MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Wittig1 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza Appellant Baltazar Acosta appeals from the trial court’s interlocutory order 2 used easements; (5) bring all bills, including utility bills, current; and (6) maintain the confidentiality of the terms of the agreement. The agreement further provides that if any of the conditions are violated, Acosta ―immediately forfeit[s] the life estate and agree[s] to vacate‖ within seven days’ notice of such violations.

Some months later, in 2009, Shimotsu asserted that Acosta was in violation of the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, Shimotsu filed a forcible detainer action in a Cameron County Justice Court.^[4]

On November 16, 2009, Acosta filed an ―Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction‖ in district court.^[5] Acosta requested that the court enjoin Shimotsu from continuing with the eviction proceedings in the justice court. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order on November 16, 2009. Following an extension of the temporary restraining order on December 3, the trial court held a hearing on December 10, 2009.

At the hearing, Acosta’s counsel argued that the agreement grants Acosta a life estate, and the question of whether he has forfeited the life estate by violating the conditions of the agreement is thus one involving title, over which the justice court has no jurisdiction.^[6] Shimotsu’s counsel argued that the agreement granted Acosta a ―life estate with contractual terms,‖ and that the justice court had jurisdiction to determine if the contractual terms had been violated, thereby forfeiting the life estate. As Shimotsu’s counsel explained to the court,

We believe the justice of the peace has the ability to make simple contractual—a simple contractual analysis, and that if he, in fact, determines that the contractual analysis had not been violated, [sic] then the life estate is in place and he wouldn’t have jurisdiction; but if, in fact, the terms were violated, there would be no life estate, which the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s representatives agreed to, and that we could go forward with the eviction.

....

This is within—it’s a simple contractual analysis that’s within the justice of the peace’s jurisdiction.

After hearing counsel’s arguments, the trial court stated:

[I]t’s purely a contractual issue at this stage of the game. It’s no different than when you have a lease, in a violation of a lease from a contractual standpoint, let’s say, an apartment complex and you want somebody evicted.

That’s the window that I’m looking at, not going beyond that. So I think on that basis[,] my ruling is that the J.P. can deal; that’s within his discretion, within his authority, so that’s where you need to go.

....

The issue before me is whether the J.P. has jurisdiction over a matter of eviction, and I’m viewing this as [a] contract because that’s what it was.

....

It’s a matter of eviction, notice of eviction pursuant to a contract that was entered between the parties. If you want to call it a life estate within the body of the contract, so be it. That’s what the Court’s ruling is. I’m not going beyond that.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court signed the order dissolving the temporary restraining order. This appeal ensued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

Whether to grant or deny a request for a temporary injunction is within the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse its decision absent an abuse of discretion. Cobb v. Caye Publ’g Group, Inc., 322 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (citing Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002)); Cascos v. Cameron County Atty. (In re Cascos), 319 S.W.3d 205, 221 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.). To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, we must decide whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Cobb, 322 S.W. 3d at 782. A trial court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law to established facts. Id.; Tom James of Dallas, Inc. v. Cobb, 109 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2003, no pet.). We review de novo any determinations on questions of law the trial court made in support of its order. Tom James of Dallas, Inc., 109 S.W.3d at 883 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)).

Jurisdiction to hear forcible detainer actions is vested in justice courts, and on appeal, to county courts for trial de novo. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004 (Vernon 2000); Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (op. on reh’g). A justice court is expressly deprived of jurisdiction to determine or adjudicate title to land. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2010). Thus, neither a justice court, nor a county court on appeal, can resolve questions of title beyond the immediate right to possession. See Bacon v. Jordan, 763 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. 1988); Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 708-09 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2001, no pet.).

In a forcible detainer action, the trial court considers only the issue of who has the right to immediate possession of real property, not the merits of the title. TEX. R. CIV. P. 746; Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied). Forcible detainer is intended to be a speedy, inexpensive, summary procedure for obtaining possession without resorting to a suit on the title. Villalon, 176 S.W.3d at 70; Malone, 115 S.W.3d at 270.

However, if the question of title is so intertwined with the issue of possession, then possession may not be adjudicated without first determining title. Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557; Rice, 51 S.W3d at 709. ―In such a case involving a genuine issue of title, neither the justice court, nor the county court on appeal, has jurisdiction.‖ Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557; see Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. ―[O]ne indication that a justice court, and on appeal a county court, may be required to adjudicate title to real estate in a forcible detainer case—and, thus, exceed its jurisdiction—is when a landlord- tenant relationship is lacking.‖ Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 712 n.4.

III. DISCUSSION

At the hearing, the trial court made clear that the basis for its ruling was its conclusion that the issue of whether Acosta had violated the terms of the agreement— thereby extinguishing his life estate—was ―a contractual issue‖ that was ―no different‖ than an issue regarding whether a tenant had violated the terms of a lease. We disagree. The only basis asserted by Shimotsu for his right to actual possession was that Acosta had forfeited his life estate by violating the terms of the agreement. Shimotsu’s counsel acknowledged that if the justice court determined that ―the life estate is in place . . . . [it] wouldn’t have jurisdiction; but if, in fact, the terms were violated, there would be no life estate . . . .‖ Thus, we conclude that this is a case in which possession may not be adjudicated without first determining title, and the justice court has no jurisdiction. See Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it misapplied the law in concluding that the justice court had jurisdiction. See Tom James of Dallas, Inc., 109 S.W.3d at 883. We sustain Acosta’s issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA

Justice Delivered and filed the 10th day of March, 2011.