United States v. Jusse J. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1971). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Jusse J. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1971). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
58 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 30 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2006)
Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971 1998 2026
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At page 1105 No requirement for written waiver of rights17 citing casesno constitutional requirement that confession be recorded1 citing court put it this way
  • Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2006).published 2 cites
    (no constitutional requirement that confession be recorded)
  • Russo v. NJ Dept. of Corr., 737 A.2d 183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).published
    See, e.g., Meeks v. McBride, 81 F. 3d at 722 ; United States v. Brown, 59 F. 3d 102 , 103-04 (9th Cir.1995); Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F. 3d 1150, 1152-53 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1044 , 115 S.Ct. 1420 , 131 L.Ed. 2d 303 (1995);…
  • State v. Beeson, 569 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 1997).published
    Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir.1982); United States v. Acosta, 495 F.2d 60, 62-63 (10th Cir.1974); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1105-06 (3d Cir.1971); Gilchrist v. United States, 427 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir.1970)…
  • Mitchell v. Keane, 974 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).published
    However, “[i]t is ... well settled that ‘punishment’ imposed by prison authorities for infractions of prison regulations does not generally bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct.” United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58…
  • People v. Baptist, 672 N.E.2d 398 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1996).published
    App. 3d 774, 778 , 537 N.E.2d 1086, 1088 (1989); see Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1989); Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir. 1982); United Stat…
  • State v. Harlin, 925 P.2d 1149 (Kan. 1996).published
    It is well-settled that there is no bar to separate criminal prosecution. . . .’) (collecting cases); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1105-06 (3d Cir.) (per curiam) (‘Administrative sanctions imposed by prison officials upon a pri…
  • Am. Samoa Gov't v. Lafoga, 30 Am. Samoa 2d 110 (1996).published
    See, e.g., United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1989); Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir. 1982); Fano v. Meachum, 520 F.2d 374 , 376 n.1 (1st Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); United…
  • United States v. Alberto Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802 (2d Cir. 1995).published
    It is well-settled that there is no bar to separate criminal prosecution....”) (collecting cases); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1105-06 (3d Cir.) (per curiam) (“Administrative sanctions imposed by prison officials upon a prison…
  • United States v. Alberto Hernandez-Fundora, 49 F.3d 848 (2d Cir. 1995).published
    It is well-settled that there is no bar to separate criminal prosecution_”) (collecting cases); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1105-06 (3d Cir.) (per curiam) (“Administrative sanctions imposed by prison officials upon a prisoner…
  • Daniel J. Garrity v. Patrick Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150 (7th Cir. 1994).published
    United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir.1989); Kerns v. Parrott, 672 F.2d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir.1982); Fano v. Meachum, 520 F.2d 374 , 376 n. 1 (1st Cir.1975), rev’d on other grounds, 427 U.S. 215 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 , 49 L.Ed.2d…
Show 7 more citing cases
  • State v. Killebrew, 327 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).published
    State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48 , 61 n. 7, 291 N.W.2d 809, 815-16 (1980). 5 See, e.g., First National Leasing Corp. v. Madison, 81 Wis. 2d 205, 208 , 260 N.W.2d 251, 253 (1977); Bruner v. Kops, 105 Wis. 2d 614, 618 , 314 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Ct.…
  • Commonwealth v. O'Bryant, 388 A.2d 1059 (Pa. 1978).published
    To the contrary, Miranda “requires only that the waiver of rights be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and not that it be made in writing.” United States v. Speaks, 453 F.2d 966, 969 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 10…
  • Sadler v. State, 333 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).published
    We agree with the following decision reached by the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeal: “Administrative sanctions imposed by prison officials upon a prisoner following his apprehension in connection with the commission of a crime is [sic]…
  • Commonwealth v. Cost, 362 A.2d 1027 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).published 4 cites
    “The rule in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) does not require that a waiver of rights be in writing, but only that it be voluntarily, willingly and intelligently made.” United States v. Stuckey, 44…
  • United States v. Hubbard, 269 F. Supp. 2d 474 (D. Del. 2003).published
    (The rule in Miranda ... does not require that a waiver of rights be in writing _)
  • United States v. Hugo Reynosa, No. 22-1321 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2022).unpublished
    See United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1144-45 (3d Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1105-06 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge based on prison sanctions for weapons possession).
  • United States v. Gene Francis Newby & Raynaldo Barber. Gene Francis Newby (Appellant in No. 92-5711). Raynaldo Barber (Appellant in No. 92-5712), 11 F.3d 1143 (3d Cir. 1993).published
At page 1106 “administrative sanctions imposed by prison officials upon a prisoner following his apprehension in connection with the commission of a crime is not a bar to subsequent prosecution for the crime in a court of competent jurisdiction.”1 citing case4 citing courts quote it
  • Mott v. State, 846 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992).published
    See United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir.1989); Kerns v. Parrat, 672 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir.1982); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1106 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 841 (1971); Gilchrest v. United States, 4…
Quoted next to this citation, but not language from this opinion
“[w]here there is a showing of a substantial question of competency, the Judge with protective restrictions can, in making that determination, require a medical examination. . . .”quoted beside the cite; not in this opinion · 2 citing cases listed
  • Cyntje v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 95 F.R.D. 430 (D.V.I. 1982).published
    “[w]here there is a showing of a substantial question of competency, the Judge with protective restrictions can, in making that determination, require a medical examination. . . .”
  • Schreck v. City of Amarillo, No. 2:21-cv-00220, 2021 WL 5178855 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2021).
    “Where there is a showing of a substantial question of competency, the Judge with protective restrictions can, in making that determination, require a medical examination.”
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America
v.
Jesse J. STUCKEY, Appellant
18859.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
May 4, 1971.
Published opinion
441 F.2d 1104
1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10384
Richard C. Brittain, Danville, Pa., for appellant., Harry A. Nagle, Asst. U. S. Atty., Lewisburg, Pa. (S. John Cottone, U. S. Atty., Scranton, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Adams, Gibbons, Per Curiam, Whipple.
Cited by 49 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 76%
Citer courts: N.D. Texas (1) · Virgin Islands (1)

