.2d 521 (9 Cir. 1964); Yeaman v. United States, 326 F.2d 293 (9 Cir. 1963).

Appellant contends that an attorney should have been appointed to prosecute his petition for a writ in the district court. An indigent state prisoner applying to a federal court for habeas corpus is not entitled to an appointed attorney unless the particular circumstances indicate that it is necessary to obtain due process. Eskridge v. Rhay, 345 F.2d 778 (9 Cir. 1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 996, 86 S.Ct. 582, 15 L.Ed.2d 483. No such circumstances appear here.

The order denying a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.