collateral estoppel doctrine in District of Columbia

2010Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has also held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel “is embodied- in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). “[Wjhen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id. at 443 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 .

2010Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has also held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel “is embodied- in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). “[Wjhen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id. at 443 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 .

2026Grp., Inc., 904 A.2d 391, 394 (D.C. 2006)).

2017Further, where, as here, the party invoking the collateral estoppel doctrine is not the defendant but instead the plaintiff — and where the plaintiff was not even a party to the original suit and has sought "to foreclose [the] defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant ... litigated unsuccessfully" in that original suit against an entirely different plaintiff — courts "apply ... collateral estoppel ‘with some caution.’ ” Modiri, 904 A.2d at 394 -95 (quoting United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 , 159 n.4, 104 S.Ct. 568 , 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984), and Newell v. District of Columbia, 741 A

2017Grp., Inc., 904 A.2d 391, 394 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 601 (D.C. 1995)). 7 The party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked must have had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue, and the determination of the issue in the prior proceeding must have been “essential to the judgment, and not merely dictum.” Id. (quoting Davis, 663 A.2d at 501 ).

2017Grp., Inc., 904 A.2d 391, 394 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 601 (D.C. 1995)). 7 The party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked must have had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue, and the determination of the issue in the prior proceeding must have been “essential to the judgment, and not merely dictum.” Id. (quoting Davis, 663 A.2d at 501 ).

2006And, in Copening v. United States, 353 A.2d 305 (D.C.1976), we did not apply the collateral estoppel doctrine because no prior final judgment had issued.

2006Id. at 310 (“The existence of a prior judgment has been described as the ‘linchpin’ of [ Ashe, supra], and subsequent case law has stressed the requirement of a previous trial.... [W]e conclude that there was no ‘prior adjudication’ which would mandate application of the collateral estoppel doctrine.”) (citations omitted).

1988We have also recognized that when the prior trial involved a multi-count indictment, wherein the jury acquitted on one count general verdict, and hung on the other count(s), “one is frequently unable to discern, as required by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, what the jury must have determined factually.” Smith, supra, 337 A.2d at 501 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original).

1988We have also recognized that when the prior trial involved a multi-count indictment, wherein the jury acquitted on one count general verdict, and hung on the other count(s), “one is frequently unable to discern, as required by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, what the jury must have determined factually.” Smith, supra, 337 A.2d at 501 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original).

2010See Yeager, 129 S.Ct. at 2368 n. 6 ("To preclude retrial [based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel], [the defendant] must show that the jury necessarily decided an issue in his favor."); cf. Martin, 647 A.2d at 1140 (King, J., concurring) (when there have been inconsistent verdicts, collateral estoppel principles permit "re-trial with respect to any of the counts upon which there was a conviction").

2010See Yeager, 129 S.Ct. at 2368 n. 6 ("To preclude retrial [based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel], [the defendant] must show that the jury necessarily decided an issue in his favor.”); cf. Martin, 647 A.2d at 1140 (King, J., concurring) (when there have been inconsistent verdicts, collateral estoppel principles permit "re-trial with respect to any of the counts upon which there was a conviction”).

2010See Yeager, 129 S.Ct. at 2368 n. 6 ("To preclude retrial [based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel], [the defendant] must show that the jury necessarily decided an issue in his favor."); cf. Martin, 647 A.2d at 1140 (King, J., concurring) (when there have been inconsistent verdicts, collateral estoppel principles permit "re-trial with respect to any of the counts upon which there was a conviction").

2010See Yeager, 129 S.Ct. at 2368 n. 6 ("To preclude retrial [based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel], [the defendant] must show that the jury necessarily decided an issue in his favor.”); cf. Martin, 647 A.2d at 1140 (King, J., concurring) (when there have been inconsistent verdicts, collateral estoppel principles permit "re-trial with respect to any of the counts upon which there was a conviction”).

1988In Copening , we stated that the “application of the collateral estoppel doctrine requires the concurrence in different proceedings of the three circumstances of (1) a common factual issue necessary to both adjudications, (2) a prior determination of that issue in litigation between the same parties, and (3) a showing that the determination was in favor of the party seeking to raise the estoppel bar. 353 A.2d at 309 ; accord Jackson, supra, 528 A.2d 1211 .

1988In Copening , we stated that the “application of the collateral estoppel doctrine requires the concurrence in different proceedings of the three circumstances of (1) a common factual issue necessary to both adjudications, (2) a prior determination of that issue in litigation between the same parties, and (3) a showing that the determination was in favor of the party seeking to raise the estoppel bar. 353 A.2d at 309 ; accord Jackson, supra, 528 A.2d 1211 .

1996The determination of the prior proceeding "`is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.'" Ali Baba Co. v. WILCO, Inc., 482 A.2d 418, 421 (D.C.1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27).

1991See generally Ali Baba Co., Inc. v. Wilco, Inc., 482 A.2d 418, 423 (D.C.1984) (discussing factors for determining whether it is fair to apply doctrine of collateral estoppel, adopting analysis in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 , 99 S.Ct. 645, 650-52 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979)).

