People v. Muir, 134 A.D.3d 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2015). · Go Syfert
People v. Muir, 134 A.D.3d 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2015). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
14 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Cited for
At page 641 Waiving rights negates need for detailed colloquy5 citing cases“having already waived his rights, a rigorous and detailed colloquy at defendant's replea to a lesser charge, carrying with it a lesser sentence, would have been an unnecessary formalism”3 citing courts quote it
  • People v. Mattis (Michael), No. 2017 NYSlipOp 51367(U) (N.Y. App. Term. Oct. 16, 2017).published
    "Having already waived his rights, a rigorous and detailed colloquy at defendant's replea to a lesser charge, carrying with it a lesser sentence, would have been an unnecessary formalism" (People v Muir , 134 AD3d at 641 [internal quotatio…
  • People v. Morales (Barbara), No. 2016 NYSlipOp 50785(U) (N.Y. App. Term. May 19, 2016).published
    "Having already waived h[er] rights, a rigorous and detailed colloquy at defendant's replea to a lesser charge, carrying with it a lesser sentence, would have been an unnecessary formalism" (People v Muir , 134 AD3d at 641 [internal quotat…
  • People v. Higgins (Xavier), No. 2016 NYSlipOp 50628(U) (N.Y. App. Term. Apr. 20, 2016).published
    "Having already waived his rights, a rigorous and detailed colloquy at defendant's replea to a lesser charge, carrying with it a lesser sentence, would have been an unnecessary formalism" ( People v Muir , 134 AD3d at 641 [internal quotati…
  • People v. Ramirez (Ana), No. 2016 NYSlipOp 50630(U) (N.Y. App. Term. Apr. 20, 2016).published
    "Having already waived h[er] rights, a rigorous and detailed colloquy at defendant's replea to a lesser charge, carrying with it a lesser sentence, would have been an unnecessary formalism" ( People v Muir , 134 AD3d at 641 [internal quota…
  • People v. Hosten (Desmond), 69 Misc. 3d 141(A) (N.Y. App. Term. 2020).unpublished
At page 642 “the later plea, and we reject defendant’s argument that the replacement of one plea with another rendered the first plea a “nullity” with regard to the waivers of rights (see People v Conceicao, 26 NY3d 375 [2015]).”1 citing casethe opinion's own words at *642
  • People v. McLeod, 205 A.D.3d 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2022).published 2 cites
    Accordingly, a detailed colloquy at defendant's ultimate plea to a lesser charge, carrying with it a lesser sentence, was not necessary ( see People v Muir , 134 AD3d 641, 642 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1147 [2016]).
The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Kaestnor Muir, Appellant
16493 1421/12.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Dec 29, 2015.
Published opinion
134 A.D.3d 641
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Juan M. Merchan, J.), rendered June 27, 2014, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted petit larceny, and sentencing him to a conditional discharge for a period of one year, unanimously affirmed.

The record amply establishes that defendant’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Defendant entered into a plea agreement that contemplated that he would initially plead guilty to attempted robbery in the third degree but would ultimately have that conviction reduced to attempted petit larceny if he completed the requisite mental health program.

At the first plea proceeding, where defendant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery, the court fully explained the terms of the agreement and advised defendant of the rights he was waiving (see Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238 [1969]). Having already waived his rights, a “rigorous and detailed” colloquy at defendant’s replea to a lesser charge, carrying with it a lesser sentence, would have been an “unnecessary formalism” (People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 16 [1983]). Under the circumstances presented, the initial plea allocution sufficiently established defendant’s understanding of his Boykin rights for purposes of[*642] the later plea, and we reject defendant’s argument that the replacement of one plea with another rendered the first plea a “nullity” with regard to the waivers of rights (see People v Conceicao, 26 NY3d 375 [2015]). In this case, the second plea was essentially an extension of the first plea, but with the conviction reduced to a misdemeanor for defendant’s benefit. Concur — Friedman, J.P., Acosta, Andrias and Richter, JJ.