v.
State
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-13-00268-CR
No. 07-13-00269-CR
RODOLFO GONZALES, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 364th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2012-435,536 & 2012-435,537
Honorable Cecil Puryear, Presiding by Assignment
December __, 2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
Following an open plea of guilty, Rudolfo Gonzales was convicted of the offense of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver, over 4 grams but less than 200 grams, enhanced by a prior felony conviction, and sentenced to fifty years confinement in Cause No. 07-13-00268-CR (trial court cause no. 2012-435,536).1 At the same time, Appellant was convicted of the offense of possession of marihuana, over 4 pounds but less than 50 pounds, and sentenced to ten years confinement in Cause No. 07-13-00269-CR (trial court cause no. 2012-435,537).2 The trial court ordered the two sentences to be served concurrently. By a single issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress because the officer’s affidavit did not provide sufficient probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant that lead to the discovery of the controlled substances the subject of the respective prosecutions. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On July 2, 2012, Officer Brady Lewis of the Lubbock Police Department received an anonymous tip alleging that controlled substances were being trafficked from a specific residence in the city. Based on this tip, Officer Lewis and another officer set up surveillance of the residence. During the surveillance he observed three vehicles arrive at the residence. Officer Lewis observed various individuals enter the residence for a short period of time and then leave. Based on this observation and the prior tip, Officer Lewis followed an individual leaving the residence and made contact. During a search of that individual’s vehicle, a white powdery substance was discovered that field tested to be cocaine. The individual detained stated that he purchased the cocaine from a Hispanic male named “Rudy” at the residence under surveillance.
That same day, Officer Lewis presented an affidavit for a search warrant to Judge Drue Farmer of the Lubbock County Court at Law # 2.3 A search warrant was signed and issued and, later that same day, the search warrant was executed at the residence listed. A search of the residence yielded evidence which Appellant sought to suppress via a pretrial motion to suppress. In support of that motion, Appellant argued that the search was unreasonable and illegal under both the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution because it was based on an affidavit that failed to give the magistrate sufficient facts to reasonable conclude the object of the search was probably located on the premises described. The trial court denied that motion and the Appellant entered a plea of guilty without a plea recommendation. Following conviction and sentencing he brings this appeal to contest the denial of that motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Due to the constitutional preference for searches to be conducted pursuant to a warrant as opposed to a warrantless search, a trial court’s determination whether probable cause exists to support the issuance of a search warrant is subject to a highly deferential standard of review, constrained solely to the “four corners” of the probable cause affidavit. State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). An appellate court should uphold the magistrates’ probable cause determination if it finds the affidavit in support of the warrant provides the magistrate a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding that probable cause existed. McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271.
ANALYSIS
From the four corners of the probable cause affidavit we know that (1) an anonymous informant suspected narcotics activity at the residence based on his observation of seventeen vehicles coming and then leaving the residence after a short interval of time, (2) traffic patterns similar to this are common with street level narcotics trafficking, (3) officers confirmed by observation similar traffic patterns at the residence, (4) cocaine was found in a vehicle observed at the residence, conforming to that traffic pattern, that was stopped immediately after leaving the residence, (5) the driver of that vehicle stated that he purchased the cocaine at that residence from someone named “Rudy,” (6) the utilities at the residence were in the name of Rudolfo Gonzales, and (7) Rudolfo Gonzales had a prior criminal history including manufacture / delivery of a controlled substance. When these facts are considered together, we believe a reasonable magistrate could conclude that there was a ‘substantial basis’ for believing that probable cause existed that narcotics would be found at the residence in question, at the time the warrant was issued. Accordingly, Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Patrick A. Pirtle Justice
Do not publish.