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, Jesse J. Stuckey, appeals from his conviction in the Middle District of Pennsylvania for violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1792 and § 2. Specifically, he was found guilty of possession of a knife-like instrument while a prisoner at Lewisburg Penitentiary. Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting an FBI agent’s testimony concerning certain oral admissions made by Stuckey. Out of the presence of the jury the trial judge conducted a hearing on these statements, at which time Special Agent Mayfield testified that he personally interviewed Stuckey at Lewisburg. At that time the “Miranda” warnings were given in the following manner:

“A. I provided the defendant with this copy and asked him to read it. After he read it I went over it with him and asked him if he understood what his rights were. He stated that he did. I asked him to sign it and he declined to do so.” [p. 69 Transcript—Joint Exhibit G].

Mayfield later testified that he went over each specific warning listed on the card and Stuckey then told him (May-field) that he wouldn’t sign it, but he had no objections to discussing the matter with the agents. Stuckey himself offered no testimony at the hearing or at trial.

The rule in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) does not require that a waiver of rights be in writing, but only that it be voluntarily, willingly and intelligently made. This ease is not dissimilar from United States v. Ruth, 394 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 888, 89 S.Ct. 206, 21 L.Ed.2d 166 (1968). This court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the fact that Stuckey made oral statements must mean that he could not have understood the nature of the warning. There is no evidence of misunderstanding and we decline to manufacture such evidence in lieu of its absence in the record. This case is factually distinguishable from United States v. Frazier (D.C.Cir. Feb. 24, 1971). In that case there was evidence that the defendant did not understand the meaning of the warnings and the police either knew it or should have known it.

In addition to the admission of his oral statement, Stuckey argues that his conviction must be reversed because it constituted a violation of his Fifth Amendment right not to be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Appellant alleges he was placed in a segregation unit for 15 days after he was apprehended. He argues that this should constitute his sole punishment. Administrative sanctions imposed by[*1106] prison officials upon a prisoner following his apprehension in connection with the commission of a crime is not a bar to subsequent prosecution for the crime in a court of competent jurisdiction. Gilchrist v. United States, 427 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1970); Patterson v. United States, 183 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kimball v. United States, 340 U.S. 893, 71 S.Ct. 200, 95 L.Ed. 647 (1950).

The opinion of the district court is affirmed.