Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. B. E. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981). · Go Syfert
Search
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. B. E. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1986 · …a district court does not lose jurisdiction over a claim for non-monetary relief simply because it may later be the basis for a money judgment. at p. 1379 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1985 · …does not preclude review of agency action when the relief sought is other than money damages. at p. 1379 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1988 · …the court of claims' jurisdiction cannot be avoided by a complaint that appears to seek only equitable relief when 'the real effort of the complaining party is to obtain money from the federal government. at p. 1379 ≈ altered
94 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 25 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In Re Chateaugay Corp. v. Shalala (nysd, 1993-12-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Chateaugay Corp. v. Shalala
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · confidence medium
Because nothing in the due process clause requires payment of money damages for its violation, the Claims Court does not have jurisdiction over due process claims.); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981) (“The Tucker Act applies only to claims for money damages.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Charter Federal Savings Bank v. Office Of Thrift Supervision
4th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Charter Federal Savings Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision
4th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ensign Financial Corp. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
S.D.N.Y. · 1992 · confidence medium
Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Poole v. Rourke
E.D. Cal. · 1991 · confidence medium
See Beller v. Middendorf 632 F.2d 788, 799 (9th Cir.1980) (“[A] district court does not lose jurisdiction over a claim for non-monetary relief simply because it may later be the basis for a money judgment.”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 , 102 S.Ct. 304 , 70 L.Ed.2d 150 (1981); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1979) (same); Vietnam Veterans v. Secretary of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 534 (D.C.Cir.1988) (“a claim is not for money merely because its success may lead to pecuniary costs for the government or benefits for the plaintiff”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Charter Federal Savings Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision
W.D. Va. · 1991 · confidence medium
Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) DCP Farms v. Yeutter
N.D. Miss. · 1991 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Department of the Navy
D. Kan. · 1990 · confidence medium
Leech v. Dole, 749 F.2d 331, 336 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 , 105 S.Ct. 3480 , 87 L.Ed.2d 615 (1985); Minnesota v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 852, 858 (8th Cir.1983); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Justice v. Lyng
D. Ariz. · 1989 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States ex rel. Ferguson Door Co. v. Safeco Insurance
S.D. Cal. · 1989 · confidence medium
“The Court of Claims’ jurisdiction cannot be avoided by a complaint that appears to seek only equitable relief when ‘the real effort of the complaining party is to obtain money [in excess of $10,000] from the federal government.’ ” Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Darrell Bedoni v. Navajo-Hopi Indian Relocation Commission (2×)
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
This Court has repeatedly stated, however, that the Tucker Act "does not preclude review of agency action where the relief sought is other than monetary damages." Northside Lumber, 753 F.2d at 1485, Laguana Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Rowe, 633 F.2d at 802 . 16 The district court is prohibited from evading the preclusive effect of the Tucker Act or infringing upon the exclusive province of the Court of Claims by issuing injunctions or declaring judgments which are designed to serve as res judicata in the Court of Claims to affect a monetary recovery in a subseq…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bedoni v. Navajo-Hopi Indian Relocation Commission (2×)
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
This Court has repeatedly stated, however, that the Tucker Act “does not preclude review of agency action where the relief sought is other than monetary damages.” Northside Lumber, 753 F.2d at 1485, Laguana Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Rowe, 633 F.2d at 802 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Justice v. Lyng
D. Ariz. · 1988 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); State of Tennessee ex rel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Oregon v. Bowen
D. Or. · 1988 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colorado Department Of Highways v. United States Department Of Transportation
10th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Dep't of Transp. v. Department of Transp., Federal Highway Admin., 561 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.1977) (Tucker Act jurisdiction not at issue); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981) (no Claims Court jurisdiction because money damages not sought by plaintiff); Louisiana Dep't of Highways v. United States, 604 F.2d 1339 (Ct.Cl.1979) (additional contractual obligation accepted by Louisiana Department of Highways was not part of contract provisions and specifications approved by FHWA and thus FHWA was not contractually obligated to provide settlement funds). 13 The district cou…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colorado Department of Highways v. United States Department of Transportation
10th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Dep’t of Transp. v. Department of Transp., Federal Highway Admin., 561 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.1977) (Tucker Act jurisdiction not at issue); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981) (no Claims Court jurisdiction because money damages not sought by plaintiff); Louisiana Dep’t of Highways v. United States, 604 F.2d 1339 (Ct.Cl.1979) (additional contractual obligation accepted by Louisiana Department of Highways was not part of contract provisions and specifications approved by FHWA and thus FHWA was not contractually obligated to provide settlement funds).
cited Cited as authority (rule) District of Columbia Retirement Board v. United States
D.D.C. · 1987 · confidence medium
See Hahn, 757 F.2d at 589 ; Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by Its Department of Public Welfare v. Departmental Grant Appeals Board of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by Its Department of Public Welfare v. Departmental Grant Appeals Board of the United States Department of Health and Human Services
1st Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 , 71 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 2620 , 2629 n. 15, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); Sarasota, Fla. v. E.P.A., 799 F.2d 674 (11th Cir.1986); Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 589-90 (3d Cir.1985); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981). 19 The Commonwealth's jurisdictional arguments, however, do not match its actual claim for relief.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Departmental Grant Appeals Board of United States Department of Health & Human Services
