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G Cite
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 1989–2013 ·
…the evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
at p. 254
✓
cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2008 ·
…no more than a shorthand expression of the rule that, after a guilty verdict by a jury or a finding of guilt by a trial court, an appellate tribunal may not substitute its inferences from the evidence for those drawn by the factfinder, if there was sufficient evidence to submit …
✓
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977
2001
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
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discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Willis Wheeler
Where such inferences may be drawn, a reviewing court may not “[r]evers[e] the jury’s conclusion simply because another inference is possible — or even equally plausible” because on review for sufficiency of the evidence “[t]he evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 432 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Willis Wheeler
Where such inferences may be drawn, a reviewing court may not “[r]evers[e] the jury’s conclusion simply because another inference is possible — or even equally plausible” because on review for sufficiency of the evidence “[t]he evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 432 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977)). 20 A. Wheeler argues that the Government’s case was wanting because, despite hours of wir…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Wrensford
Thus, “ ‘[t]he question is whether all the pieces of evidence against the defendant, taken together, make a strong enough case to let a jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 432 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Robert Franz
(2×)
United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Aundel Benoit
Reversing the jury ’ s conclusion simply because another inference is possible — or even equally plausible — is inconsistent with the proper inquiry for review of sufficiency of the evidence challenges, which is that “[t]he evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 432 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Richard Caraballo-Rodriguez
Reversing the jury’s conclusion simply because another inference is possible — or even equally plausible — is inconsistent with the proper inquiry for review of sufficiency of the evidence challenges, which is that “ ‘[t]he evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977) (quoting United States v. Allard, 240 F.2d 840, 841 (3d Cir.1957)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Kenneth Kilson
In other words, “[o]ne may not be convicted of conspiracy solely for keeping bad company.” United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir.1977).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Craig Claxton
(2×)
According to Isaac, the farm had a specific “function ... to th[e] organization,” serving as a place where organization members would meet to “talk about drug activities and fight dogs.” (Joint App. at 155-56.) Although a jury reviewing that testimony might have concluded that Claxton simply “ke[pt] bad company,” which would not suffice to establish a conspiracy conviction, United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1977), the verdict instead reflects that the jury found that *838 Claxton did know what he was involved in, and we are bound by that determination so long as i…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Regina Tolliver
Further, “evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States *103 v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Boria
(2×)
In a series of cases, this Court has been reluctant to uphold drug conspiracy convictions unless the Government introduces evidence from which the jury could infer knowledge of drugs, as opposed to some other contraband. 9 See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 92 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1114-15 (3d Cir. 1991); Thomas, 114 F.3d at 406 ; United States v. Idowu, 157 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir.1998); Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 291 .
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Huezo
(6×)
See United States v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 7 , 13 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1984); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir.1977); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 861-63 (4th Cir. 1996) (in banc); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 628-29 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1225-29 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (8th Cir.2006) (in banc); United States v. Esparza, 876 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Clavis, 977 F.2d 538, 539 (11th Cir.1992) (denying rehearing). [8] Only the *188 Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits contin…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Juan Vincent Gomez Castrillon (USA)
(3×)
See United States v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 7 , 13 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 861-63 (4th Cir. 1996) (in banc); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621 , 628- 29 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1225-29 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 2006) (in banc); United States v. Esparza, 876 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Clavis, 977 F.2d 538, 539 (11th Cir. 1992) (denying rehearing).8 Only the 1 Just six days before Tomplain, a distr…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Cardona-Rosario
First, Cardona-Rosario argues that the “slight connection” instruction too closely resembles the “slight evidence” instruction that we rejected in United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir.1977) (“Clearly, it would be reversible error to charge a jury that, once the government has shown the existence of a conspiracy, it may connect a particular defendant to it by ‘slight evidence,’ rather than by evidence proving the connection beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (citation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Lewis
(2×)
