At page 739 Applying the door closing statute to diversity jurisdiction15 citing casesnoting that under the Door Closing Statute courts are denied subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a suit involving a "foreign cause of action brought by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign corporation
- Jamila Grice v. Indep. Bank, 147 F.4th 440 (4th Cir. 2025).unpublished “Door Closing Statute”
- Jamila Grice v. Indep. Bank, 147 F.4th 440 (4th Cir. 2025).published “Door Closing Statute”
- Grice v. Indep. Bank, No. 7:20-cv-01948, 2024 WL 1287203 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2024).“closes the doors of South Carolina’s courts for suits . . . involving a foreign cause of action brought by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign corporation”
- Commissioners of Pub. Works of the City of Charleston v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 2:21-cv-00042 (D.S.C. Dec. 13, 2021).In Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit held that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply § 15-5-150 unless countervailing federal considerations are present.
- Hart v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No. 2:21-cv-00044 (D.S.C. June 11, 2021). In Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit held that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply § 15-5-150 unless countervailing federal considerations are present.
- Hencely v. Fluor Corp., No. 6:19-cv-00489 (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2020). N. Am., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 750, 752 (D.S.C. 2014)] (quoting [Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739 (4th Cir. 1980)]).
- Hencely v. Fluor Corp., No. 6:19-cv-00489 (D.S.C. July 29, 2020).Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739 (4th Cir. 1980).
- Boisvert v. Techtronic Indus. North Am., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 750 (D.S.C. 2014).published “must apply § 15-5-150 ‘unless there are affirmative countervailing federal considerations”
- Ward v. Dixie Nat'l Life, No. 06-2022 (4th Cir. Nov. 29, 2007).unpublished“a South Carolina federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply § 15-5-150 ‘unless there are affirmative countervailing federal considerations”
- Ward v. Dixie Nat'l Life Ins., 257 F. App'x 620 (4th Cir. 2007).unpublished“a South Carolina federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply § 15-5-150 ‘unless there are affirmative countervailing federal considerations”
Show 5 more citing cases
- Tuttle Dozer Works, Inc. v. Gyro-Trac (USA), Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 544 (D.S.C. 2006).publishedWesleyan Coll., 6 F.3d at 186 n. 3; Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739 (4th Cir.1980); Bumgarder v. Keene Corp., 593 F.2d 572, 573 (4th Cir.1979) (per curiam); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 63-64 (4th Ci…
- Fung Lin Wah Enter. Ltd. v. East Bay Imp. Co., 465 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D.S.C. 2006).published“closes the doors of South Carolina’s courts for suits ... involving a foreign cause of action brought by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign corporation”
- Tyrus G. Smith Bonnie S. Smith v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 991 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1993).unpublished In Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir.1980), we held that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply § 15-5-150 unless countervailing federal considerations are present.
- Grimsley v. United Engineers & Constructors, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 147 (D.S.C. 1993).publishedProctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir.1980).
- Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 550 S.E.2d 589 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).published (noting that under the Door Closing Statute courts are denied subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a suit involving a "foreign cause of action brought by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign corporation)
At page 740 Analyzing countervailing federal considerations for diversity jurisdiction11 citing cases“a south carolina federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply 15-5-150 'unless there are affirmative countervailing federal considerations.”
- Hart v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No. 2:21-cv-00044 (D.S.C. June 11, 2021). In Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit held that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply § 15-5-150 unless countervailing federal considerations are present.
- Hencely v. Fluor Corp., No. 6:19-cv-00489 (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2020). N. Am., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 750, 752 (D.S.C. 2014)] (quoting [Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739 (4th Cir. 1980)]).
- Hencely v. Fluor Corp., No. 6:19-cv-00489 (D.S.C. July 29, 2020).Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739 (4th Cir. 1980).
