“the federal principle of collateral estoppel precludes re-litigation of an adversely decided issue by a party who has 232 once had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues, regardless of whether his present adversary was a party to the previous lawsuit.”
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976
2001
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Reticulum Management, LLC v. Dean, III
Bankr. N.D. Tex. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote
· confidence low
non-mutual defensive collateral estoppel bars a plaintiff from litigating the same issue against successive defendants after that issue has been decided adversely to that plaintiff.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Lincoln-Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan
D.R.I. · 2008 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote
· confidence low
the federal principle of collateral estoppel precludes re-litigation of an adversely decided issue by a party who has 232 once had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues, regardless of whether his present adversary was a party to the previous lawsuit.
discussed
Cited "see"
John W. Vicory v. Robert R. Walton, Sheriff of Butler County and John F. Holcomb, Butler County Prosecutor
(2×)
6th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265, 267 (M.D.Ga.), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.1976); Capitol City Manor, Inc. v. Culberson, 1 Ark.App. 137 , 613 S.W.2d 835, 837 (1981); Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412 A.2d 948, 951 (D.C.App.1980); Haddad v. Louisville Gas & Electric Company, 449 S.W.2d 916, 919-920 (Ky.1969); Kooper v. King, 195 Cal.App.2d 621 , 15 Cal.Rptr. 848, 852 (1961); 78 A.L.R. 938 , 939. 21 Therefore, I would reverse with directions to enter judgment for both defendants on the basis of immunity alone. 22 I am constrained to conclude that Parratt, supra, is not applicable t…
discussed
Cited "see"
Jackson v. District of Columbia
D.C. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265, 267 (M.D.Ga.), aff’d, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976); Beall v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 350 F.Supp. 978, 981 (D.Md.1972); see also North Central Truck Lines v. United States, 381 F.Supp. 1217, 1220 (W.D.Mo.1974), aff’d, 420 U.S. 901 , 95 S.Ct. 820 , 42 L.Ed.2d 832 (1975). 4 The plaintiffs here were not prejudiced by the defendants’ failure to amend their answer to include the collateral estoppel defense.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Forest Oil Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc.
S.D. Miss. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265 (M.D.Ga.), aff’d sub nom 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1978) (extending the Aerojet-General holding to include collateral estoppel); Stovall, 632 F.2d at 540.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Goldkind v. Snider Bros., Inc.
D.C. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265, 267 (M.D.Ga.), aff’d, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.1976) (failure to plead collateral estop-pel in answer pursuant to Rule 8(c) was not fatal because “both parties after being informed of this issue by the court submitted briefs and thus no prejudice has resulted to the plaintiff by defendant’s noncompliance with this rule”); Beall v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 350 F.Supp. 978, 981 (D.Md.1972) (even though res judicata was not raised in the pleadings, it would be considered by the court because both parties had briefed the issue).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
D. Minnesota · 1982 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 908 , 96 S.Ct. 210 , 46 L.Ed.2d 137 (1975), and Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265 (M.D.Ga.), aff’d without opinion, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying federal law of res judicata and collateral estoppel), with McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F.Supp. 335, 338-39 (S.D.Miss.1980) (applying state law of collateral estoppel).