States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1112, 1114 (3d Cir.1991) (finding no evidence in the record that defendant Fitzpatrick, asked "to watch [co-defendant's] back,” knew the transaction concerned drugs); Wexler, 838 F.2d at 92 n. 2 (finding insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that defendant knew the contents "behind a closed track door which he neither drove nor rode in"); United States v. Terselich, 885 F.2d 1094, 1098 (3d Cir.1989) (finding no evidence that defendant, “sharing] driving chores and lodging with the driver of the vehicle,” knew that a secret compartment in the tra…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Edge
(2×)
See Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 290-91 (finding no evidence in the record that defendant had knowledge of the nature of the transaction and noting the lack of evidence that defendant had ever been in possession of the cocaine); Idowu, 157 F.3d at 268-270 (finding the evidence insufficient to support the inference that defendant knew the transaction involved drugs because defendant never heard specific reference to the subject matter, nor did he see the drugs); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1112, 1114 (3d Cir.1991) (finding no evidence in the record that defendant Fitzpatrick, asked “to…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ibrahim v. Government of the Virgin Islands
See e.g., United States v. White, 611 F.2d 531, 539 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that intent to defraud may be shown be surrounding facts and circumstances); Greene, 708 F.2d at 115-16 (“So long as the totality of circumstantial evidence relating to intent would enable a reasonable factfinder to infer such intent beyond a reasonable doubt, the due process requirement for sufficiency of the evidence on that element of the offense is satisfied.”) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253-54 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Thomas
In Wexler, supra, for example, where we reversed the defendant Wexler's conviction for conspiracy to distribute hashish, we held that the "inferences rising `from keeping bad company' are not enough to convict a defendant for conspiracy." Id. at 91 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Melvin Marvin Thomas, Melvin Thomas
In Wexler, supra, for example, where we reversed the defendant Wexler's conviction for conspiracy to distribute hashish, we held that the "inferences rising "from keeping bad company' are not enough to convict a defendant for conspiracy." Id. at 91 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir. 1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Schramm
See, e.g., United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1114-16 (3d Cir.1991) (reversing the conviction of a defendant who aided in the sale of a wrapped package, but had no knowledge of the contents); United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 91-92 (3d Cir.1988) (holding that a defendant’s participation as a lookout and assisting in the movement of a truck that contained a large quantity of hashish was insufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiring to distribute hashish in the absence of any evidence that the defendant knew what was in the truck); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Schramm
See, e.g., United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1114-16 (3d Cir.1991) (reversing the conviction of a defendant who aided in the sale of a wrapped package, but had no knowledge of the contents); United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 91-92 (3d Cir.1988) (holding that a defendant's participation as a lookout and assisting in the movement of a truck that contained a large quantity of hashish was insufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiring to distribute hashish in the absence of any evidence that the defendant knew what was in the truck); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Igor Veksler, United States of America v. Richard McNaughton
The “ ‘evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’.” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Veksler
The "'evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt'." United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 (1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. James Price, A/K/A \Squeezie
"The evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Price
“The evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Rene Ramos-Rascon, United States of America v. Alejandro Gonzalez-Villegas
However, “the inferences rising from keeping bad company are not enough to convict a defendant for conspiracy,” United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d at 91 (citing United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir.1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Nichelle K. Davis
(2×)
See Gordon, 712 F.2d at 114 (“It is not enough that the defendant merely associated with those participating in a conspiracy....”); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir.1977) (“One may not be convicted of conspiracy solely for keeping bad company.").
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Parker D. Langston, United States of America v. Huey Lee Francis, United States of America v. Enoch McIlroy United States of America v. William McIlroy United States of America v. James McIlroy United States of America v. Speck Aron Ross
The jury could infer more than merely that Langston was a passenger in an enclosed, padlocked truck, as in United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir.1977).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Langston
The jury could infer more than merely that Langston was a passenger in an enclosed, padlocked truck, as in United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir.1977).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Darrin Casper, A/K/A Barry Jackson
United States v. Vastola, 899 F.2d 211, 226 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3233 , 111 L.Ed.2d 744 (1990); United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1831 , 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Amos Salmon, No. 90-3355, Raymond E. Washington, No. 90-3363, Richard Fitzpatrick, No. 90-3366, John Surratt, No. 90-3438
Cf. United States v. Leon, 739 F.2d 885, 892-93 (3d Cir.1984) (finding sufficient to uphold determination that defendant knew objective of conspiracy evidence that defendant was found lying face down just yards away from spot where tons of marijuana had been recently unloaded and found by agents); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir.1977) (finding evidence of defendant’s traveling cross-country with coconspirator in truck with rear compartment containing marijuana and sharing motel room with coconspirator insufficient to uphold conclusion that defendant knew of marijuana). …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Raphello Harris, Sr.
