Smallwood Darden, of New Albany, for appellants. In determining the right of the appellants in this case there are two questions involved: (1) Whether or not the provision of section 2 of chapter 171 of the General Laws of Mississippi of 1934, in regard to the calling of an election for the purpose of voting wine and beer out of a county, contravenes any of the rights of the appellants guaranteed to them under section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and under section 14 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, commonly known as the Due Process Clauses; (2) That if the provisions of section 2 of chapter 171 of the Laws of 1934 do not have the effect of depriving the appellants of any constitutional guarantees, whether or not they must have any process, so that they may have their day in court, before a question involving their property rights and personal privileges can be determined in a judicial proceeding. It has been definitely decided by this court that the entering of the order for an election under the beer act is the entering of a judgment, notwithstanding the fact that such judgment is mandatory if the required facts authorizing it exist. The finding of the necessary facts to authorize the judgment and the entering of the judgment are both judicial actions. Mohundro v. Bd. of Supervisors, Tippah County, 174 Miss. 512 , 165 So. 124 . It has, therefore, been determined by the above decision that the board of supervisors of Union county, in considering the petitions filed and entering the order for the election, were acting as a judicial body and their acts were not ministerial under the law. It is an essential element of any judicial proceeding that the interested party or parties to any such judicial proceeding shall be notified of the pendency of the particular action that he or they have an opportunity to come in and to be heard upon questions which concern himself or themselves. It is axiomatic that every man must have his day in court, and any judicial proceeding which results in a final judgment must be predicated upon an opportunity to all parties interested to be heard on questions involving their rights of property, of liberty, and of freedom of action. Standley v. W.J. Wheelis Co., 46 Miss. 666 ; Boutwell v. Grayson, 118 Miss. 80 , 79 So. 61; Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144 , 132 So. 81 , 76 A.L.R. 238. Nowhere in the statute in question is any procedure set up whereby any interested party may have notice, either actual or constructive, to come into court and to be heard upon the validity of the petition provided for the act, and as to the validity of which the board of supervisors are required under the law to take judicial action, and to enter a judgment in accordance with its judicial findings. We submit that such a procedure is a most flagrant disregard of the rights provided by the constitutions of the United States and the state of Mississippi, guaranteeing to its citizens the right to be protected in their property and liberties by due process of law. We submit that any law which contemplates the entering of a judgment under such circumstances, as does section 2 of chapter 171 of the Laws of 1934, which makes no provision for notice or service of process either before or after judgment, is unconstitutional and void. If it is not unconstitutional, and if there be some statute which provides for the requisite notice, still the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to quash the writ of certiorari, for the record shows that no notice was given to the appellants herein either before or after the entering of the judgment in which they were interested. Lamar F. Easterling, of Jackson, amicus curiae. It is my contention that chapter 171 of the Laws of 1934 is unconstitutional in so far as the same attempts to provide that by a majority vote of the qualified electors of a county such county shall come out from under the provisions of said chapter, and that the sale of light wines and beer shall not be permitted in that county. Section 33 of the Constitution of 1890 vests the lawmaking power of the state in the Legislature, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Of course, it is admitted that the Legislature can pass a law, the effect of some portions of which may depend upon a contingency such as the vote of the people. Alcorn v. Hammer, 38 Miss. 653 ; Schulherr v. Bordeaux, 64 Miss. 59 , 8 So. 201. The Legislature may also make the operation of a statute dependent upon future contingencies. Armond v. White, 85 Miss. 276 , 37 So. 834. But it is equally clear that the Legislature cannot delegate to the whole people, or any portion of the people, or to any other department of government, its power to make laws, or to repeal laws. Alcorn v. Hammer, 38 Miss. 562 . In determining whether or not any act of the Legislature violates section 33 of the Constitution, the court must look to the entire act. It must be determined by the effect of such an election. If the effect of such an election is designed to prevent the sale of said beverages in