- Boisvert v. Techtronic Indus. North Am., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 750 (D.S.C. 2014).published It is well established that a South Carolina federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction “must apply § 15-5-150 ‘unless there are affirmative countervailing federal considerations.’ ” Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738,…
- California Buffalo v. Glennon-Bittan Grp., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 255 (D.S.C. 1996).published (noting that the crucial question when applying 15-5-150 is whether South Carolina might be the only state in which a party could join multiple defendants)
- Collins v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 901 F. Supp. 1038 (D.S.C. 1995).published(Georgia plaintiff suing Pennsylvania and New York defendants for Georgia injuries)
- Tomczak v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, No. 5:21-cv-01564 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2022).(holding that the Door-Closing Statute barred the lawsuit)
- Tomczak v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, No. 5:21-cv-01564 (D.S.C. Mar. 24, 2022).(holding that the Door Closing Statute barred the lawsuit)
- Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2001).published(finding that South Carolina “door-closing” statute deprived federal court of jurisdiction)
- Collins v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 92 F.3d 1177 (4th Cir. 1996).unpublished
Show 1 more citing case
- Collins v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 95-2805 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1996).unpublished
Other citing cases
- Bussie v. United States, No. 3:24-cv-00671 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2024).
- Bussie v. Weaver, No. 3:24-cv-00777 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2024).
- Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981).published
- Myelle v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 57 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1995).published
- Witt v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 295 (D.S.C. 1994).published
- Recreonics Corp. v. Aqua Pools, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 754 (D.S.C. 1986).published
v.
C. F. ROLLINS, Appellee
By permission of this court, Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. and SCM Corporation prosecute this interlocutory § 1292(b) appeal of the denial of their motions to dismiss. Among the grounds asserted for reversal, they argue that South Carolina’s “door-closing” statute, S.C.Code § 15-5-150, deprived the district court of jurisdiction. We agree.
In 1972, Rollins was injured in an accident involving a machine manufactured by Proctor & Schwartz. Rollins resides in, was injured in, and recovered workmen’s compensation in Georgia. The allegedly defective machine was manufactured in Pennsylvania. Proctor & Schwartz, a Pennsylvania corporation, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of SCM, a New York corporation.
Five years after the accident, Rollins sued the two foreign corporations in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. South Carolina’s relatively long six-year statute of limitations, rather than any nexus with the facts giving rise to this cause of action, dictated Rollins’ choice of forum. By 1977 the Georgia limitations period had long since run.
Section 15-5-150 opens the South Carolina state courts to two types of suits against foreign corporations: (1) by any resident for any cause of action; and (2) by a nonresident for any cause of action that arose within South Carolina. By implication, and by interpretation of the South Carolina Supreme Court, [1] the statute closes the doors of South Carolina’s courts for suits, as the present one, involving a foreign cause of action brought by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign corporation.
In Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), this court held that a South Carolina federal court exercis[*740] ing diversity jurisdiction must apply § 15-5-150 “unless there are affirmative countervailing federal considerations.” Id. at 64. In refusing to apply the “door-closing” statute in Szantay, this court noted several countervailing federal considerations: (1) the purpose in the grant of diversity jurisdiction of avoiding discrimination against nonresidents; (2) the policy of encouraging a state to enforce the laws of its sister states; and (3) the fact that South Carolina was the only state in the country in which the two defendants could be joined.
Of the three countervailing federal considerations noted in Szantay, the third was the most crucial. This court recognized as much in Bumgarder v. Keene Corporation, 593 F.2d 572 (4th Cir. 1979). In that case the plaintiff was a resident of North Carolina, where the injury occurred. The defendants were foreign corporations. Refusing to apply the Szantay analysis “[bjecause there was an alternate forum to the South Carolina court where Bumgarder could gain full relief,” this court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint in light of the “door-closing” statute.
Rollins and the district court would distinguish Bumgarder, asserting that the North Carolina forum in that case was still available to the plaintiff when the suit was filed in South Carolina. The per curiam opinion neither supports nor rebuts that assertion. [2] In any event, the distinction is not persuasive. A plaintiff’s failure to timely file suit in the more logical, convenient forum does not constitute a countervailing consideration favoring the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
Because we hold that the “door-closing” statute deprived the district court of jurisdiction, we need not reach the alternative grounds for dismissal. [3] We reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
. Nix v. Mercury Motors Exp. Inc., 270 S.C. 477, 242 S.E.2d 683 (1979).
. Reference to the record in Bumgarder indicates that the action was not commenced in South Carolina until October 1976, more than three years after accrual of the cause of action early in 1973. North Carolina General Statutes § 1-52(5).
. Because the district court has no subject matter jurisdiction, the case may not be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).