MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes Vicente Martinez a/k/a Vicente Martinez Jr., appellant, appeals two theft convictions,1 state-jail felonies, punished as second-degree felonies because of prior THE COURT: You never ever thought—this is what kills me when you all come in here and you say I got a drug problem and I need some help because we never hear that when you are out on the street. It is only when I am about to send you to prison for up to twenty years that all of a sudden we hear that. So it makes the judges kind of jaded, if you can understand that.

Immediately following this exchange, appellant explained to the trial court that he had participated in “AA” voluntarily and attended church, but later “relapsed.” He also explained that he called a rehabilitation facility but could not receive help because he lacked the means to pay for the rehabilitation.

The trial court declined to place appellant on probation and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement, citing appellant’s extensive criminal history, his past probation, and the trial court’s belief that he had not sought help for a drug problem on his own. The trial court also expressed its belief that if appellant really wants help, he can get it in prison.

II. ANALYSIS

Appellant argues the trial court’s comments, quoted above, demonstrate partiality and the trial court’s failure to consider the full punishment range, which deprived him of due process of law. We disagree.

Due process requires a neutral and detached hearing body or officer. Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 644–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973)). However, absent a clear showing of bias, a trial court is presumed to have been neutral and detached. Id.; Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, pet. dism’d., 872 S.W.2d 758 (1994)). As long as the trial court exercises its judgment in a constitutional manner, past judicial experience may be relevant to sentencing. See State v. Hart, 342 S.W.3d 659, 675 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 121 (2012); see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983) (plurality op.).

We recognize that appellant did not object to the trial court’s comments in the trial court and that a timely, specific objection is generally necessary to preserve a complaint for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. However, because the record does not show the trial court acted improperly in sentencing, we need not reach the question of whether an objection was necessary to preserve error in this case. See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 644–45 (“We need not decide today whether an objection below is required to preserve an error of this nature on appeal because the record here does not reflect partiality of the trial court or that a predetermined sentence was imposed.”).

In Brumit, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a trial court’s comments that an earlier case made it think that anyone who ever harmed a child should be put to death did not reflect bias, partiality, or the failure of the trial court to consider the full punishment range when the record showed otherwise. See 206 S.W.3d at 644–45. As in Brumit, the record in this case does not show the trial court acted partially or without considering the full punishment range. See id.; cf. Earley, 855 S.W.2d at 262–63 (concluding trial court violated due process when it expressed desire to impose life sentence before it had received any evidence). Instead, the record shows that the trial court considered the evidence of appellant’s prior criminal history, probation, and failure to seek drug treatment, and that these factors influenced the sentence imposed. The trial court stated the punishment range, but did not impose the maximum sentence of twenty years per offense, opting instead to sentence appellant to ten years’ confinement in each case, with the sentences to run concurrently. Because appellant has not overcome the presumption that the trial court was neutral and detached, we overrule his sole issue in each appeal. See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

GREGORY T. PERKES

Justice Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 11th day of April, 2013.