1st Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 , 71 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 2620 , 2629 n. 15, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); Sarasota, Fla. v. E.P.A., 799 F.2d 674 (11th Cir.1986); Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 589-90 (3d Cir.1985); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) National Bank of Fairhaven v. United States
D. Mass. · 1987 · confidence medium
E.g., Hahn, 757 F.2d at 589 ; Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sarasota, Florida v. Environmental Protection Agency (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 , 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2968 , 77 L.Ed.2d 580, 591 (1983) ("claim must be one for money damages"); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981) ("Tucker Act applies only to claims for money damages"); Eastport S.S.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sarasota v. Environmental Protection Agency (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 , 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2968 , 77 L.Ed.2d 580, 591 (1983) (“claim must be one for money damages”); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981) (“Tucker Act applies only to claims for money damages”); Eastport S.S.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Washington
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 3536 , 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1978 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. State Of Washington
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3536 , 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1978 (9th Cir.1981). 14 The Declaratory Judgment Act does not grant litigants an absolute right to a legal determination.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hahn, Michael S. And Bradley, B. Shay and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. United States
3rd Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Leech v. Dole, 749 F.2d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 1984); Minnesota by Noot v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 852, 858 (8th Cir.1983); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 , 1126 n. 17 (2d Cir.1976). 7 These courts hold that district court jurisdiction over a suit for nonmonetary relief is not foreclosed by the fact that it may later be the basis for an award of damages against the United States.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) North Side Lumber Co., Summit Timber Co., Stevenson Co-Ply, Inc., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, and Bohemia, Inc., Medford Corporation, Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., Boise Cascade Corporation, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, Georgia-Pacific Corporation, Penn Timber, Inc., Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, Publishers Paper Co., and Willamette Industries, Inc., Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees v. John Block, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture R. Max Peterson, Chief of the United States Forest Service: Jeff M. Sirmon, Regional Forester for Region Vi of the United States Forest Service, and Lane County, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant. North Side Lumber Co., Summit Timber Co., Stevenson Co-Ply, Inc., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, and Bohemia, Inc., Medford Corporation, Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., Boise Cascade Corporation, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, Georgia-Pacific Corporation, Penn Timber, Inc., Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, Publishers Paper Co., and Willamette Industries, Inc., Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellants v. John Block, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture R. Max Peterson, Chief of the United States Forest Service: Jeff M. Sirmon, Regional Forester for Region Vi of the United States Forest Service, and Lane County, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 6121, 6133. 13 This court twice has said that the Tucker Act "does not preclude review of agency action when the relief sought is other than money damages." Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Rowe v. United States, 633 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir.1980) cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 , 101 S.Ct. 2047 , 68 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) North Side Lumber Co. v. Block (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
This court twice has said that the Tucker Act “does not preclude review of agency action when the relief sought is other than money damages.” Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Rowe v. United States, 633 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir.1980) cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 , 101 S.Ct. 2047 , 68 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.C. Products, Inc. v. United States
W.D. Mich. · 1984 · confidence medium
See also Rowe v. United States, 633 F.2d 799 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 , 101 S.Ct. 2047 , 68 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Sellers v. Brown, 633 F.2d 106 (8th Cir.1980); Alamo Navajo School Bd. Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 229 (10th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, Apachito v. Watt, 456 U.S. 963 , 102 S.Ct. 2041 , 72 L.Ed.2d 487 (1982); Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Pierce, 706 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of New Mexico v. Donald T. Regan, Etc. (2×)
10th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Bergland, 664 F.2d 818, 823 (10th Cir.1981); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Chelsea Community Hospital v. Michigan Blue Cross, 630 F.2d 1131 , 1136 (6th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tempo, Inc. v. City of Gladstone Housing Commission
W.D. Mich. · 1984 · confidence medium
See Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Pierce, 706 F.2d 471, 473 (4th Cir.1983); Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 968 (D.C.Cir.1982); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981). 3 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Public Power Council v. Johnson
D. Or. · 1984 · confidence medium
See Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 1431 , 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Temistocles Ramirez De Arellano v. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense (2×) also: Cited "see"
D.C. Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE Sec. 2751 (2d ed. 1983) 74 See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-74 , 91 S.Ct. 764, 766-768 , 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (when state criminal prosecution had begun prior to federal suit, injunctive and declaratory relief had same effect and must be judged by the same standards) 75 See sources cited supra note 73 76 See Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981) (district court does not lose jurisdiction simply because its declaratory judgment may later become the basis for a monetary judgment) 77 See Amalgamated Sugar Co. v.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) John D. McKeel Jr. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America
