Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 647 N.E.2d 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). · Go Syfert
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Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 647 N.E.2d 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 5× by 5 distinct cases, last quoted 2009 · (1) knowledge that the primary party's conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tortious act. ✓ Topic ↗
63 citation events (49 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Maurent v. Foley (ohioctapp, 2024-06-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maurent v. Foley
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Accordingly, there was never an opportunity for this Court to decide whether to grant a temporary stay of the trial court’s order of discharge. {¶12} “‘This Court is loath to issue advisory opinions * * *.’” Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 575 (9th Dist.1994), quoting Joreski v. Teeple, 62 Ohio App.3d 712, 716 (1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Schubert
Ohio Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Lorain No. 13CA010393, 2014-Ohio-1332, ¶ 7 ; Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 576 (9th Dist.1994) (declining to address cross-appellant’s assignments of error when it prevailed at trial despite the court’s alleged errors).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lee v. Certainteed Corp.
E.D.N.C. · 2015 · confidence medium
Co. v. Leahey Const. Co., 219 F.3d 519 , 533 (6th Cir. 2000)(quoting Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191-92 (1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blake v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA
S.D. Ohio · 2013 · confidence medium
While the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Ohio had not expressly approved Section 876 of the Restatement, the Court of Appeals noted authority for the proposition that Ohio’s highest court had implicitly recognized the existence of the tort: As the Court of Appeals of Ohio has observed, the state’s highest court “has never expressly approved Section 876....” Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191 (Ohio Ct.App.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Veolia Transportation Services Inc
D.D.C. · 2011 · confidence medium
As noted earlier, “in order to establish aiding and abetting liability, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant provided ‘substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tortious act.’” Aetna, 219 F.3d at 537 (quoting Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 647 N.E.2d 190, 192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) National Railroad Passenger v. Veolia Transportation Services, Inc.
D.D.C. · 2011 · confidence medium
As noted earlier, “in order to establish aiding and abetting liability, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant provided ‘substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tortious act.’ ” Aetna, 219 F.3d at 537 (quoting Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 192 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Unencumbered Assets, Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank
S.D. Ohio · 2009 · confidence medium
Aiding and Abetting 4 The elements of an aiding and abetting claim are: “(1) knowledge that the primary party’s conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tortious act.” Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 574-75 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191-92 (Ohio Ct.App.1994); see also Aetna, 219 F.3d at 533.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc.
S.D. Ohio · 2009 · confidence medium
Aiding and Abetting [4] The elements of an aiding and abetting claim are: "(1) knowledge that the primary party's conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tortious act." Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 574-75 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191-92 (Ohio Ct.App. 1994); see also Aetna, 219 F.3d at 533.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc.
S.D. Ohio · 2009 · confidence medium
The elements of an aiding and abetting claim are: "(1) knowledge that the primary party's conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tortious act." Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 574-75 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191-92 (Ohio Ct.App. 1994); see also Aetna, 219 F.3d at 533 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Unencumbered Assets, Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank
S.D. Ohio · 2009 · confidence medium
The elements of an aiding and abetting claim are: “(1) knowledge that the primary party’s conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tortious act.” Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 574-75 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191-92 (Ohio Ct.App.1994); see also Aetna, 219 F.3d at 533 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc.
S.D. Ohio · 2008 · confidence medium
The elements of an aiding and abetting claim are: “(1) knowledge that the primary party’s conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tor-tious act.” Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 574-75 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191-92 (Ohio Ct.App.1994); see also Aetna Cas. and Sur.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., Investment Litigation
S.D. Ohio · 2007 · confidence medium
