Galloway v. W. Union Tel. Co., 89 S.E. 638 (S.C. 1916). · Go Syfert
Galloway v. W. Union Tel. Co., 89 S.E. 638 (S.C. 1916). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we decline to follow durrett's 70 fair market value rule for the reason that a regularly conducted sale, open to all bidders and all creditors, is itself a safeguard against the evils of private transfers to relatives and favorites”
168 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 51 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Clair v. Northern Kentucky Independent Health District (kyed, 2006-09-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1918 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1918 1972 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Clair v. Northern Kentucky Independent Health District
E.D. Ky. · 2006 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in a procedural due process case under section 1983, the plaintiff must attack the state's corrective procedure as well as the substantive wrong.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc. v. Spitters (In Re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc.)
Bankr. N.D. Cal. · 1994 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
madrid ii
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Barrett v. Commonwealth Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
E.D. Pa. · 1990 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
we decline to follow durrett's 70 fair market value rule for the reason that a regularly conducted sale, open to all bidders and all creditors, is itself a safeguard against the evils of private transfers to relatives and favorites
cited Cited "see" Asquith v. Volunteers of America
D.N.J. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Robinson v. United States, No. 94-1037, 1995 WL 564187 , *3 (D.D.C.
cited Cited "see" The Estate Construction Company v. Miller & Smith Holding Company, Incorporated
4th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (9th Cir.1982), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 66 (1984); Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins.
cited Cited "see" Gantz v. Colonial Central Savings Bank, F.S.B. (In Re Gantz)
D. Wyo. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424, 426 (9th Cir. BAP 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.1984), ce rt. denied, 469 U.S. 833 , 105 S.Ct 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 66 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Estate Construction Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co.
4th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (9th Cir.1982), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 66 (1984); Durrett v. Washington Nat’l Ins.
discussed Cited "see" Hall v. California Department of Corrections
N.D. Cal. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir.1983), reh'g denied, 730 F.2d 466 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) ("in section 1983 damage suits claiming the deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate”).
discussed Cited "see" Plumer v. Maryland
4th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.1983) (Sec. 1983 not violated "[s]o long as a state's damage remedies are not shown to be inadequate in theory or practice--that is, so long as there is no systemic problem with the state's corrective process"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Plumer v. Maryland
4th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.1983) (§ 1983 not violated “[s]o long as a state’s damage remedies are not shown to be inadequate in theory or practice — that is, so long as there is no systemic problem with the state’s corrective process”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Thomas F. Edwards v. Gary Livesay
6th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 125 (1984).
cited Cited "see" In Re Ristich
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Madrid v. Lawyers Title 725 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir., 1984), cert. den. — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 66 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Kjeldahl v. United States (In Re Kjeldahl)
D. Minnesota · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See, In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.) cert. *923 denied — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 66 (1984); In re Reinboldt, 39 B.R. 677 (Bankr.Minn.1983) aff'd sub nom, In re William 39 B.R. 678 (D.Minn.1984).
cited Cited "see" Wright v. National Bank of Stamford
N.D.N.Y. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Silver Bros. Co., Inc.
Bankr. D.N.H. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (BAP 9th Cir.1982), aff'd 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 833 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 66 (1984); In re Rancourt, 153 B.R. 380 (Bankr.D.N.H.1993); In re Stadium Management Corp., 895 F.2d 845 , 847 (1st Cir.1990).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Ben Collins v. John Nagle
6th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id. at 543 , 101 S.Ct. at 1917 ; see also Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Beck v. General Accident Insurance (In Re Hughes & Associates Insurance Agency, Inc.)
Bankr. S.D. Ind. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 66 (1984) (Farris, J., concurring); In re Bundles, 61 B.R. 929, 934 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ind.1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wheless Drilling, New Park Drilling Fluids, Inc. v. Bennett
5th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Madrid v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 66 (1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1981) (Clark, J., dissenting); Alden, Gross & Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals For Solving the Problem, 38 Bus.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Emerald Oil Co.
5th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Madrid v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 , 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 66 (1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1981) (Clark, J., dissenting); Alden, Gross & Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals For Solving the Problem, 38 Bus.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Richard Thorne v. Village of Sanford, Michigan
6th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 125 (1984). 6 The second question, regarding the equal protection violation, is more difficult.
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re Smith
D.D.C. · 1984 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.1980), with In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 125 , 83 L.Ed.2d 66 (1984).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Galloway
v.
Western Union Telegraph Co.
9464.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jul 15, 1916.
89 S.E. 638
1916 S.C. LEXIS 204
Messrs. Miller Lawson , for appellant, cite: Code Civ. Proc., secs. 361, 365, 424; 11 Cyc. 28; 7 R.C.L. 783; 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 626; 165 App. Div. N.Y. 826; 155 S.W. 328 ; 129 La. 825 ; 143 Ky. 480 ; 129 S.W. 376 ; 141 Mo. App. 637 ; 134 App. Div. N.Y. 58; 120 S.W. 1088; 187 Mass. 421 ; 89 S.W. 729; 33 App. Div. N.Y. 136; 25 S.C. 243 ; 45 S.C. 4 ; 41 S.C. 206 ; 44 S.C. 376 ; 22 S.C. 309 ; 43 S.C. 262 ; 79 S.C. 388 ; 47 S.C. 150 . Messrs. Willcox Willcox and S.M. Wetmore , for respondent, cite: As to who is prevailing party: 53 Mo. 328 ; 39 S.C. 463 ; 43 S.C. 262 ; 47 S.C. 163 ; 45 S.C. 4 ; 45 Vt. 531 ; 133 Mass. 587 ; 79 S.C. 389 ; 41 S.C. 206 .
Gary, Gage.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Chief Justice Gary.