1986See Jackson v. District of Columbia, supra, 412 A.2d at 951 (plaintiffs “were not prejudiced by the defendants’ failure to amend their answer to include the collateral estoppel defense” because the trial court “considered the views of both parties on [that] issue”); Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265, 267 (M.D.Ga.), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.1976) (failure to plead collateral estoppel in answer pursuant to Rule 8(c) was not fatal because “both parties after being informed of this issue by the *460 court submitted briefs and thus no prejudice ... resulted to the plaintiff by defendant’s no

1980See Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265, 267 (M.D.Ga.), aff’d, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976); Beall v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 350 F.Supp. 978, 981 (D.Md.1972); see also North Central Truck Lines v. United States, 381 F.Supp. 1217, 1220 (W.D.Mo.1974), aff’d, 420 U.S. 901 , 95 S.Ct. 820 , 42 L.Ed.2d 832 (1975). 4 The plaintiffs here were not prejudiced by the defendants’ failure to amend their answer to include the collateral estoppel defense.

1986See Jackson v. District of Columbia, supra, 412 A.2d at 951 (plaintiffs “were not prejudiced by the defendants’ failure to amend their answer to include the collateral estoppel defense” because the trial court “considered the views of both parties on [that] issue”); Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265, 267 (M.D.Ga.), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.1976) (failure to plead collateral estoppel in answer pursuant to Rule 8(c) was not fatal because “both parties after being informed of this issue by the *460 court submitted briefs and thus no prejudice ... resulted to the plaintiff by defendant’s no

1980See Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265, 267 (M.D.Ga.), aff’d, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976); Beall v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 350 F.Supp. 978, 981 (D.Md.1972); see also North Central Truck Lines v. United States, 381 F.Supp. 1217, 1220 (W.D.Mo.1974), aff’d, 420 U.S. 901 , 95 S.Ct. 820 , 42 L.Ed.2d 832 (1975). 4 The plaintiffs here were not prejudiced by the defendants’ failure to amend their answer to include the collateral estoppel defense.

2012United States v. Felder, 548 A.2d 57, 64-65 (D.C.1988).

2006In United States v. Felder, 548 A.2d 57 (D.C.1988), “we [were] called upon to determine whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a component of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment as enunciated in Ashe[, su pra], and its progeny prevents the government from relitigating certain facts at a second trial.” Id. at 58 .

2005The record shows, however, that the court and counsel apparently focused mainly on our decision in (Anne) Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412 A.2d 948 (D.C.1980), a case in which we did not consider claims for false arrest, negligence and false pretenses on the merits because of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

2005The record shows, however, that the court and counsel apparently focused mainly on our decision in ( Anne) Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412 A.2d 948 (D.C. 1980), a case in which we did not consider claims for false arrest, negligence and false pretenses on the merits because of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

1986See Jackson v. District of Columbia, supra, 412 A.2d at 951 (plaintiffs “were not prejudiced by the defendants’ failure to amend their answer to include the collateral estoppel defense” because the trial court “considered the views of both parties on [that] issue”); Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265, 267 (M.D.Ga.), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.1976) (failure to plead collateral estoppel in answer pursuant to Rule 8(c) was not fatal because “both parties after being informed of this issue by the *460 court submitted briefs and thus no prejudice ... resulted to the plaintiff by defendant’s no

1980See Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265, 267 (M.D.Ga.), aff’d, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1976); Beall v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 350 F.Supp. 978, 981 (D.Md.1972); see also North Central Truck Lines v. United States, 381 F.Supp. 1217, 1220 (W.D.Mo.1974), aff’d, 420 U.S. 901 , 95 S.Ct. 820 , 42 L.Ed.2d 832 (1975). 4 The plaintiffs here were not prejudiced by the defendants’ failure to amend their answer to include the collateral estoppel defense.

2021See Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 617 (D.C. 1989) (“[I]ssue preclusion operates to bar relitigation of identical issues actually decided between the parties or their privies.”); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 853 A.2d 207, 211 (D.C. 2004) (the “issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties”) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)).

2021See Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 617 (D.C. 1989) (“[I]ssue preclusion operates to bar relitigation of identical issues actually decided between the parties or their privies.”); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 853 A.2d 207, 211 (D.C. 2004) (the “issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties”) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)).

2017Sup. Ct. R. 23 (e) (stating that an unpublished opinion “is not precedential and may not be cited by any party except to support contentions of double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case”); see also Gilbert v. Miodovnik, 990 A.2d 983 , 992 n.11 (D.C. 2010).

2014See Albertie v. Louis & Alexander Corp., 646 A.2d 1001, 1006 (D.C. 1994) ("Where an issue is raised for the first time on appeal, we will reverse only ‘where it is apparent from the face of the record that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.’ ”) Because appellant does not direct us to specific factual determinations (rather than "all issues") that he believes were entitled to preclu-sive effect, and the two orders are not so fundamentally inconsistent as to cause a miscarriage of justice, any collateral estoppel claim by appellant fails. 2 .

2006D.C. at 95, 344 F.2d at 189 (footnote omitted).

2006We believe that in such a case as this “[t]he common law doctrine of collateral estoppel ... is not to be rigidly or mechanically applied and must on occasion, yield to more fundamental concerns.” New York v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58 , 436 N.Y.S.2d 224 , 417 N.E.2d 518, 521 (1980).

2006We believe that in such a case as this “[t]he common law doctrine of collateral estoppel ... is not to be rigidly or mechanically applied and must on occasion, yield to more fundamental concerns.” New York v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58 , 436 N.Y.S.2d 224 , 417 N.E.2d 518, 521 (1980).

2000The government contends that “the Double Jeopardy Clause [and the doctrine of collateral estoppel] do[ ] not apply to probation-revocation proceedings, [and therefore] the prior prosecution of [Johnson] for firearm possession posed no obstacle to the subsequent revocation based on the same incident.” The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States “safeguards a defendant from multiple trials or successive prosecutions or multiple punishments for the same offense.” United States v. Allen, 755 A.2d 402, 406 (D.C.2000) (referencing Lindsay v. United Stat