any county, then it would seem that the Legislature had abdicated its power to make or repeal laws for such county, and had delegated this power to the majority vote of the county. The effect of the vote here does not seem to be whether or not chapter 171 shall be suspended, or does not affect the time when the same shall go into effect. Stripped of all verbiage, it seems that the Legislature, to use a slang phrase, instead of legislating for any county on this subject, attempted to "pass the buck" to the voters of the county, not as to whether or not any law of the Legislature should be suspended or might go into effect upon the happening of a contingency only, but that the voters, by a majority of vote, could prohibit that which was legal under the said act throughout the state, and come out from under the terms of said chapter 171, and resurrect and repeal other laws. 17 Am. Eng. Enc. Law, 224, 225; Hallie v. State, 14 Tex. App. 505[ 14 Tex.Crim. 505 ]; State v. Geebrich, 5 Iowa 49 ; Turner v. Saxton, 20 P. 685; Thornton v. Territory, 3 Wn. Ter., 452. Under the statute here, there is provision made for only one contingency, in case the people vote for sale of the beverage. If it was the legislative idea that if the vote was against said beverages, to resurrect these laws, chapter 39 of the Code of 1930, the act is unconstitutional in delegating this power to the voters. The Legislature cannot leave it to the people to say that any law repealed shall be brought to life, or to determine that certain acts shall be prohibited or not permitted. It would therefore seem obvious that the Legislature attempted to delegate to the voters of any county the power to call into life the general laws providing against the sale of intoxicating liquors, the power to repeal other laws and parts of laws, the power to determine, the discretion to decide, the revival and repeal of other laws. It certainly seems plain that if the Legislature leaves it to a majority vote of the people of a county to say whether certain laws repealed should be revived or laws permitting the sale of light wines and beer, license for a certain price and for a certain time, should be repealed, that this is delegating legislative power and discretion to the voters of a county, contrary to the constitution. The Legislature could not vest in the people the power to repeal this law or any law, or to revive any law that had been repealed. I.C.C. v. Railroad Co., 218 U.S. 88 , 44 L.Ed. 949; 12 C.J. 839, 840; State v. Watkins, 147 So. 8 ; Porter Coal Co. v. Davis, 165 So. 93 , 231 A.L.R. 359; 17 Am. Eng. Enc. Law, 224, 225; 76 A.L.R. 1044-1055; 6 R.C.L. 166, 164; 12 A.L.R. 1435; 44 A.L.R. 1004; 58 L.R.A. 227; 56 L.R.A. 733. It would seem that if mistaken in the foregoing contention, and if the court should hold that the law authorizing submission of the question to the voters is constitutional, then we submit that sections 310 and 311 of the Code of 1930 are the ones applicable and controlling, and that it was not only the duty of the board to prescribe and give the notice for thirty days, but also to prepare the ballot and if the proposition was against sale, then it would become the duty of the board under said sections to pass an order putting the proposition in effect in the said county, which order of the board, it would seem, should be published so as to advise the people thereof. Rush H. Knox, of Jackson, for appellants. The circuit court erred in sustaining the motion to quash the writ of certiorari. There can be no question but that such procedure is to deprive the appellants of their property without due process of law and, therefore, violates section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi. The circuit court was without jurisdiction to uphold an election based merely upon petitions of the qualified electors for an election, and an order of the board of supervisors ordering an election to be held. So far as this record is concerned, we do not know whether or not an election was held. If any was held, we do not know what the return of the election was, except by imagination and conjecture. Without the final order of the board of supervisors judicially declaring that the election was actually held and carried in favor of excluding the transportation, storage, sale, distribution, receipt and/or manufacture of wine or beer, of alcholic content of not more than four per cent by weight, and fixing a date for the order to become operative and effective, it certainly cannot be said that an election was held. In other words, the fact that a bill is presented in the Legislature is no proof that it passed and finally became a law. There is not a word in the record to indicate that the election commissioners ever ordered the election, and there is nothing in the record to show that they ever gave any notice of the election to be held, and there is no return or report by the election commissioners to the board of supervisors showing that any election was ever held. So, since it seems that this case has been tried upon suppositions and wild conjectures, I hope therefore that