Dezzie Estelle Hinton Cotten v. Two 'R' Drilling Co., Inc. v. James Casing Crews, Inc., 508 F.2d 669 (Idaho 1975). · Go Syfert
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Dezzie Estelle Hinton Cotten v. Two 'R' Drilling Co., Inc. v. James Casing Crews, Inc., 508 F.2d 669 (Idaho 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
21 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. United States (uscfc, 2018-08-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 2018 · confidence medium
See Yakima Co., 583 F. App’x at 746 (noting that courts require that the attorney’s fees recovered pursuant to an indemnity contract be reasonable when the contract is silent on the issue); Cotten v. Two “R” Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that it is “well settled” that an indemnitee may recover “reasonable expenses” and “that these expenses include attorney’s fees”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoa Gases
amsamoa · 1994 · confidence medium
It is equally well settled, however, indeed it is hornbook law, that the reasonable expenses incurred by an indemnitee in defending a claim against him may be recovered of his indemnitor — and that these expenses include attorney's fees." Cotten v. Two "R" Drilling Co., Inc., 508 F.2d 669, 771 (5th Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hardy v. Gulf Oil Corp.
5th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Prior to Reliable Transfer, this Court held that a tortfeasor whose negligence was "passive" could pursue an indemnity action against a tort-feasor whose negligence was "active.” See, e.g., Cotten v. Two “R" Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir.1975); Kelloch v. S & H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767, 769 (5th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cities Service Co. v. Lee-Vac, Ltd.
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
American Hoist cites Cotten v. Two "R” Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 670 (5th Cir.1975), to support its claim that defendants who are found not to be liable are entitled to be indemnified for attorneys’ fees and costs from defendants who are found to be liable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cities Service Company v. Lee-Vac, Ltd.
3rd Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Furthermore, in Odd Bergs Tankrederi A/S v. S/T Gulfspray, 650 F.2d 652, 655 (5th Cir.1981), this court held that attorneys' fees and legal costs incurred by a defending tortfeasor are not recoverable by way of contribution from other parties who are liable 2 American Hoist cites Cotten v. Two "R" Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 670 (5th Cir.1975), to support its claim that defendants who are found not to be liable are entitled to be indemnified for attorneys' fees and costs from defendants who are found to be liable.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ocean Barge Transport Co. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.
D.V.I. · 1984 · confidence medium
Israel Commodity Co. v. American-West African Line, Inc., 397 F.2d 170 (3rd Cir. 1968); Cotten v. Two “R” Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Trevor E. Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., Vince Guzzetta D/B/A Guzzetta Offshore Marine Service, Inc. v. Petty Ray Geophysical Co., a Division of Geosource, Inc., Defendant-Third Partyplaintiff-Appellant v. International Offshore Navigation and Midnight Boat Corporation, Third-Partydefendants-Appellees. Trevor E. Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., Petty Ray Geophysical Co., a Division of Geosource, Inc., Defendant-Third Partydefendant-Appellant, International Offshore Navigation and Midnight Boat Corp., Third-Partyplaintiffs-Appellees
3rd Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Martin, 664 F.2d 85, 91-92 (5th Cir. 1981) 9 E.g., Cotten v. Two "R" Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Kelloch v. S & H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767, 769 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The passively negligent tortfeasor is clearly entitled to total indemnity from the actively negligent party."); Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1969) ("the right of indemnity exists between parties, one of whom is guilty of active or affirmative negligence, while the other's fault is only technical or passive").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc.
5th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
E.g., Cotten v. Two “R” Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Kelloch v. S & H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767, 769 (5th Cir. 1973) (“The passively negligent tortfeasor is clearly entitled to total indemnity from the actively negligent party.”); Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1969) (“the right of indemnity exists between parties, one of whom is guilty of active or affirmative negligence, while the other’s fault is only technical or passive”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Company v. Riverway Harbor Service St. Louis, Inc.
8th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
Cotten v. Two "R" Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Kelloch v. S & H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 1973). 10 Although originally contending that any theory of active-passive negligence is an insufficient foundation for an award of attorneys' fees, and that such awards are proper only against a defendant who has expressly or impliedly agreed to pay attorneys' fees, or has been held vicariously liable, Phillips appears to have altered its position.
cited Cited as authority (rule) E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Riverway Harbor Service St. Louis, Inc.
8th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
Cotten v. Two “R” Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Kelloch v. S & H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Noritake Co., Inc. v. M/v Hellenic Champion
5th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Cotten v. Two "R" Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Sommer Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 479 F.2d 1131, 1132-33 (5th Cir.1973); Brock v. Coral Drilling, Inc., 477 F.2d 211, 217 (5th Cir. 1973); Kelloch v. S&H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767, 771 (5th Cir.1973).
discussed Cited "see" Insurance Company Of North America v. M/V Ocean Lynx
11th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cotten v. Two "R" Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir.1975); Noritake, 627 F.2d at 724 n. 5; see also Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., 861 F.2d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir.1988) (Florida law); Nitram, Inc. v. Cretan Life, 599 F.2d 1359 , 1372 (5th Cir.1979). 31 Bottacchi claims that the present case was not an indemnity action, pointing to the form of the district court's judgment, which did not use the term "indemnity." Bottacchi also argues that COGSA provided Mar's exclusive remedy in this case, and that therefore Mar's case could not have been one for indemnification.
discussed Cited "see" Insurance Co. of North America v. M/V Ocean Lynx
11th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cotten v. Two “R” Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir.1975); Noritake, 627 F.2d at 724 n. 5; see also Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., 861 F.2d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir.1988) (Florida law); Nitram, Inc. v. Cretan Life, 599 F.2d 1359 , 1372 (5th Cir.1979).
cited Cited "see" City of Boston v. S.S. Texaco Texas, Her Engines, Boilers, Etc., Texaco Panama, Inc.
1st Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cotten v. Two “R” Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir.1975); Moran Towing & T.
discussed Cited "see" S. C. Loveland, Inc. v. East West Towing, Inc.
S.D. Fla. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cotten v. Two “R” Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1975.) Damages The court has found that the State of Florida Department of Transportation has sustained damages in the amount of $123,-025.47.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Alfred L. Hardy v. Gulf Oil Corporation, Zaire Gulf Oil Company, Gulf Oil Exploration and Production Company and Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, Defendants-Third Party v. Bouygues Offshore U.S.A., Inc. And Bouygues Offshore S.A., Defendants-Third Party on and Offshore Quality Control Specialists, Inc.
3rd Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Yeates, Dye & Garcia, Contribution and Indemnity in Maritime Litigation, 30 S.Tex.L.Rev. 215, 241 (1989) 13 Prior to Reliable Transfer, this Court held that a tortfeasor whose negligence was "passive" could pursue an indemnity action against a tortfeasor whose negligence was "active." See, e.g., Cotten v. Two "R" Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir.1975); Kelloch v. S & H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767, 769 (5th Cir.1973).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dezzie Estelle Hinton COTTEN, Plaintiff,
v.
TWO \R\" DRILLING COMPANY
34846.
Idaho Supreme Court.
Feb 21, 1975.
508 F.2d 669
1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15978
Tuttle, Roney, Gee.
GEE, Circuit Judge:

Three and a half years ago Lonnie Birl Cotten was killed by a falling joint of pipe while working as a member of a crew setting casing in an oil well. He was then an employee of Appellee James Casing Crews, Inc. (James). His death occurred on a submersible drilling barge owned and manned, except for James’ casing crew, by Appellant Two “R” Drilling Company, Inc. (Two “R”). The barge was then located on navigable waters in Lafourche Parish, Louisiana. James and Two “R” were each working at the time under separate contracts with Texaco Oil Company; there was no express contractual relationship between them.

Cotten’s beneficiaries under the Jones Act and general maritime law sued James and Two “R,” asserting that each was negligent and the barge unseawor-thy. James crossclaimed, seeking full indemnity for any damages which might be visited upon it and its costs and attorney’s fees as well. Special findings by the jury exonerated James but impaled Two “R” on both heads. James had judgment against Two “R” for its costs, expenses and the increment of attorney’s fees incurred by it in successfully resisting the claims of Cotten’s beneficiaries, but not those for pressing its cross-claim. Two “R” appeals from the award of attorney’s fees, asserting the general American rule that attorney’s fees are not recoverable by prevailing parties in the absence of statute or contract so providing and arguing that the Ryan [1] triangle exception to the general rule does not cover this case. Though both principles advanced by Two “R” were true, these arguments come too late in the day and other, more precisely applicable, principles would require us, as we do, to affirm.

We have no quarrel with the general rule against recovery of attorney’s fees, as such, by a party which[*671] incurs them in enforcing a claim against another. It is equally well settled however, indeed it is hornbook law, that the reasonable expenses incurred by an in-demnitee in defending a claim against him may be recovered of his indemnitor — and that these expenses include attorney’s fees. [2] We have so held in Kel-loch v. S & H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 1973), a suit for indemnity of a passive maritime tort-feasor against an active one. It would be strange indeed to hold that one who is guilty of no fault at all has no similar right. Nor are the two general principles in conflict, for in the indemnity situation the fees are recovered as reasonable and necessary expenses of defending, not qua attorney’s fees. Appellant would have us hold that, though other proper expenses are recoverable, attorney’s fees are not, being somehow stigmatized. We decline to do so. [3]

Nor is whether Ryan extends to our fact situation dispositive. As the court below correctly noted:

The Supreme Court held in Kerma-rec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlan-tique [4] that a shipowner owes to all who are on board, for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests, the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances. That duty of due care was extended to the stevedor-ing company as well, thus under federal maritime law, a shipowner owes a duty of due care to an independent contractor who came aboard to transact business and its breach will give rise to an independent cause of action for damages.

Appellant points to Ryan’s warranty of workmanlike performance as the basis of that decision. Though that be true, we held in Tri-State Oil Tool Industries, Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co. [5] that no contractual relationship between indem-nitor and indemnitee was necessary to recovery in circumstances like these:

It would be wrong to assess damages against a non-negligent or passively negligent shipowner for loss or injury suffered solely as the result of active negligence of another party, regardless of the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties.
This accident occurred in navigable waters; therefore, the federal maritime law is the applicable law. Ker-marec v. Compagnie Generale Transat-lantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628, 79 S.Ct. 406, 408, 409, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959). As we have already indicated, maritime law provides for tort indemnity where there is no negligence or only passive negligence attributed to the indemni-tee.

410 F.2d at 186.

Two “R” breached its shipowner’s duty of due care owed James. That breach caused James to incur expenses in defending itself against suit by its employee, Cotten. Among those expenses were reasonable attorney’s fees. James may have them of Two “R”.

Affirmed.

1

. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133 (1956).

2

. Other requisites of such recovery, not in contention here, being satisfied. 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 24 (1944).

3

. Here James was plainly within the “danger zone” of liability. A different case might well be presented had it been joined, say, frivolously, or by mistake in identity. See Strachan Shipping Co. v. Koninklyke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maalschappy, 324 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954, 84 S.Ct. 969, 11 L.Ed.2d 972 (1964).

5

. 410 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1969).