9th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thomas B. Sawyer v. County of Sonoma and Retirement Board of the County of Sonoma, Defendants
9th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.1981); see also, Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 539 F.Supp. 887, 901-902 (N.D.Cal.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 3 soc.sec.rep.ser. 108, Medicare&medicaid Gu 33,413 State of Minnesota, by Its Commissioner of Public Welfare, Arthur E. Noot v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary, and the United States Department of Health and Human Services, State of Minnesota, by Its Commissioner of Public Welfare, Arthur E. Noot v. Margaret M. Heckler, in Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (2×)
8th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Melvin v. Laird, 365 F.Supp. at 520 ; see also Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 799 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 3030 , 69 L.Ed.2d 405 (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Minnesota v. Heckler (2×)
8th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Melvin v. Laird, 365 F.Supp. at 520 ; see also Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 799 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 3030 , 69 L.Ed.2d 405 (1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
N. Mar. I. · 1983 · confidence medium
Laguna Honda Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1981). 88/ Finally, the § 706(a)(1) "agency discretion" exception to APA review is unavailable to defendants.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Spilman v. Crebo
D. Mont. · 1982 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Young v. Reynolds Metals Company
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Standard of Review 8 In reviewing a decision in a diversity case, we will accept the construction of state law by a federal judge sitting in the state unless "clearly wrong." See, e.g., Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1981); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Young v. Reynolds Metals Co.
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Standard of Review In reviewing a decision in a diversity case, we will accept the construction of state law by a federal judge sitting in the state unless “clearly wrong.” See, e.g., Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1981); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Henry Hope X-Ray Products, Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., an Arizona Corporation and Karl Ungar
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Michael Eugene Brackney, an Infant by Judith C. Brackney, His Guardian Ad Litem and Judith C. Brackney v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., University of Chicago, and John Doe I, John Doe Ii, John Doe Iii, John Doe Iv, John Doe V, John Doe Vi, John Doe Vii, John Doe Viii, John Doe Ix, John Doe X, Richard Dean McKinley Ann Marie Rowell John Michael McKinley and Caroline Irene McKinley v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., and University of Chicago
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1380 (CA9 1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brackney v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1380 (CA9 1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. v. Levitt
unknown court · 1982 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. v. Levitt
unknown court · 1982 · confidence medium
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1981).
discussed Cited "see" Teitelbaum v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development
D. Nev. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Rowe v. United States, 633 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 , 101 S.Ct. 2047 , 68 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981). 2 This exception, however, has been narrowly construed to stand for *330 the proposition that where a contract-related claim rests at the bottom on statutory rights, the District Court can declare the existence of contract rights, but cannot inquire into the content of the parties’ rights.
discussed Cited "see" Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. United States
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See North Side Lumber, 753 F.2d at 1484-85 (Tucker Act is "a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and a limitation on the remedies available in actions on government contracts"). 12 This court observed in two earlier cases involving contract issues that the Tucker Act does not in all instances "preclude review of agency action when the relief sought is other than money damages." Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981); Rowe v. United States, 633 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
discussed Cited "see" South Delta Water Agency v. United States
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
Therefore, it does not preclude review of agency action when the relief sought is other than money damages." Rowe v. United States, 633 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 , 101 S.Ct. 2047 , 68 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981); see Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981). 48 Because South Delta seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, not damages, the Tucker Act does not preclude jurisdiction under section 1331.
discussed Cited "see" South Delta Water Agency v. United States
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
Therefore, it does not preclude review of agency action when the relief sought is other than money damages.” Rowe v. United States, 633 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 , 101 S.Ct. 2047 , 68 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981); see Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited "see" Temistocles Ramirez De Arellano v. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE Sec. 2751 (2d ed. 1983); See Developments in the Law--Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV.L.REV. 787, 787-90, 874 (1949) 138 See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-74 , 91 S.Ct. 764, 766-768 , 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (where state criminal prosecution had begun prior to federal suit, injunctive and declaratory relief had same effect and must be judged by the same standards) 139 See sources cited supra note 137 140 See Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.1981) (district court does not lose jurisdiction simply because its declara…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
LAGUNA HERMOSA CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
B. E. MARTIN Et Al., Defendants-Appellants
79-4257.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
May 1, 1981.
643 F.2d 1376
1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13697
Robert L. Klarquist, Washington, D.C., argued, for defendants-appellants; G. William Hunter, U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., on brief., Maynard Garrison, Garrison, Townsend & Hall, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Hug, Skopil, King.
Cited by 70 opinions  |  Published
SKOPIL, Circuit Judge:

