v.
State
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
KIMBERLY GALINDO, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 156th District Court
of Bee County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Vela Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza On September 3, 2009, appellant Kimberly Galindo was convicted of recklessly causing injury to a child, a second-degree felony, in trial court cause number B-09- 2114-2-CR-B. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2010). Galindo was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment and was assessed a $1,000 fine, with the prison term suspended and community supervision ordered for a period of ten years. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3.
The State filed a motion to revoke Galindo’s community supervision on March 16, 2010. The State alleged in this motion that Galindo violated the terms of her community supervision by: (1) intentionally and knowingly possessing and using less than one gram of cocaine, and (2) intentionally and knowingly consuming alcohol. Galindo stipulated to the truth of the allegations in this motion. On April 13, 2010, the trial court granted the motion, revoked Galindo’s community supervision, sentenced her to eight years’ imprisonment, and assessed a $1,000 fine. This appeal followed.
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Galindo’s appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in support thereof in which he states that he has diligently reviewed the entire record has concluded that there is no reversible error. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel has informed this Court that he has (1) examined the record and has found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) served copies of the brief and motion to withdraw on Galindo, and (3) informed Galindo of her right to review the record and to file a pro se response.[1] See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3. More than an adequate time has passed, and no pro se response has been filed.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and find that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion it considered the issues raised in the brief and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, Galindo’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as her appellate counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant the motion to withdraw.
We order that counsel must, within five days of the date of this opinion, send a copy of the opinion and judgment to Galindo and advise her of her right to file a petition for discretionary review.[2] See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).