Those elements are: “(1) knowledge that the primary party’s conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tortious act.” Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 574-75 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191-92 (Ohio Ct.App.1994); see also Aetna Cas. and Sur.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc.
S.D. Ohio · 2007 · confidence medium
Those elements are: “(1) knowledge that the primary party’s conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substantial assistance or encoui'agement to the primary party in carrying out the tortious act.” Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 574-75 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191-92 (Ohio Ct.App.1994); see also Aetna Cas. and Sur.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Enron Corporation Securities
S.D. Tex. · 2006 · confidence medium
Co. v. Leahey Const. Co., 219 F.3d 519 , 533 (6th Cir.2000), observed that although the Ohio Supreme Court had never expressly adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 876(b), [48] but opined, "[W]e conclude that the Supreme Court of Ohio would recognize aiding and abetting liability if squarely faced with the issue...." Id. at 533, citing Andonian v. AC. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Newby v. Enron Corp.
unknown court · 2006 · confidence medium
Co. v. Leahey Const. Co., 219 F.3d 519 , 533 (6th Cir.2000), observed that although the Ohio Supreme Court had never expressly adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b), 48 but opined, “[W]e conclude that the Supreme Court of Ohio would recognize aiding and abetting liability if squarely faced with the issue....” Id. at 533, citing Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pavlovich v. National City Bank
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Co., 219 F.3d at 532-33 (quoting Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 647 N.E.2d 190, 192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lauren M. Pavlovich v. National City Bank
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Co., 219 F.3d at 532-33 (quoting Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 192 (Ohio App. 9 Dist.1994)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pavlovich v. National City Bank
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Co., 219 F.3d at 532-33 (quoting Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 647 N.E.2d 190, 192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sekerak v. National City Bank
N.D. Ohio · 2004 · confidence medium
“Section 876(b) requires two elements: (1) knowledge that the primary party’s conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substantial assistance or encouragement to *717 the primary party in carrying out the tor-tious act.” Aetna, 219 F.3d at 533 (quoting Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191 (1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pavlovich v. National City Bank
N.D. Ohio · 2004 · confidence medium
“Section 876(b) requires two elements: (1) knowledge that the primary party’s conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tor-tious act.” Aetna, 219 F.3d at 533 (quoting Andonian v. AC. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191 (1994)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Leahey Construction Co.
6th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
As the Court of Appeals of Ohio has observed, the state’s highest court “has never expressly approved Section 876....” Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, N/k/a Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, Plaintiff-Appellee/ (99-3005) v. Leahey Construction Company, Inc., Keybank National Association (Ohio) and Edward Donnelly, (98-4545)/cross-Appellees, Mark J. Elmore and Mark J. Elmore, C.P.A., Inc., Defendants-Appellees/ (99-3006)
6th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
At the outset, Donnelly, KeyBank, and Elmore question whether Section 876(b) is a recognizable cause of action under Ohio law. 84 As the Court of Appeals of Ohio has observed, the state's highest court "has never expressly approved Section 876 . . . ." Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 647 N.E.2d 190, 191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
discussed Cited "see" Pharos Capital Partners, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P. (2×)
S.D. Ohio · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 574 , 647 N.E.2d 190, 191 (Ohio Ct.App.1994) (“Ohio has not definitively adopted this section [Restatement(Second) of Torts § 876] and few Ohio cases have applied it.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Federated Management Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
Bank (Dec. 7, 1995), Franklin App. No. 95APE02-219, unreported, at 8, 1995 WL 723664 ; see, also, *382 Andonian v. A.C. & S., Inc. (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 572, 574 , 647 N.E.2d 190 , 191-192 In summary, although appellants arguably waived the right to assert as error the trial court’s conclusion that Ohio does not recognize a claim for aiding and abetting common-law fraud and the dismissal of the claim on that basis, this court finds that Ohio does not recognize such a claim for relief.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
ANDONIAN Et Al., Appellants,
v.
A.C. & S., INC. Et Al., Appellees
No. 16472..
Ohio Court of Appeals.
Sep 7, 1994.
647 N.E.2d 190
1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4011
A. Russell Smith and R. Bryan Nace, for appellants. Robert Bunda, for appellees.
Cook, Baird, Dickinson.
Cited by 32 opinions  |  Published
Cook, Judge.

