Roy Bryant Cattle Co., Inc. v. The United States of Am., 463 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
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Roy Bryant Cattle Co., Inc. v. The United States of Am., 463 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Conoco, Inc. v. Hodel (ded, 1986-01-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 9 C.F.R. § 307.2 cited 1× in this case · 1 total citations of statute #1 7 U.S.C. § 394 cited 1× in this case · 5 total citations of statute #1 9 C.F.R. § 307.4 cited 1× in this case · 1 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conoco, Inc. v. Hodel
D. Del. · 1986 · confidence medium
Udall v. Tail-man, 380 U.S. 1, 16 , 85 S.Ct. 792, 801 , 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). “[T]he agency’s interpretation of a regulation ‘is deemed of controlling weight as long as it is one of several reasonable interpretations ... even though the chosen exegesis may not appear quite as reasonable as some other construction.’ ” Budd Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 513 F.2d 201, 205 (3d Cir.1975) (per curiam) (quoting Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir.1972)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lindenberg v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
N.D. Ga. · 1981 · confidence medium
Although not required to give effect to an interpretative regulation, “when faced with a problem of statutory construction, this court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.” Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 , 85 S.Ct. 792, 801 , 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mary S. Smith v. Don Chapman, D/B/A Don Chapman Motor Sales
5th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260, 1270 (5th Cir. 1978); Florida Sugar Cane League, Inc. v. Usery, 531 F.2d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1976); Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972); Allen M.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marshall v. Huffhines Steel Co.
N.D. Tex. · 1979 · confidence medium
While the courts are obligated to give persuasive force to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, or enabling statute, e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 , 91 S.Ct. 849, 854-855 , 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972), that deference must give way where, as here, the Supreme Court has expressly reached a contrary interpretation, for the agency, like the district court, must yield to the Supreme Court’s role as ultimate arbiter of the law.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall
E.D. Pa. · 1979 · confidence medium
In insisting that the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the Secretary points to the language of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972), quoted approvingly by our own Court of Appeals in Budd v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 513 F.2d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1975), which assigns “controlling weight” to an agency interpretation of its own regulations “as long as it is one of several reasonable interpretations.” , If the Secretary were simply contending, in a matter of first judicial imp…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
3rd Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
We affirmed the Commission’s reading of the regulations, stating: [T]he agency’s interpretation of a regulation “is deemed of controlling weight as long as it is one of several reasonable interpretations . . . even though the chosen exegesis may not appear quite as reasonable as some other construction” Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972). 10 Two of the three OSHRC Commissioners have now adopted the position that maintenance workers may be covered by (g)(2)(i).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 6 O.S.H. Cas.(bna) 1440, 1978 O.S.H.D. (Cch) P 22,628 Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor
3rd Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
We affirmed the Commission's reading of the regulations, stating: 36 (T)he agency's interpretation of a regulation "is deemed of controlling weight as long as it is one of several reasonable interpretations . . . even though the chosen exegesis may not appear quite as reasonable as some other construction" Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972). 10 37 Two of the three OSHRC Commissioners have now adopted the position that maintenance workers may be covered by (g)(2)(i).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jets Services, Inc. v. Hoffman
M.D. Fla. · 1976 · confidence medium
Credit Union v. National Credit Union Admin., 477 F.2d 777 , 784 (10th Cir. 1973); Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972); Crowley v. Pierce, 461 F.2d 614 , 620 and n.14 (5th Cir. 1972); Allen M.
cited Cited as authority (rule) American Federation of Government Employees v. Hoffmann
N.D. Ala. · 1976 · confidence medium
Brennan v. Southern Contractors Services, 492 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.1974); Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir.1972); Allen M.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lucas Coal Company v. Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals
3rd Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 513 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1975). “[T]he agency’s interpretation of a regulation ‘is deemed of controlling weight as long as it is one of several reasonable interpretations ..’ ” Id. at 205 (quoting Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nos. 74-1256, 74-1781
3rd Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
Upon issuance of the decision, jurisdiction shall rest solely in the Commission, and all motions, petitions and other pleadings filed subsequent to such issuance shall be addressed to the Commission. 8 See 29 U.S.C. § 660 (a) (Supp.1974) 9 502 F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir. 1974) 10 380 U.S. 1, 16 , 85 S.Ct. 792, 801 (1965), quoting Unemployment Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 , 67 S.Ct. 245 , 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946) and Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 , 81 S.Ct. 1529 , 6 L.Ed.2d 924 (1961) 11 Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Budd Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
3rd Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor v. Southern Contractors Service and Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, No. 73-2682 Summary Calendar. Rule 18, 5th Cir. See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Casualty Co. Of New York, 5th Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I
5th Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brennan v. Southern Contractors Service
5th Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1972).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
ROY BRYANT CATTLE CO., Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
the UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee
72-1256.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jul 28, 1972.
463 F.2d 418
Jack B. Manning, Houston, Tex. (Bean & Manning, Houston, Tex., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant., James R. Gough, Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Brown, Goldberg, Morgan.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published
GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff, Roy Bryant Cattle Company, instituted this action in federal district court under the provisions of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346, to recover monies allegedly wrongfully paid to the United States Department of Agriculture for overtime services performed by federal meat inspectors at the plaintiff’s meat processing establishment in Houston, Texas. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and we affirm.

