Bertman Ames & Gloria Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1979). · Go Syfert
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Bertman Ames & Gloria Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1983 · 2 courts · …the presentation of false evidence or the withholding of evidence at p. 185 ✓
56 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 21 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#12 26 U.S.C. § 7801 cited 1× in this case · 111 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mack v. Hamdani (2×)
E.D. Mo. · 2025 · confidence medium
The Eighth Circuit has summarized Section 2680(h) to narrowly apply to any intentional tort claim for “false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution [or] abuse of process … committed by investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Iverson v. United States, 973 F.3d 843, 846 (2020)( “[a] plaintiff may sue the United States for injuries resulting from assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution, if committed by an investigative or…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Greene Johnson v. United States (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · confidence medium
In Ames v. United States, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of abuse of process, false arrest, and false imprisonment claims because “plaintiff’s arrest, confinement and indictment occurred prior to March 16, 1974.” Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir. 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kingdom Holdings, LLC v. Foss
D.S.D. · 2024 · confidence medium
Cf Arnott v. Mataya, 995 F.2d 121 , 124 n.4 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the defendants’ argument that the grand jury’s indictment of plaintiff insulates them from § 1983 liability for false arrest because it would eliminate all § 1983 lawsuits for false arrest, contrary to congressional intent); Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir. 1979) (“[A]bsent any specific allegation, such as the presentation of false evidence for the withholding of evidence, the grand jury indictment breaks any chain of causation linking the employees’ activities to the institution of criminal proc…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ching v. Dung
Haw. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
For example, in Ames v. United States , 600 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1979), which is cited and quoted in Bullen , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of, inter alia, claims for malicious prosecution, ruling that in the absence of "any specific allegation, such as the presentation of false evidence or the withholding of evidence, the grand jury indictment [broke] any chain of causation linking the [defendant] employees' activities to the institution of criminal proceedings, thus insulating the [defendants] from tort liability." Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Young v. Klass
D. Minnesota · 2011 · confidence medium
Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.1979) ("The tort of malicious prosecution is triggered by institution of criminal proceedings, in this case the return of a grand jury indictment.... [AJbsent any specific allegation, such as the presentation of false evidence or the withholding of evidence, the grand jury indictment breaks any chain of causation linking the employees’ activities to the institution of criminal proceedings, thus insulating the F.B.I. and Justice Department employees from tort liability.”); Pratt v. Kilborn Motors, Inc., 48 Ill.App.3d 932 , 6 Ill.Dec. 770 , 3…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Forsch v. City of Kent
Wash. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 942 (1990); Rodriguez v. Richey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978); Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137 (1983); Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir. 1988); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972); Jones v City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1988); Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir. 1979); Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) (Smiddy I); Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 267 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sutkiewicz Ex Rel. Sutkiewicz v. Carlson
E.D. Mich. · 1994 · confidence medium
The Dick court explained: The Court also finds that Judge Teigum’s orders, given the circumstances, under which they were procured, did not break the causal chain. * * * ' * * * The Eighth Circuit has ruled in Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.1979), that situations involving the presentation of false evidence or the withholding of evidence are exceptions to the general rule that a grand jury indictment, or as in this case, a court order, breaks the chain of causation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) George Jones, Cross-Appellant v. City of Chicago, Cross-Appellees
7th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1457 (8th Cir.1987); Hand v. Gary, supra; Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266-67 (9th Cir.1981); Dellums v. Powell, supra, 566 F.2d at 192-94 ; Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.1979) (dictum); cf. McLaughlin v. Alban, 775 F.2d 389 (D.C.Cir.1985) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bullen v. Derego
Haw. · 1986 · confidence medium
In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs claims against the employees of the department, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that in the absence of “any specific allegation, such as the presentation of false evidence or the withholding of evidence, the grand jury indictment [broke] any chain of causation linking the employees’ activities to the criminal proceedings, thus insulating the F.B.I. and Justice Department employees from tort liability.” Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Scott County Master Docket (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D. Minnesota · 1985 · confidence medium
In Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.1979), the court did state that a grand jury indictment breaks the chain of causation between in *1546 vestigatory activities and resulting harm to a plaintiff, thus insulating the investigators from liability.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Soto v. City of Sacramento