Appellants, John Gladman, John Posan, Delmar Pursley, and French Riggins, appeal from a trial court order granting appellee Owens-Illinois, Inc. a directed verdict as to appellants’ concert of action claim. Owens-Illinois cross-appeals, asserting several errors in the trial court’s jury instructions and handling of punitive damages issues. We affirm the directed verdict because appellants fail to show that reasonable minds could come to more than one conclusion on the concert of action claim. We decline to render an advisory opinion on Owens-Illinois’ cross-appeal.

[*574] Appellants are former tire workers who worked at various Summit County rubber plants. They claim that they were exposed to Kaylo, an insulation product, while employed at these plants. They assert that this alleged exposure caused asbestos-related illnesses.

Owens-Corning Fiberglass, Inc. (“Owens-Corning”) currently owns and produces Kaylo. Owens-Corning purchased the rights to Kaylo from Owens-Illinois in 1958. Owens-Illinois developed and patented Kaylo. Owens-Illinois also manufactured and sold Kaylo until 1958; much of this Kaylo was sold to Owens-Corning, which then resold it.

As their sole assignment of error, appellants claim that “[t]he trial court erred in granting [Owens-Illinois’] motion for directed verdict regarding [appellants’] concert of action theory of liability.” Owens-Illinois cross-appeals on five separate issues concerning jury instructions and punitive damages.

I. Appellants’ Concert of Action Claim

Civ.R. 50(A) establishes the standard for reviewing directed verdict motions. The court must construe, but not weigh, the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party and, in order to grant the motion, must find that reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion which is adverse to the nonmoving party. Civ.R. 50(A)(4); Winson v. Fauth (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 738, 740, 580 N.E.2d 44, 46.

Appellants base their argument on Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1979) 315, Section 876. This section is divided into three parts; only part (b) is relevant here. This section states that “[fjor harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he * * * (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself * * *.”

We must first consider whether Ohio recognizes Section 876. Ohio has not definitively adopted this section and few Ohio cases have applied it. The Supreme Court of Ohio has never expressly approved Section 876; however, it has cited this section in two cases. See Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Tobias (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 127, 130-131, 524 N.E.2d 168, 171-173; Allstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Singler (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 27, 30, 43 O.O.2d 43, 45, 236 N.E.2d 79, 81. We need not determine whether Ohio recognizes Section 876 because we conclude that appellants did not prove the elements necessary to sustain a claim under that section.

We next address appellants’ argument concerning the applicability of Section 876 as a basis for liability in this case. Section 876(b) requires two elements: (1) knowledge that the primary party’s conduct is a breach of duty and (2) substan[*575] tial assistance or encouragement to the primary party in carrying out the tortious act. Appellants allege that Owens-Illinois knew of tortious conduct by Owens-Corning through test results showing specific dangers of Kaylo. As for the element of “assisting or encouraging,” appellants cite Owens-Illinois’ role in creating Owens-Corning, its ownership of Owens-Corning stock, its sale of the Kaylo rights to Owens-Corning, and its manufacture of Kaylo boxes for Owens-Corning after selling the rights.

Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of appellants, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding that appellants had not shown that Owens-Illinois knew of Owens-Corning’s allegedly tortious conduct. To support the “knowledge” element, appellants point only to studies, commissioned by Owens-Illinois, which revealed the possibility of illnesses befalling persons working with Kaylo. Importantly, however, these studies contemplated the risks to two types of workers: employees at the point of Kaylo manufacture and employees installing Kaylo. See Plaintiffs Exhibit PX-537 (letter from U.E. Bowes, Owens-Illinois’ Director of Research, to Dr. L.U. Gardner at Saranac Laboratories). This evidence does not permit the conclusion that Owens-Illinois knew or should have known that Kaylo was harmful to persons whose exposure to Kaylo was limited to working in buildings where Kaylo had been installed. Appellants cite no other evidence that establishes the knowledge necessary to support a Section 876 concert of action claim. We therefore conclude that the trial court properly granted Owens-Illinois’ directed verdict motion.

Because we have determined that the directed verdict was supported by the absence of evidence on the knowledge element, we will not examine whether it was also supportable on the element of substantial assistance.

Appellants’ assignment of error is overruled.

II. Owens-Illinois’ Cross-Appeal

Owens-Illinois asserts five errors in its cross-appeal. According to Owens-Illinois, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on appellants’ strict liability design defect theory, in instructing the jury on the consumer expectation test for determining whether the product was defective in design, and in instructing the jury on strict liability failure to warn. Owens-Illinois also argues that in future cases, the trial court should adopt a clear and convincing standard for instruction on punitive damages and should bifurcate trials on the issue of punitive damages amounts.

We decline Owens-Illinois’ invitation to rule on these issues. As we stated in Joreski v. Teeple (1989), 62 Ohio App.3d 712, 716, 577 N.E.2d 419, 421, “[t]his court is loath to issue advisory opinions which do not serve to materially[*576] advance correct disposition of the matter on appeal.” We will not issue a decision which does not affect the case before us. Owens-Illinois prevailed at trial despite the trial court’s alleged errors. Any ruling, therefore, on these issues would not affect this case.

Owens-Illinois’ cross-assignments of error are therefore overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Baird, P.J., and Dickinson, J., concur.