In line with our jurisprudence for reviewing the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, we note that such evidence need not “be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it establishes a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Leon, 739 F.2d 885, 891 (3d Cir.1984) (citing United States v. Allard, 240 F.2d 840, 841 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 939 , 77 S.Ct. 814 , 1 L.Ed.2d 761 (1957)); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir.1977) (referring to the Glasser and Allard standards of reviewing e…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Government of the Virgin Islands v. DuBois
The court may not substitute its own judgment of the evidence for that of the jury, see United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir. 1977), and must draw all reasonable inferences that are favorable to the government.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States of America, at Nos. 89-5372/5383, at No. 89-5510 v. Gaetano Vastola, at No. 89-5372, at No. 89-5510 v. Elias Saka, at No. 89-5383
Furthermore, as recently reaffirmed in United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300 (3d Cir.1989), the evidence “ ‘does not have to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which a jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. at 311 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gonzalez
The court may not substitute its own judgment of the evidence for that of the jury, see United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir.1977), and must draw all reasonable inferences favorable in favor of the government.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sandini
As we stated in United States v. Cooper, " '[t]he evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' " 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sandini
As we stated in United States v. Cooper, “ ‘[t]he evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Antonio Torres
See United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 91 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 808 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir.1977).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Levy
The Third Circuit “has been obliged to overturn conspiracy convictions because the defendant was not proven to have had knowledge of the illegal objective contemplated by the conspiracy.” Wexler, 838 F.2d at 91 , United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 808 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Samuels, 741 F.2d 570, 573-74 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Molt, 615 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir.1977).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Robert Craig Wexler
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 808 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Samuels, 741 F.2d at 573-74 ; United States v. Molt, 615 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir.1977).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sylvester Scanzello
United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir.1977).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
The United States v. Shirl F. Kapp, Ronald Klinger, Robert Lewis, Robert Miller and Paul Briggs. Appeal of Paul Briggs
(8×)
also: Cited "see"
As this court stated in United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir.1977), “to convict a defendant of participating in a conspiracy, there must be some evidence tending to prove that he entered into an agreement and that he knew the agreement had the specific unlawful purpose charged in the indictment.” (emphasis in original).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ralston Greene
United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253-54 (3d Cir.1977).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir. 1977).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Michael S. Brandon, United States of America v. Melanie R. Smith
United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3rd Cir. 1977).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Scarborough
United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Hamilton, 457 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1972).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. William F. Schoenhut, Jr
United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252 at 253 (3d Cir. 1977).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Mercado
Frorup, 963 F.2d at 43 ; see United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977)(“The evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
discussed
Cited "see"
Kamienski v. Hendricks
See United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977) (vacating conspiracy conviction where record contained no evidence to show defendant-passenger knew contents of locked trunk compartment contained marijuana).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Zavala
The evidence is just as consistent, for example, with a conspiracy to transport stolen goods, an entirely different crime.” Id. at 92 ; see United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1977) (“[T]here [was] no evidence that [appellant] knew what was in the padlocked rear compartment....
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Adrian Mastrangelo, Jr. Adrian Mastrangelo
Accord United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.1977) (reversing conviction because there was no proof that defendant, who rode cross-country in truck, knew locked compartment contained drugs).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America
v.
COOPER, Richard John, Appellant
v.
COOPER, Richard John, Appellant
77-1208.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Nov 29, 1977.
Harvey S. Swickle, Swickle & Katz, P. A., Miami Beach, Fla., for appellant., David W. Marston, U. S. Atty., Walter S. Batty, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., William C. Fields, III, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Gibbons, Weis, Steel.
Cited by 81 opinions | Published
OPINION OF THE COURT
GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.In a non-jury trial held on stipulated facts, Richard John Cooper and two others were found guilty of conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. [1] Cooper contends that the stipulated facts do not support the conclusion that he was a member of an unlawful conspiracy. The district court made a general finding of guilty, and neither the government nor Cooper requested that the facts be found specially. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(c). Our task is to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government in order to determine if the factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cooper conspired with his two co-defendants to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it. The existence of a conspiracy between the other two is not disputed by Cooper.
The government, relying on statements in some recent Third Circuit decisions, suggests that it need only prove membership in a conspiracy by “slight evidence.” [2] Those cases do refer to “slight evidence,” but they cannot be understood to establish the novel rule that the prosecution in a conspiracy case is relieved of the burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Clearly, it would be reversible error to charge a jury that, once the government has shown the existence of a conspiracy, it may connect a particular defendant to it by “slight evidence,” rather than by evidence proving the connection beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 628 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied,-U.S.-, 98 S.Ct. 298, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977). In a case tried without a jury the government’s burden of persuasion is no less.