[*126] This is an appeal from a taxation of costs. The action was for damages, alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, through the wilful and negligent acts of the defendant in failing to deliver a telegram. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $100 actual damages and $100 punitive damages. On appeal to this Court by the defendant, the judgment of the Circuit Court as to punitive damages was reversed, but as to actual damages it was affirmed. 101 S. C. 159, 85 S. E. 309. The present appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court, which decided that the defendant is entitled to the costs arising out of the appeal to the Supreme Court, on the ground that it was the prevailing party.

The appellant’s attorneys contend that the case of Salley v. Railway, 79 S. C. 388, 60 S. E. 938, is conclusive of the question under consideration. The Court thus states the facts, and its ruling thereon:

“The plaintiff has recovered judgment against defendant, before a magistrate, for $2 damages and $40 statutory penalty for delay in transportation of freight, and this judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court. On appeal to this Court, it was held that Sunday was not to be included in the days for which penalty is allowed, and the Court rendered judgment ‘that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed, with a reduction of $5, the overcharge on the amount found as penalty.’ The question presented is, Which party is entitled to the costs as prevailing party? This is a case at law, and the Court can only affirm or reverse, and has no power to modify as in equity cases. The judgment of this Court, therefore, in terms and in legal effect was substantially a judgment of affirmance. Of course, it cannot be said that the defendant prevailed in reversing the judgment. * * * The judgment in this case, if it is not to be strictly construed as an affirmance of the judgment appealed from, bears analogy to cases at law in[*127] which a new trial nisi has been granted, but judgment to stand affirmed, upon remitting the amount designated by the Court, in which case, if the remittance is made and judgment stands affirmed for the reduced amount, the party whose judgment stands affirmed is the prevailing party, and entitled to costs of appeal.”

In the case just mentioned, the error merely related to the amount of the verdict, and the Court could calculate with mathematical certainty the extent to which it should be reduced; furthermore, the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. In the present case, however, the error was not based upon the amount of the verdict for punitive damages, but upon the ground that there was no testimony whatever tending to sustain it. In other words, the error was fundamental; and the judgment, in so far as it was founded upon punitive damages, was reversed.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Gage, being disqualified, did not participate in the consideration of this case.

Footnote. — As to who is the prevailing party on appeal for the purpose of determining liability to costs, see Burnett v. Johnson, 93 S. C. 316, 76 S. E. 820.