E.D. Cal. · 1983 · confidence medium
In accord, Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.1979); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 192 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 , 98 S.Ct. 3146 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1161 (1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 886 , 99 S.Ct. 234 , 58 L.Ed.2d 201 (1978); Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir.1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 , 98 S.Ct. 894 , 54 L.Ed.2d 799 (1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dick v. Watonwan County (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Minnesota · 1983 · confidence medium
The Eighth Circuit has ruled in Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir. 1979), that situations involving “the presentation of false evidence or the withholding of evidence” are exceptions to the general rule that a grand jury indictment, or as in this case, a court order, breaks the chain of causation.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Smiddy v. Varney (3×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
I. and Justice Department employees from tort liability." 600 F.2d at 185
cited Cited "see" Hackenmueller v. Fadden
D. Minnesota · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See, e,g„ Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.1979); Arnold v. Hoelscher, No. 1:10-CV-187, 2011 WL 1226901 , at *3 (E.D.Mo.
cited Cited "see" Melvin Folkerts v. City of Waverly
8th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.1979); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir.2012). 7 .
discussed Cited "see" Clint Small v. James McCrystal (2×)
8th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited "see" Randall Edward Rex v. John P. Teeples, Donald E. Johnson, Jr., and Edward Rupert, Defendants (2×)
10th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir.1979); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 192 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 , 98 S.Ct. 3146 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1161 (1978); Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 , 98 S.Ct. 894 , 54 L.Ed.2d 799 (1978); Hoffman v. Holden, 268 F.2d 280, 296-97 (9th Cir.1959); Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F.Supp. 662, 688 (D.C.Cal.1983).
cited Cited "see" Druckenmiller v. United States
E.D. Pa. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir. 1979). 3 .
cited Cited "see" Diminnie v. United States
E.D. Mich. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1979).
discussed Cited "see" Smiddy v. Varney (2×)
9th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185 (8th Cir. 1979); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 192 (D.C.Cir.1977); Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc). 2 Thus, we hold that where police officers do not act maliciously or with reckless disregard for the rights of an arrested person, they are not liable for damages suffered by the arrested person after a district attorney files charges unless the presumption of independent judgment by the district attorney is rebutted.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hector v. Watt
3rd Cir. · 2000 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Townes v. City of New York, 176 F .3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that the chain of causation between a police officer's unlawful arr est and a subsequent conviction and incarceration is br oken by the intervening exercise of independent judgment"), Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir . 1989) (finding that intervening decisions of prosecutor, grand jury, judge, and jury supervene), Hand v. Gary, 838 F .2d 1420, 1427-28 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that a decision of a magistrate or grand jury supervenes), Smiddy v. Var ney, 665 F.2d 261 , 266-68 (…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Eugene Hector v. Gordon J. Watt Alberto Diaz Richard Davy Scott Hunter, in Their Individual and Official Capacities (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2000 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that the chain of causation between a police officer's unlawful arrest and a subsequent conviction and incarceration is broken by the intervening exercise of independent judgment"), Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that intervening decisions of prosecutor, grand jury, judge, and jury supervene), Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427-28 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that a decision of a magistrate or grand jury supervenes), Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266-68 (9th Cir…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." DeLong v. United States
D. Alaska · 1984 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183 , 185 n. 3 (8th Cir.1979) ( 28 U.S.C. § 547 does not empower U.S. Attorneys to search, seize, or arrest); Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.Supp. 182, 185-86 (D.D.C.1983) (5 U.S.C.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bertman AMES and Gloria Ames, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
78-1867.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Jun 20, 1979.
600 F.2d 183
William E. Macklin (on brief), Ahl, Hal-berg & Nord, Lakeville, Minn., argued for appellants., John M. Lee, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Andrew W. Danielson, U. S. Atty., and Paul C. Engh, Legal Intern, Minneapolis, Minn., on brief, for appellee.
Lay, Heaney, Meredith.
Cited by 39 opinions  |  Published
LAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Bertman Ames appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging illegal acts and omissions of agents and employees of the Department of Justice, the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota and his assistant, in connection with Ames’ arrest and trial for conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. Jurisdiction exists under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. [1] The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6). We affirm, although on somewhat different grounds than those relied upon by the district court.