The undisputed facts are that Roy Bryant Cattle Company commenced operations as a meat processing plant subject to the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 601 et seq., in February of 1968. Pursuant to the provisions of that Act, the Consumer and Marketing Service of the Department of Agriculture assigned the plaintiff an establishment number and proceeded to provide the company with inspection service. At the outset the company operated for eight hours during the day, and the Department was able to tie the plaintiff into a patrol assignment in which several federal meat inspectors serviced the Roy Bryant Cattle Co. and Armour & Company, a large processing plant approximately two miles from the plaintiff’s establishment. The upshot of this patrol assignment was that the plaintiff received eight hours of free inspection service every work day. Sometime in 1968 the plaintiff began operating exclusively between the hours of 12 midnight and 8:30 a. m., which is outside the operating hours observed by the majority of the meat packing establishments throughout the Houston, Texas area. This metamorphosis engendered an administrative determination by the Department of Agriculture that the plaintiff was not operating within reasonable hours. Accordingly, the Department altered its inspection patrol assignments and began charging the plaintiff for an inspector’s overtime work at the rate of three-and-one-half hours per day. The plaintiff paid almost $15,000 in overtime charges for more than two-and-one-half years and then instituted this suit to recover those payments. Sustaining the Department of Agriculture’s interpretation of its own regulations, the district court held that the overtime charges paid by the plaintiff were properly assessed and collected.

On appeal the sole issue which commands our attention is the reasonableness of the Department of Agriculture’s interpretation of the following regulation:

“The management of an official establishment, an importer, or an exporter desiring to work under conditions which will require the services of an employee of the Program on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, or for more than 8 hours on any other day, shall sufficiently in advance of the period of overtime, request the officer in charge or his assistant to furnish inspection services during such overtime period, and shall pay the Administrator therefor $8.00 per hour to reimburse the Service for the cost of the inspection service so furnished. . . ."

9 C.F.R. § 307.4. It is the plaintiff’s contention that this regulation does not require the payment of overtime charges for inspection services unless a meat processor utilizes the services of an inspector in its own establishment for more than eight hours in any one day (excluding a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday). In other words, the company claims that this administrative directive entitles it to eight hours of free meat inspection every normal working day. The Department of Agriculture, on the other hand, has consistently interpreted the phrase “8 hours on any other day” as referring to the eight hours that an inspector works during a given day.[*420] Thus, it is the Department’s position that any time an inspector labors for the Department more than eight hours a day the regulation authorizes the agency to be reimbursed by the meat processor for overtime pay to that inspector, regardless of whether or not all eight hours of non-overtime pay were spent in any one establishment. Finding the Department’s interpretation of the above regulation to be entirely reasonable, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

When a court is faced with the construction of an administrative dictate, “it is an axiom of judicial review that an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation . be accorded the greatest deference.” Allen M. Campbell Co. General Contractors, Inc. v. Lloyd Wood Construction Co., 5 Cir. 1971, 446 F.2d 261, 265. Indeed, the agency’s interpretation is deemed controlling as long as it is one of several reasonable interpretations and even though the chosen exegesis may not appear quite as reasonable as some other construction. See, e. g., Udall v. Tailman, 1964, 380 U.S. 1, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616, and cases cited therein. In the instant case the Department of Agriculture’s interpretation of its “overtime” regulation quite clearly implements the policy inherent in the enabling legislation: [1] that is, to reimburse the Department for necessary overtime expenses. Moreover, we find the application of that interpretation particularly reasonable within the factual context of the present case.

As noted above, when the plaintiff instituted operations at its establishment during the day, the Department provided the company with eight hours of free inspection. The plaintiff’s decision to conduct its operations entirely during a graveyard shift forced the Department to reallocate its inspectorial resources. Since the Department determined that under the new schedule the plaintiff was not operating its establishment during reasonable hours, [2] a determination which the plaintiff does not attack, that agency charged the company for the overtime pay its inspectors received as a result of the change in working hours. In effect, the Department of Agriculture determined that the plaintiff should bear the agency’s overtime expenses incurred in accommodating the company’s desire to operate during unreasonable hours. There is no allegation that the “overtime” regulation was discriminatorily applied to the plaintiff. Absent such a contention, we do not believe the company possesses the right, for its own operative convenience, to determine the hiring procedures and working hours of the Department’s inspectorial force. It is administratively impossible for the Department to codify regulations for every permutation of plant operation, and it is for this reason that we must permit administrative latitude in the interpretation of the agency’s regulations. While we do not decry the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s interpretation of the “overtime” regulation as requiring that every meat processing plant be accorded eight hours of free inspection every day, we simply cannot conclude that the Administrative fabric of the Federal Meat Inspection Act must be tailored to suit the economic eccentricities of a particular establishment. Therefore, we feel no compunction to say nay to a carping critic. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

1

. The enabling legislation provides as follows :

“The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized in his discretion, to pay employees of the Bureau of Animal -Industry employed in establishments subject to the provisions of the Meat Inspection Act, for all overtime work performed at such establishments, at such rates as he may determine, and to
accept from such establishments wherein such overtime work is performed reimbursement for any sums paid out by him for such overtime work.”

7 U.S.C.A. § 394.

2

. 9 C.F.R. § 307.2 provides in part: “All slaughtering of animals and preparation of products shall be done within reasonable hours and with reasonable speed.”