The reference to “slight evidence” in the cases cited in note 2 is no more than a shorthand expression of the rule that, after a guilty verdict by a jury or a finding of guilt by a trial court, an appellate tribunal may not substitute its inferences from the evidence for those drawn by the fact-finder, if there was sufficient evidence to submit to the factfinder in the first place. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Hopkins, 518 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1975). As we observed in United States v. Kates, 508 F.2d 308, 310-11 (1975), to convict a defendant of participating in a con spiracy, there must be some evidence tending to prove that he entered into an agreement and that he knew the agreement had the specific unlawful purpose charged in the indictment. As we declared in United States v. Allard:
[*254] The question is whether all the pieces of evidence against the defendant, taken together, make a strong enough case to let a jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
. The evidence does not need to be, inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
240 F.2d 840, 841 (3d Cir. 1957).
The case now before us involves a shipment of 1100 lbs. of marijuana from Boulder, Colorado, to Pottsville, Pennsylvania. For purposes of this appeal we take it as established that there was a conspiracy between Cooper’s co-defendants, Thomas J. Meador and John Brett Allen. These two conspired to have the marijuana loaded in a Ryder truck rented by Meador and to have the truck driven from Boulder to Pottsville. The case against Cooper consisted of the following evidence:
1. In the week before the departure of the Ryder truck from Colorado three phone calls were placed from a telephone at Allen’s residence to a telephone at Cooper’s residence. (There is no evidence concerning the identity of the participants or the subject matter of the conversations.)
2. A search of the Ryder truck after its seizure in Pottsville produced a Colorado motel receipt dated December 16, 1975, bearing Cooper’s name and the registration number of the truck.
3. On December 18, 1975, Cooper and Meador checked into the Dusselfink Motel in Pottsville, Pennsylvania. The registration number of the Ryder truck was listed on the registration form. Both Meador and Cooper were assigned to Room 242.
4. Two telephone calls were made from Room 242. One was to the telephone in Cooper’s home. The other was to an answering service listed to Allen; the message was that Allen should call Jeff Stewart at 385-2407, the Dusselfink Motel number, Room 242. (There is no evidence that Cooper made either call. There is no evidence concerning the subject matter of the call to Cooper’s home. There is no evidence that Cooper ever identified himself as Jeff Stewart.)
5. While Cooper and Meador were registered at the Dusselfink Motel, the manager saw an unidentified person leave the motel restaurant parking lot, get in the Ryder truck, and drive off.
6. Some time after the truck was seized elsewhere, Meador and Cooper were arrested in Room 242.
7. The arresting officers found, atop a bureau in the room, a page torn from a telephone directory with a telephone number written on it. The number belonged to the Stapleton Plaza Hotel in Denver, Colorado, where Allen had stayed several days earlier. (There is no evidence about who wrote the number on the torn page. There is no evidence that Cooper called the Stapleton Plaza Hotel.)
8. The search of the Ryder truck revealed that the marijuana was stored in the padlocked rear compartment. The key to the padlock was found in Allen’s jacket pocket when he was arrested in Pottsville. (There is no evidence that Cooper ever had access to the key or the compartment.)
The evidence against Cooper, in addition to proving the facts enumerated, is sufficient to support inferences that he rode in the Ryder truck with Meador from Colorado to Pennsylvania and that he shared with Meador a motel room in Colorado. But there is no evidence that he knew what was in the padlocked rear compartment and no evidence that illegal plans were discussed during telephone calls to his home telephone. The fact that he rode in the truck and shared rooms with Meador is consistent with a purpose of obtaining inexpensive transportation by sharing driving and expenses. In the absence of some evidence that he knew of the contents of the locked compartment or some evidence that he engaged in telephone or other communication of a conspiratorial nature, no factfinder[*255] could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cooper was a member of the Allen-Meador conspiracy. [3] The available evidence is perfectly consistent with innocence. There is no evidence suggesting guilty knowledge or participation. One may not be convicted of conspiracy solely for keeping bad company. The trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal for Cooper on the conspiracy charge.
The judgment appealed from will be reversed.
1
. The conviction of co-defendant Thomas J. Meador was affirmed by another panel of this Circuit. United States v. Meador, 559 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1977) (judgment order). The appeal by co-defendant John Brett Allen is disposed of in an opinion of this panel, filed simultaneously with this opinion. United States v. Allen, 566 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1977).
2
. United States v. Kates, 508 F.2d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. DeCavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1273 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Cohen, 197 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1952).
3
. We need not answer the question whether the evidence against Cooper was sufficient to permit the admission against him of statements by an alleged co-conspirator linking him to the conspiracy. Neither Allen nor Meador made such statements.