Plaintiff’s complaint against F.B.I. and Department of Justice employees for abuse of process, false arrest and false imprisonment are barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act. As originally enacted the[*185] Act excepted any claim against the United States for, inter alia, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (amended 1974). Effective March 16, 1974, the Act was amended to allow recovery for such actions committed by investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), as amended by Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub.L.No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50. [2] Since the only acts and omissions alleged in plaintiff’s complaint upon which liability of F.B.I. and Department of Justice employees conceivably could be based — plaintiff’s arrest, confinement and indictment — occurred prior to March 16, 1974, plaintiff’s complaint against those employees is barred. Gaudet v. United States, 517 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir. 1975). [3]

Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution also fails to state a cause of action against employees of the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation. [4] The tort of malicious prosecution is triggered by institution of criminal proceedings, in this case the return of a grand jury indictment. [5] Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 653(a), 654(2)(b), Comment (c) (1977). The actions alleged to have been done with malice and without probable cause in the malicious prosecution count are Ames’ arrest, confinement, and prosecution, and the placing of a lien against his property. The complaint does not allege specific activity by F.B.I. or Justice Department employees preceding the grand jury indictment and subsequent arrest that could be construed as an allegation that those employees initiated or procured the institution of the grand jury indictment. Furthermore, absent any specific allegation, such as the presentation of false evidence or the withholding of evidence, the grand jury indictment breaks any chain of causation linking the employees’ activities to the institution of criminal proceedings, thus insulating the F.B.I. and Justice Department employees from tort liability. See Rodriguez [*186] v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047, 98 S.Ct. 894, 54 L.Ed.2d 799 (1978); cf. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916, 98 S.Ct. 3146, 57 L.Ed.2d 1161 (1978). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653, Comment (d) (1977); W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 119 (4th ed. 1971).

The final count alleges in conclusory fashion that the acts complained of violated Ames’ constitutional rights. No allegations of additional activities which would constitute a violation of Ames’ constitutional rights are pleaded. Since the actions complained of cannot be the basis for holding the United States liable for common law torts, it follows that they cannot be the basis for its liability under a constitutional or “Bivens” tort theory. [6]

The judgment is affirmed.

1

. Jurisdiction is also asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, the jurisdictional counterpart of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By its very terms, however, section 1983 applies only to actions taken under “color of state law.” Since the only defendant here is the United States, the lower court’s holding that the action was time barred under rules applicable to section 1983 claims was erroneous.

2

. Section 2680(h) currently reads:

The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to—
Any claim arising out of-assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
3

. The amendment further limited the liability of the United States to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers, which the amendment defined as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Since United States Attorneys are not so empowered, 28 U.S.C. § 547, sovereign immunity still bars suit against the United States. See Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, suit against the United States Attorney and his assistant is barred by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), at least to the extent the United States may adopt as a defense the personal immunities of its agents. Cf. Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390, 395-96 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003, 99 S.Ct. 613, 58 L.Ed.2d 678 (1978); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039, 97 S.Ct. 735, 50 L.Ed.2d 750 (1977).

4

. The complaint against the Internal Revenue Service is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Although an administrative complaint was filed with the Department of Justice within the two year period, no claim was filed with the Department of the Treasury, of which the Internal Revenue Service is a part. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7801, 7802. Unless the appropriate agency is given an opportunity to consider and finally deny the claim, suit is barred. Provancial v. United States, 454 F.2d 72, 74 (8th Cir. 1972).

5

Although the grand jury indictment which preceded Ames’ arrest is not mentioned in the complaint, it is a matter of court record in the third division of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, which was the forum for Ames’ gambling prosecution as well as the present civil suit.

6

. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).