INTRODUCTION

This case reaches us on an appeal by the United States, representing B. E. Martin, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation. The district court entered a declaratory judgment extending the Concession Agreement of Laguna Hermosa Corporation (“Laguna”) with Napa County (“the County”), the United States’ predecessor in interest. The United States claims that the district court lacked jurisdiction, and that the United States could not be estopped on the facts of this case. We affirm.

FACTS

Laguna is a concessionaire providing public use facilities at Lake Berryessa (“the Lake”) in northern California. The Lake was created by the Solano Project undertaken by the Bureau of Reclamation.

In 1958 the United States and the County entered into a management agreement. The agreement authorized the County to administer development of the Lake. The management agreement limited all concession agreements to 20-year terms. In December 1958, Laguna entered into a 20-year Concession Agreement with the County.

The 1958 management agreement proved impractical. Because of the 20-year limit on the concession agreements, the concessionaires were unable to obtain financing. In 1962, the United States and the County executed a superseding management agreement. It provided for 30-year concession agreements, with options for two additional 10-year terms. The ultimate termination date of any such agreement was not to exceed the 50-year term of the management agreement itself.

Laguna and the County agreed to substitute the 1962 management agreement for the 1958 management agreement. This did not extend Laguna’s Concession Agreement. A separate execution of the extension agreement was required. The Lake Berryessa Park Commission approved an extended concession agreement of 30 years[*1378] with two additional 10-year terms for Laguna. Before Laguna sought final approval from the County Board of Supervisors, it learned that the 1962 management agreement was not acceptable to lenders. The United States and the County began negotiating a third management agreement.

The district court found that while the negotiations were underway, both the United States and the County represented, and Laguna understood, that the extended Concession Agreement was available as a matter of course. Based on these representations, Laguna did not execute the offered extended term Agreement. In reliance upon the representations made by the United States and the County, Laguna constructed extensive public use facilities.

In April 1974 the County voted to terminate the second management agreement. Prior to the termination date, Laguna sought to execute the extended term Concession Agreement. The County Board of Supervisors did not object to Laguna’s application, but failed to act because it was terminating its control over concessions at the Lake.

The United States refused to recognize Laguna’s asserted right to the extended term Agreement. Laguna sought and obtained a declaratory judgment estopping the United States to deny Laguna the extended Agreement. This appeal followed. We note jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

ISSUES

1. Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction over Laguna’s request for a declaratory judgment?

2. Did the district court err in estopping the United States to deny Laguna

the benefit of the extended term Concession Agreement?

DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Laguna presented a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) by alleging that B. E. Martin, as the Bureau of Reclamation’s Regional Director, and Robert Wier, as the Bureau of Reclamation’s Recreation Manager at the Lake exceeded their statutory authority. Laguna alleged that they violated the Reclamation Development Act of 1974, Pub.L.No.93-493, §§ 601-02, 88 Stat. 1486, by reassuming management of the Lake from the County without honoring the County’s prior commitments.

The district court’s jurisdiction is limited by sovereign immunity. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953-954, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 769, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). Section 1331(a) does not waive sovereign immunity. The Administrative Procedure Act (“the APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, does waive sovereign immunity in certain cases. Rowe v. United States, 633 F.2d 799, 801 (9th Cir. 1980); Lee v. Blumenthal, 588 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1979); Hill v. United States, 571 F.2d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 1978).

Section 702 of the APA provides, in pertinent part:

“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensible party. The United States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States: PROVIDED, That ... [njothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review where the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equita[*1379] ble ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.”

By its own terms, section 702 does not affect existing limitations on district court jurisdiction. Rowe, supra; Lee, supra. See H. R.Rep.No.1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 6121, 6133; S.Rep.No.996, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976).

