MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez1

Appellant, Rebecca Lynn Williams, was convicted of theft and forgery—state jail felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (a), (b)(1), (e)(4)(A) (West Supp. 2011), § 32.21(b), (d) (West 2011). Williams received a sentence of two years’ confinement in court orally pronounced that the sentences were to run consecutively. This appeal followed.

II. VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA

By her first issue, Williams contends that the trial court failed to admonish her concerning the possibility that if the trial court revoked her community supervision, the sentences could be stacked. Williams generally argues that the failure to admonish a defendant of this possibility renders the plea involuntary.

Williams states that “[n]owhere in the Statement of Facts prepared by the Court Reporter from the hearings held, can [Williams] discern when the Trial Court orally admonished [her] that if there would be a revocation, that the sentence after the revocation could be made consecutive or cumulative.” Williams does not cite any authority, or provide any argument, establishing that the trial court’s failure to admonish on the possibility of stacking her sentences prevented her from entering her pleas freely and voluntarily.^[2] See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

Nonetheless, we note that “a guilty plea is considered voluntary if the defendant was made fully aware of the direct consequences. It will not be rendered involuntary by lack of knowledge as to some collateral consequence.” State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The court of criminal appeals has further explained that direct consequences are those that are “definite and largely or completely automatic” and that a trial court is only required to advise a defendant of direct consequences that are “punitive in nature or specifically enunciated in the law.” Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 135–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

In McGrew v. State, we stated, “We agree that the imposition of consecutive sentences is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea, and a plea is not rendered involuntary by the trial court’s failure to warn of such a possibility.” 286 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.). Because the trial court’s cumulation of Williams’s sentences was a collateral consequence of her guilty pleas, she has failed to establish that her pleas were involuntary due to the trial court’s failure to warn of that consequence.^[3] See id. Accordingly, we overrule Williams’s first issue.

III. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

By her second issue, Williams contends that the trial court improperly stacked her jail sentences. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.03(a) (West Supp. 2011). Williams argues that section 3.03 prohibited the stacking of the sentences in this case because the cases were prosecuted in a single criminal action. See id.; Robbins v. State, 914 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); LaPorte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Under section 3.03 of the Texas Penal Code, sentences generally cannot be stacked if the crimes arise out of the same criminal episode and are prosecuted in a single criminal action. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.03(a).

Williams does not contend that the crimes that she was convicted of committing arose out of the same criminal episode. Furthermore, the record does not support such a finding. The record shows that Williams allegedly committed theft on December 3, 2008 by unlawfully appropriating shingles owned by Anthony Brown with the intent to deprive Brown of the property without his consent. See id. § 31.03 (a), (b)(1). Williams allegedly committed forgery on November 19, 2008 by signing Randall Glaze’s name on a check and then passing the check to Lucille Cooper with the intent to defraud and harm another. See id. § 32.21(b). There is no evidence in the record that Williams committed the theft and the forgery pursuant to the same transaction or pursuant to two or more transactions that were connected or constituted a common scheme or plan. See id. § 3.01(1) (West 2011) (defining a “criminal episode”). Moreover, Williams does not argue that these offenses are the same or similar. See id. § 3.01(2). Thus, we cannot conclude that these offenses arose out of the same criminal episode. See id. We overrule Williams’s second issue.

IV. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

By her third issue, Williams generally contends that the sentences were disproportionate because the trial court ordered them to run consecutively. Thus, Williams argues the sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” Id. The Eighth Amendment applies to punishments imposed by state courts through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.

amend. XIV. This right—like every constitutional or statutory right—can be waived by a “failure to object.” Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151-52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (concluding that by failing to object, the appellant did not preserve an argument that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to offense); Wynn v. State, 219 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Smith v. State, 10 S.W.3d 48, 49 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (same); see Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“As a general rule, an appellant may not assert error pertaining to his sentence or punishment where he failed to object or otherwise raise such error in the trial court.”); see also Jones v. State, No. 09-10-00397-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 2374, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont March 30, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (determining that the appellant had waived her argument that the sentence imposed was disproportionate and was unreasonable under the eighth amendment by failing to object). To preserve a complaint of disproportionate sentencing, the criminal defendant must make a timely, specific objection to the trial court or raise the issue in a motion for new trial. Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475; Noland, 264 S.W.3d at 151–52; Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 927–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref'd); Quintana v. State, 777 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref’d) (holding defendant waived cruel and unusual punishment argument by failing to object); see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see also Jones, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 2374, at *3–4.

Here, Williams did not object when the trial court pronounced that the sentences were to run consecutively or complain of the sentence in any post-trial motion. Therefore, Williams has failed to preserve this issue for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475; Noland, 264 S.W.3d at 151–52; Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927–28; Quintana, 777 S.W.2d at 479; see also Jones, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 2374, at *3–4. Moreover, even had Williams preserved error, a punishment falling within the limits prescribed by a valid statute, as in this case, is not usually excessive, cruel, or unusual.^[4] See Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 928; see also Stevens v. State, 667 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (providing that cumulating a sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment) (citing Baird v. State, 455 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970)). We overrule Williams’s third issue.

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

__________________ ROGELIO VALDEZ Chief Justice Do not Publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) Delivered and filed the 29th day of March, 2012.