United States v. Troy L. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1974). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Troy L. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
33 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Hardy (armfor, 1997-04-08)
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1975 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hardy
C.A.A.F. · 1997 · confidence medium
Circuits discussed supra, the view that jury nullification should be recognized or encouraged has been rejected by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 449-50 (1983); the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (1974); the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 518-20 (1972); and the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105-06 (1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Diaz
Mass. App. Ct. · 1984 · confidence medium
United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1974).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Perkins
Minn. · 1984 · confidence medium
And see, United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir.1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ozzie Lee Avery, Jr.
6th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 , 15 S.Ct. 273 , 39 L.Ed. 343 (1895); United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir.1974); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C.Cir.1972); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 , 93 S.Ct. 1443 , 35 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Paul M. Drefke, United States of America v. Richard O. Jameson
8th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 627 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir.1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Leonard Crow Dog (2×)
8th Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
We agree. 57 As recently stated by this court in United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208 (8th Cir. 1975):It is well established that a reasonable prosecutorial discretion is inherent in our judicial system, United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1974), and that such discretion does not amount to unconstitutional discrimination unless it is deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification, United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1971). 58 Further, we are guided by the principle that "(t)he presumption is alway…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Minneapolis v. Buschette
Minn. · 1976 · confidence medium
In the case of United States v. Swanson, 509 F. 2d 1205, 1208 (1975), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated: “It is well established that a reasonable prosecutorial discretion is inherent in our judicial system, United States v. Wiley, 503 F. 2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1974) * * * " The principles enunciated in Swanson are applicable to the issue in the instant case.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gordon R. Swanson, United States of America v. Glenn F. Gaffey
8th Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
It is well established that a reasonable prosecutorial discretion is inherent in our judicial system, United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1974), and that such discretion does not amount to unconstitutional discrimination unless it is deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification, United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1971).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Gordon S. Buttorff and Charles A. Dodge
8th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1974).
discussed Cited "see" Watts v. United States (2×)
D.C. · 1976 · signal: accord · confidence high
Arshack v. United States, D.C.App., 321 A.2d 845, 849-52 (1974); accord, United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 -07 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dougherty, supra, 154 U.S.App.D.C. at 93-100 , 473 F. 2d at 1130-37 ; United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 , 93 S.Ct. 1443 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 706 (1973); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 , 90 S.Ct. 1124 , 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1005-07 (4th Cir…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Fernandez
Cal. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
And it is not inappropriate to add that a juror called upon for an involuntary public service is entitled to the protection, when he takes action that he knows is right, but also knows is unpopular, either in the community at large or in his own particular grouping, that he can fairly put it to friends and neighbors that he was merely following the instructions of the court.” (United States v. Dougherty, supra, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 ; see also United States v. Wiley (8th Cir. 1974) 503 F.2d 106, 107 .) We note that Justice Kaus, in his concurring opinion in People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d 4…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Fox v. State (2×)
Okla. Crim. App. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 , 107 n. 4 (8th Cir.1974).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Walker v. State (2×)
Okla. Crim. App. · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 , 107 & n. 4 (8th Cir.1974).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Edgar Chaux Trujillo
11th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See e.g., United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir.1974); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C.Cir. 1972); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 , 93 S.Ct. 1443 , 35 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519-20 (9th Cir.1972); United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 , 90 S.Ct. 1124 , 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1005-09 (4th Cir.1969); cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 , 90 S.Ct. 908 , 25 L.Ed.2d 91 (1970).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." John Lewis Washington v. John C. Watkins, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections (2×)
5th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 , 107 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1974) (surveying the federal court cases supporting its holding that defendant not entitled to jury nullification instruction).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. William R. Ojala
8th Cir. · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1974).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Troy L. WILEY, Appellant
74-1266.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Sep 16, 1974.
503 F.2d 106
1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6858
Troy L. Wiley, pro se., W. H. Dillahunty, U. S. Atty., and Richard M. Pence, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Gibson, Bright, Smith.
Cited by 32 opinions  |  Published
TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.

Defendant Troy L. Wiley appeals from his conviction by a jury of two counts of violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, willful failure to file an income tax return. [1] He contends the trial court erred in failing to give a requested instruction on “jury nullification,” and in failing to dismiss because of alleged discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement of the statute here involved. We affirm.

The defendant’s proposed instruction states in part that “the members of the jury have an inherent right[*107] to disregard the instructions of the court and the evidence presented and return a verdict of acquittal if you find that the defendant was not blameworthy in the sense that he has not shocked the community conscience * * [2] It would serve no useful purpose to repeat here the debates over jury nullification which have been presented from time to time. [3] Suffice it to say that we are persuaded, as have been all the federal courts which have recently considered the issue, [4] that the defendant is not entitled to the instruction here requested. Particularly relevant here are the pointed observations of Judge Sobeloff in United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910, 90 S.Ct. 908, 25 L.Ed.2d 91 (1970):

To encourage individuals to make their own determinations as to which laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite chaos. No legal system could long survive if it gave every individual the option of disregarding with impunity any law which by his personal standard was judged morally untenable.

The defendant, an attorney, moved to dismiss the indictment alleging that the Government discriminatorily enforces 26 U.S.C. § 7203 “by intentionally and purposefully prosecuting self-employed persons, particularly professionals and specifically attorneys.’’ His proofs thereon' failed to convince the trial judge, and we find no error in the denial of the motion. It is clear that a reasonable prosecutorial discretion is inherent in our judicial system. As we stated in United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349, 1350-1351 (8th Cir. 1971):

[T]he law is clear that a prosecutor may exercise discretion in deciding who should be prosecuted as long as he does not deliberately discriminate between persons in similar circumstances based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. [Citations and footnote omitted.]

Affirmed.

1

. Defendant was acquitted on a third count.

2

. The full text reads :

Now that you have heard the evidence and argument, it becomes my duty to give you the instructions of the court as to the law applicable in this case.
Generally, it is your duty as jurors to consider the law as stated in the instructions of the court and to apply the rules of law so given to the facts as you find them from the evidence in the case.
It is my duty, however, to instruct you that you the members of the jury have an inherent right to disregard the instructions of the court and the evidence presented and return a verdict of acquittal if you find that the defendant was not blameworthy in the sense that he has not shocked the community conscience, or if you further feel that he is a victim of an oppressive or discriminatory prosecution.
3

. E. g., Follow-up/The Jury, Center Magazine, July, 1970, at 59; Seheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S.Cal.L. Rev. 168 (1972); Comment, Jury Nullification and the Pro Se Defense: The Impact of Dougherty v. United States, 21 Kan.L.Rev. 47, 57-63 (1972).

4

. United States v. Dougherty, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 76, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-1137 (1972); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 1443, 35 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 518-519 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991, 90 S.Ct. 1124, 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1005-1007 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910, 90 S.Ct. 908, 25 L.Ed. 2d 91 (1970). See United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1341 (4th Cir. 1970).