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, is a waiver of sovereign immunity antedating the APA. It grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to decide claims “against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States. ...” District courts have concurrent jurisdiction of claims. against the United States for less than $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).

The United States argues that the Tucker Act impliedly forbids the relief sought by Laguna. It contends that Laguna’s claim can only be brought in the Court of Claims, which is not empowered to issue declaratory judgments. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4-5, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502-1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969).

The Tucker Act applies only to claims for money damages. It does not preclude review of agency action when the relief sought is other than money damages. Rowe, 633 F.2d at 802.

In the instant case, Laguna has requested a declaration that it possesses contract rights against the United States. It has not sought money damages for breach of those rights, nor has it sought specific performance. A district court does not lose jurisdiction over a claim for non-monetary relief simply because it may later be the basis for a money judgment. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 71 n.15, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2629 n.15, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 799 (9th Cir. 1980); Glines v. Wade, 586 F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 1978), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Brown v. Glines, 440 U.S. 957, 99 S.Ct. 1496, 59 L.Ed.2d 769 (1980). We need not decide whether either damages or injunctive relief would be available in a district court on these facts. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703-05, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1468-1469, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949); Lee, 588 F.2d at 1282.

Our holding will not undermine the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims’ jurisdiction cannot be avoided by a complaint that appears to seek only equitable relief when “the real effort of the complaining party is to obtain money [in excess of $10,000] from the federal government.” Rowe, supra, quoting from Bakersfield City School District v. Boyer, 610 F.2d 621, 628 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Lee, 588 F.2d at 1283.

The Tucker Act does not impliedly forbid the issuance of a declaratory judgment stating that Laguna possesses contract rights against the United States. The district court possessed jurisdiction to consider the merits of Laguna’s request for declaratory relief.

II. Estoppel.

The district court held that the United States is estopped to deny Laguna the extended term Concession Agreement. The United States contends that it cannot be estopped on the facts of this case.

In its post-trial brief, the United States stated that Laguna’s rights against the County were identical to those against the United States. The United States also conceded that “[t]he course of events between 1962 and 1975 ... concededly presents a classic case for estoppel in favor of plaintiff against the County, but for the legal immunity of the latter.... ” The United States argued only that California law forbids es-topping the County under these circumstances.

[*1380] The United States concedes that the question of whether it can be estopped on the facts of this case depends upon California law. We will uphold the determination of a district judge as to the law of the state in which the district is located unless such determination is clearly wrong. Anderson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 630 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980).

California law permits estoppel against the government where the traditional elements of estoppel are present and where “the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel.” City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal.3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 448, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 (1970). See also Bib’le v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 26 Cal.3d 548, 606 P.2d 733, 736, 162 Cal.Rptr. 426, cert. denied,-U.S.-, 101 S.Ct. 163, 66 L.Ed.2d 77 (1980); Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Mindlin, 106 Cal.App.3d 698, 165 Cal.Rptr. 233, 239-40 (1980).

The United States contends that California’s statutory policy that a county may act only by majority vote of its board of supervisors would be frustrated if an estoppel were raised on these facts. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 23005, 23006, 25005.

California courts have not adopted such an inflexible rule. They have held that failure of a board of supervisors to act does not necessarily preclude estoppel. Advance Medical Diagnostic Laboratories v. County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal.App.3d 263, 275, 129 Cal.Rptr. 723, 729 (1976). The public policy requiring board action has prevented estoppel in cases where the board of supervisors has been bypassed, State v. Haslett Co., 45 Cal.App.3d 252, 119 Cal.Rptr. 78 (1975), and where the board, exercising its discretion, reversed itself. Santa Monica Unified School District v. Persh, 5 Cal.App.3d 945, 85 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1970).

Laguna did not bypass the County Board of Supervisors, nor did the Board change its mind as to executing the extended agreement. The district court found that the Board failed to act “solely because its jurisdiction over the matter was to revert to the United States.” The Board had assumed that the extension was available to Laguna. It only failed to approve the required documents. The United States does not contend that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous.

The statutory policy favoring board of supervisors’ action does not outweigh the injustice which would result from failure to raise an estoppel on the facts of this case. The district court did not err in estopping the United States to deny Laguna an extension of its Concession Agreement on the same terms and conditions and for the same period of time as was afforded to the other concessionaires.

CONCLUSION

The district court had jurisdiction to consider Laguna’s request for declaratory relief against the United States. The district court did not err in estopping the United States to deny Laguna the extended term Concession Agreement. The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.