United States v. Adelia Guerra De Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1979). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Adelia Guerra De Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“litigants are generally bound 21 by the conduct of their attorneys, absent egregious circumstances.”
14 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hawes v. Angol (akd, 2025-06-25)
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hawes v. Angol
D. Alaska · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
litigants are generally bound 21 by the conduct of their attorneys, absent egregious circumstances.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ross v. Stewart
9th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Id. at 857-58 (citing United States v. Guerra de Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir.1979) (“Litigants are generally bound by the conduct of their attorneys, absent egregious circumstances.”)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Leblanc and Marie Margaret Leblanc v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
1st Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
But “P]itigants are generally bound by the conduct of their attorneys, absent egregious circumstances.” United States v. Guerra de Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir.1979) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gilberto Rodriguez-Gonzalez, Jose Luz Aquiando-Cortez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
9th Cir. · 1981 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. Guerra de Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir. 1979) (in-court admission by counsel combined with previous written admission bound alien in deportation proceeding).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sims v. State
Iowa · 1980 · confidence medium
J., concurring); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 , 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1697 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126, 135 (1976); United States v. Guerra de Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir.1979); State v. LaMar, 224 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Iowa 1974); ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function and The Defense Function § 5.2, at 237-38 (1971).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Qasim
D. Ariz. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. 26 INS, 640 F.2d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Even criminal defendants are bound by the admissions of fact made by their counsel . . . in their presence and with their authority.”). 27 Qasim has not argued any “egregious circumstances” exist that would keep him from being bound by his counsel’s statements—Qasim’s current counsel simply called the previous 28 statements “inartful.” See United States v. Guerra de Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 1 Because Qasim’s kafala arrangement did not “terminate the legal relationship�…
cited Cited "see" Dearing v. McDaniel
9th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Guerra de Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir.1979); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Tanh Huu Lam
9th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Guerra de Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir.1979) (“Litigants are generally bound by the conduct of their attorneys, absent egregious circumstances.”); cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (“The argument that the client should not be held responsible for his lawyer’s misconduct strikes at the heart of the attorney-client relationship.
cited Cited "see" Elvira Magallanes-Damian v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Monica Gallegos-Ares v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Marisol Montero v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Candalaria Garcia-Quesada v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Jose Gallegos-Arrez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Engracia Saucedo-De Gallegos v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Lucia Solis De Garcia v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
9th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Guerra de Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir.1979); LeBlanc, 715 F.2d at 694 .
cited Cited "see" Magallanes-damian v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
9th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Guerra de Aguilera, 600 F.2d 752, 753 (9th Cir.1979); LeBlanc, 715 F.2d at 694 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Adelia GUERRA De AGUILERA, Defendant-Appellant
78-3441.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jun 13, 1979.
600 F.2d 752
Rudolf A. Diaz, Deputy Public Defender, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant., Nancy W. Stock, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Hufstedler, Wallace, Fitzgerald.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Guerra appeals her conviction as a formerly deported alien found in the United States without permission in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. She contends that her prior deportation was in violation of her Fifth Amendment due process rights, because the hearing officer never personally asked her if she admitted that she was deportable. We affirm.

Guerra was found to be deportable in December 1966. At her hearing, she was represented by her attorney. An official interpreter was present. Her attorney stipulated to her deportability, but requested that she receive a suspension of deportation due to hardship. He presented to the hearing officer an “Application for Suspension of Deportation” which Guerra had executed. In that document, Guerra admitted her alienage. However, the hearing officer never personally asked her whether or not she was in fact an alien.

Guerra’s application for suspension was denied and a warrant of deportation was issued. However, she remained in the United States until October 1977 when she was finally deported to Mexico. Two months later she was apprehended in the United States and the charge was made which resulted in these proceedings.

During her trial, Guerra testified that she could not remember making any admissions concerning her deportability at the 1966 hearing, nor could she remember filing the document which requested a suspension of her deportation. She also testified that she cannot read English.

A defendant prosecuted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 may collaterally challenge the propriety of a prior deportation proceeding, United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1978), and the government must prove that the defendant was previously deported according to law. United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1975). At issue here is whether the government properly proved alienage and deportability in the deportation proceedings.

Litigants are generally bound by the conduct of their attorneys, absent egregious circumstances. Kung v. FOM Investment Corporation, 563 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1977). In addition, the hearing officer had accepted a document executed by Guerra admitting her alienage. Without citation of direct authority, Guerra asserts that the proceeding was constitutionally infirm. We disagree and hold that all of the process due Guerra under the Fifth Amendment was given to her.

AFFIRMED.