this honorable court will likewise indulge in similar suppositions and conjectures, and hold that so far as the record in the case goes, no election was held. L.K. Carlton, of New Albany, for appellee. The court should have dismissed the petition and quashed the writ of certiorari because there was no bond given as required by the statute. Section 72, Code of 1930, provides for appeal by certiorari from the justice of the peace court, and requires "giving bond" in all cases. Section 73 of the said code provides for certiorari to all other inferior tribunals, as follows: "Like proceedings as provided in the last section may be had to review the judgments of all tribunals inferior to the Circuit Court," etc. The record discloses that the writ of supersedeas was issued without authority, no legal showing having been made as to the grounds therefor by any proper form or pleading and that the order directing the issuance thereof recites facts which are not shown in any pleading as a basis for said writ. It is admitted by the appellants in the record that all of the proceedings of the board of supervisors in this matter as shown upon the record were regular and were valid, provided the statute under which same were performed was constitutional, which obviates any examination of the same by the court, or any defense of the same by the appellees. Chapter 171, Laws of 1934, is a local option statute. Local option statutes have been held to be valid in Mississippi. Lemon v. Peyton, 64 Miss. 161 , 8 So. 235; Schulherr v. Bordeaux, 64 Miss. 59 , 8 So. 201; 33 C.J., page 511, sec. 40 (2), and page 619, III Local Option; State v. Vandenburg, 28 So. 835; Norton v. State, 65 Miss. 297 , 3 So. 665; Wheeler v. State, 64 Miss. 462 , 1 So. 632. Chapter 171, Laws of 1934, under which appellants operate and seek to continue in business, confers upon them a mere license to engage in that business, subject to revocation at the will of the majority of the electors of said county. They began business charged with notice, under the very terms of the act, that their right to continue in business might be revoked. It violates no constitutional principles that such a provision was incorporated in this law. 12 C.J. 997, sec. 610c; Sullivan v. LaFayette County, 58 Miss. 790 ; Coulson v. Harris, 43 Miss. 728 ; Reed v. Beall, 42 Miss. 472 . Chapter 171, Laws of 1934, is valid as an exercise of the police power of the state, and does not contravene any of the provisions of the State Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. R.C.L., sections 193, 194; 12 C.J. 1228, sec. 1006. The court will take judicial notice that chapter 171, Laws of 1934, was the first and initial act passed with reference to legalizing light wines and beer; that chapter 127 of said laws, though dated the same day as chapter 171, must of necessity have been passed later than chapter 171; also that chapters 128 and 173, dated subsequently, were passed subsequently. All of these acts should be construed together and in the light of said chapter 171, and should be construed to be subject to its provisions permitting local option by the people. The provisions of chapter 173, as well as those of 171, indicate that the Legislature considered that it had amended rather than repealed chapter 38 of the Code of 1930. And it is also clear that chapter 171, by providing for an election and the orders of the board of supervisors thereon provides for the suspension of the traffic in light wines and beer only in case of an election resulting unfavorably to said traffic. Under this law the status is not fixed by the election, but there may be other elections within fixed times which might alter the situation. By chapter 171 aforesaid, the Legislature delegates to county boards of supervisors, under the police power, authority to suppress the traffic in light wines and beer upon the happening of an adverse election. The Legislature had the authority to do this. The power is delegated to boards of supervisors, not to the people. The board makes the final order, giving effect to the election, restraining such traffic. The board is vested with power subject to the contingency of a favorable popular vote. The effect of the vote and the order of the board of supervisors is to suspend, for it is provided that other elections may be held biennially. 12 C.J., page 862, sec. 358, page 864, sec. 365, and pages 866-867, sec. 366; Board of Supervisors, Rankin Co. v. Davis, 59 So. 811. Chapter 171 is complete in itself. It does not need any vote of the people in any county or even in the state to give it validity. It rests, however, upon a prescribed contingency as to whether it shall be suspended in such counties as may choose to vote upon it. That contingency is that a majority of the voters of a county may or may not reject it, or suspend it. There is nothing objectionable about that. It has been held to be constitutional in this state. 12 C.J., pages 769-770, sec. 190. Argued orally by Leslie Darden, for appellant, and by L.K. Carlton, for appellee.

Anderson.

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